Social Conflict and the Emergence of Norms by Winter, Fabian
Social Conflict
and the
Emergence of Norms
von der Fakulta¨t fu¨r Sozialwissenschaften und Philosophie
der Universita¨t Leipzig
genehmigte
Dissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
doctor rerum politicarum
(Dr. rer. pol.)
vorgelegt von
von Fabian Winter, M.A.
geboren am 10.09.1980 in Hamburg, Deutschland
Gutachter:
Prof. Dr. Thomas Voss (Leipzig)
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Werner Gu¨th (Jena)
Tag der Verleihung: 22. Mai 2012
For my family
Preface
This book is the result of my past four years of thinking about some intriguing
questions on social norms in general and normative conflicts in particular. It all
started off after a long evening of talking and drinking green tea with an old
friend. After he left, I was lying in my bed, restless and unable to sleep because
of the pots of green tea I had hours before. I began to compare all the economic
models of normative behavior I could think off, and realized how many of them
where in contradiction to each other. Later, I came to the conclusion that these
models should be regarded as models for different types of norms, rather than
contradicting models of the same norm.
I owe a lot of my basic views and concepts of social norms to my then-
professor Thomas Voss at the University of Leipzig, who was kind enough to
be the referee of this doctoral thesis and to support me especially in the early
stages of my exploration of the fundamentals of social theory.
During the two and a half years on the way to the doctoral degree, I had the
great opportunity to work in the inspiring atmosphere of the Max Planck Insti-
tute of Economics in Jena. I am very grateful for being given this opportunity
by my supervisor Werner Güth. Moreover, I would like to thank him for the
inspiring discussions on my work and the philosophy of game theory.
Furthermore, I especially would like to thank my co-author Heiko Rauhut,
who has become a good friend and was a great support over the past six years.
We deepened our understanding of the problem of normative conflict in (some-
times endless) discussions. I learned the basics of publishing my work to a
wider audience from him.
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Introduction 
Chapter One
My1 subject, social norms, is a very ordinary one, not to say mundane. In fact,
norms are so present that we rarely even realize how they structure our daily
life. Unnoticed, they shape the ways we eat, drink, dress or even die, and as
long as they successfully guide our expectations about other people’s behavior,
norms serve as a lubricant of social interaction.
In this book, I take a closer look at the crackles, frictions, and hassles in so-
cial interaction that strike us if norms fail to serve as a lubricant and turn into
a fire accelerant instead. These occasional disruptions in our taken for granted
routines all of a sudden remind us of the different and sometimes contradictory
norms existing in our environment: Often on historic, occasionally on reason-
able grounds, norms have become a part of our identity and seeing them vio-
lated makes us feel uneasy. And, as we will see, some of these norm violations
escalate to severe social conflicts.
Let me illustrate the kind of questions I will ask with a small example: The
publication of one’s own work is of utmost importance to many researchers,
as published work can increase the visibility to the peers and shape the au-
thors’ reputation and careers. Bigger research projects, however, depend on the
collaborative work of a group of people rather than only the single “armchair
philosopher”. Left aside many important social psychological questions, inter-
esting sociological questions arise. Who is considered a contributor to the work
and is thus eligible to receive credit for the research? Or who will receive which
part of the credit? Or more to the point: Who will be an author on a publica-
tion and how are the authors ordered? A short look into different branches of
the social sciences reveals at least three different norms. The two psychologists
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky alternated the order of names on their
1 In this chapter as well as in the summary at the end of the book, I will use the form “I” instead
of “we” also when I speak about chapters 2-4, though the chapters are the result of collaborative
work.
1
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publications, often determined by the flip of a coin.2 In economics, on the other
hand, an alphabetical ordering norm dominates where post-doc A would be
the first author and Professor Z the second. As opposed to that, the ordering of
authors in most parts of sociology is determined by the relative contributions
to the work, such that hard-working Professor Z would be the first author and
lazy Professor Y would be second.
The co-existence of several publication-norms is of course not a problem as
such. As long as every researcher stays in his or her discipline, no difficulties
should emerge. But how do researchers settle in inter-disciplinary research if
there is only one first-authorship? And do they settle at all or do they sacrifice
the potential gains of cooperation due to their conflicting views on the question
of authorship?
At this point, it seems necessary to make a distinction between two different
types of norms I will address later: Cooperation norms on the one hand and
norms of distributive justice on the other. Cooperation norms are one impor-
tant means to overcome individual self-interest in order to achieve efficiency
gains, whereas norms of distributive justice are more ambivalent. "Coopera-
tion is at stake in social dilemmas such as the protection of scarce natural re-
sources from overexploitation or my authorship-example from above, to name
just a few. What constitutes the dilemma here is an incentive structure which
makes individual free riding on the goodwill of others an attractive individ-
ual choice, notwithstanding unintended costs of devastating collective con-
sequences. Widespread free riding puts everybody, particularly the free-rider
himself, in a worse-off situation as compared to mutual cooperation. The con-
trol social norms exert on the individual through a sanctioning system, be it
by the peers or internalized, is often regarded a sufficient condition to ensure
cooperation and consequently efficiency.
As opposed to cooperation norms, norms of distributive justice do not nec-
essarily lead to efficiency gains in terms of material outcomes, and thus should
be treated separately. In some situations they are virtually the cause of efficiency
losses. Think for instance of the ultimatum game (Güth et al. 1982) and its vari-
ants, which I will rely on in the later chapters on fairness norms. In the ulti-
matum game, two players bargain over a given amount of money. One player
makes a proposal how to split the money, while the other player can only accept
or reject this offer. If the second player accepts, the money is paid out accord-
ing to player one’s proposal, if the offer is rejected, the money is lost. From a
neo-classical point of view, the solution by backward induction is trivial: Ac-
ceptance is always at least as good as rejection, such that the first player can
keep all the money as player two will never reject. Social norms, however, sub-
2 New York Times, November 5th, 2002
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stantially change the game. If concerns for fairness enter the game, player one
can not rely on the assumption that player two never rejects anymore: Offering
a very low share may be perceived as violating a social norm, which in turn can
be punished by player two by rejecting the offer. The resulting loss of money
can be regarded a loss of (material) efficiency due to existing fairness norms.
Normative conflict over cooperation norms
How do fairness norms affect the emergence of different
cooperation norms?
Chapter two starts from an orthodox rational choice perspective on the emer-
gence of cooperation norms in social dilemma situations. Social norms are mod-
eled as equilibria in infinite, but discounted games (see for instance Voss 2001).
Consequently, normative conflict should be seen as a conflict about how to dis-
tribute the fruits of cooperation. Unlike most of the existing literature on so-
cial dilemmas, the study presented here investigates cooperation in asymmetric
rather than symmetric games. Given the (material) incentive structure of these
kind of games, all players involved would like to overcome the free-riding prob-
lem, but would prefer different cooperation norms to be applied, according to
their position in the game. The difficulty is not only to cooperate, but also to
coordinate on ways of cooperation. Interestingly, the games studied here have
several cooperative and equally efficient, but pay-off asymmetric equilibria. In
this chapter I will address the influence of fairness norms on the equilibrium
selection process of norm emergence. I will argue, and substantiate my claim
with experimental data, that fairness norms predict the emerging norms much
better than simple game theoretical models do.
Normative conflict over norms of distributive fairness?
Chapters three, four, and five are concerned with social norms of fairness. All
three chapters have in common that their theoretical reasoning does not assume
a strictly neoclassical ‘representative agent’ but takes into account the hetero-
geneity of social actors. Is this a problem for a social theory? I believe that there
are good arguments in favor of accounting for heterogeneity in our theories.
First of all, there is very robust experimental evidence for the existence of dif-
ferent types of agents. Needles to say that homo sapiens and homo economicus are
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different species, homo sapiens not being capable of calculating equilibria in the
complex games we play in our daily lives. But empirical evidence has shown
that not only do people not act fully rational, they also strive for different goals.
Accepting the differences in norms and preferences should be a question of sci-
entific honesty. Moreover, these differences should be explicitly modeled and
their consequences rigorously explored in our theoretical reasoning. As I will
try to show later, the explicit modeling of different types can produce intrigu-
ing testable hypotheses.
How can we measure social norms of justice?
Chapter three develops a descriptive measure of social norms of justice. Given
the importance of social norms for our daily lives, their measurement plays a
pivotal role in many social sciences. This chapter makes some effort to integrate
both theoretical and methodological reasoning in sociology and economics.
From the sociological point of view, the economists’ concept of social norms of-
ten underestimates the importance of the degrees of conditionality, the levels of
consensus in the population, and the intensity of the norm (Jasso and Opp 1997).
On the methodological side, sociologists and economists disagree about the rel-
ative importance of internal and external validity. While economists predomi-
nantly conduct experiments, sociologists rather employ (factorial) surveys. Both
methods, however, suffer from distinct weaknesses. Experiments, on the one
hand, often fall short in the measurement of more complex elements, such as
the conditionality or the level of consensus of social norms. Surveys, on the
other hand, lack the ability to measure actual behavior. This chapter argues that
the so-called “strategy method” compensates for both weaknesses, by measur-
ing both conditionality and consensus of fairness norms that account for indi-
vidaul effort. To substantiate this claim, I present a methodological experiment
comparing results for the strategy ultimatum game with those from a “conven-
tional” ultimatum game (Güth et al. 1982).
How can we model and elicit normative conflict?
Normative conflict adds yet another level to the issue of fairness norms. Even
if people behave according to a social norm, their respective norm may prescribe
completely different, sometimes contradicting actions. Chapter four develops
a general game theoretical model of “normative conflict” and explains how
transaction failures on the macro-level can result from cooperative motives on
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the micro-level. This chapter lays out the core theory of normative conflict, in
which I differentiate between two different kinds of conflict. The first results
from distinct expectations regarding the specific ways in which general norma-
tive obligations should be fulfilled, the second stems from distinct expectations
regarding how strong the norm should restrain the individual self-interest. I
take a preference-based modeling approach, inspired by models like those de-
veloped by (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) or (Bicchieri 2006). The main argument is
that people have some idea about what constitutes “good behavior”, and to
what degree deviance from this norm is acceptable. Conflict is likely to emerge
if content of or commitment to the social norms differ between the interacting
partners, cooperative intentions notwithstanding. I will spell out the effects and
reasons of normative conflicts in more detail and test the predictions derived
from the model in an ultimatum game experiment to demonstrate the empirical
relevance of normative conflict.
How do norms evolve through normative conflict?
Subsequently, chapter five develops a radically different, sociological approach.
I will argue that social norms should be understood as social constructs; the
social in social norms is crucial to an adequate understanding of social norms.
They should be considered as fait sociaux that guide our ways for some time,
but are adaptive in nature when we interact with other people. As opposed to
the neoclassical repair program which models norms as hardwired preferences
like in the previous chapter, chapter five proposes a novel theory in which the
emergence of norms can be understood as the outcome of negotiations. Trans-
action failure resulting from normative conflict spark off a bargaining process
which eventually culminates in the emergence of a new norm. The theory is,
at its heart, a macro-micro-macro process. It includes structural elements such
as norms and situational aspects at the macro-level, but also interactional as-
pects like transaction failures at the meso-level, and internalized norms and
belief-updating processes at the micro level. Most importantly, we consider the
complexity of a situation to predict the complexity of the evolving norm, which
turns out to be an inverse u-shaped relationship. The theory is tested in a dy-
namic experiment on conflicts over the consideration of equality, effort or effi-
ciency for the distribution of joint earnings.
Fairness norms can explain the emergence of specific
cooperation norms in the Battle of the Prisoners Dilemma
Chapter two
The problem of social order as well as the consequences of social inequalities
have been a corner stone of sociological thought since the early days of the dis-
cipline. While the diversity of actors and their interests has been widely recog-
nized, the lion share of attention in the Rational Choice literature has focussed
on explaining cooperation among symmetric actors on the one hand and social
inequalities on the other. With the dominating focus on symmetric actors, how-
ever, important insights on solutions to asymmetric games have been neglected
(de Jasay et al. 2004).1
In this paper, we will shed light on the interaction between fairness norms,
social inequality and the emergence of cooperation norms (see also Aksoy and
Weesie 2009). We contribute to the existing literature by explicitly investigating
the predictive power of fairness norms on the emergence of different coopera-
tion norms. In this context, asymmetric games are particularly suited to model
the existence of social inequality, which can lead to intriguing problems such
as the emergence of normative conflict (Winter et al. forthcoming, Miller et al.
2011, Nikiforakis et al. 2011). This type of conflict exists not because people fail
to overcome a cooperation problem, but because they cannot agree on which
norms should guide their behavior in order to overcome their collective obsta-
cles. If we think of common fate problems, for instance the conflict of interest
between a firm and its workers, we can easily imagine this situation. Both the
owner of the firm and the worker usually have an interest in a flourishing com-
pany. However, while the principal wants low wages and a high effort level,
the employees would prefer the opposite. Though norms are likely to emerge
1 There are important differences in the kind of asymmetries that actors face such as the roles of
leaders and followers or the access to information, to name just a few. Due to space restrictions,
this paper will solely focus on social inequalities as an asymmetry in material well-being.
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in these situations as well, the respective content of the norm has to be negoti-
ated.
The experimental literature on asymmetric dilemmas has mainly focussed
on the study of N -person public goods problems. In these games, every mem-
ber of a group of players can decide to invest into a beneficial common project,
which will then be distributed among all the players, including those who did
not invest at all. Not investing, however, is usually a dominant strategy, which
leads everybody worse-off as compared to global investment.2. Different forms
of social inequality have been investigated in this context with mostly incon-
clusive results, such as different initial wealth levels leading to more resp. less
cooperation (van Dijk and Wilke 1995, Chan et al. 1996, Buckley and Croson
2006, Kroll et al. 2007) or different marginal benefit from the public good lead-
ing to more resp. less cooperation (Glöckner et al. 2011, Reuben and Riedl 2011).
All these studies have in common that global efficiency is always at odds with
a fair outcome: Full contribution to the public good necessarily leaves some
actors better of than others. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of experi-
mental studies investigates cooperation problems under a finite horizon, often
accompanied by some form of a sanctioning mechanism (for seminal papers on
off-equilibrium punishment see Yamagishi (1986), Ostrom et al. (1992) and for
a study on equilibrium punishment see Bruttel et al. (2009)).
This paper takes a different modeling approach to the cooperation problem.
Instead of only one efficient cooperative solution, there will be cases where sev-
eral efficient cooperative equilibria are feasible, but only a subset of those are
fair in the sense that they balance the monetary outcomes for all players. In what
follows, we will shortly review how the cooperation problem can be overcome
in indefinitely repeated games (section 2.1 ). Section 2.2 introduces a general
two-person game of asymmetric preferences and discusses how a cooperation
problem could be solved if the actors coordinate on a shared norm. Section 2.3
derives hypotheses on the level of cooperation and on the evolving norms by
means of game theory and fairness norms (section 2.4 ). Section 2.5 introduces
our experimental design, section 2.6 presents the results and section 2.7 con-
cludes.
2 There are a few exceptions where at least one member has a dominant strategy to invest,
see Marwell and Ames (1979) for a sociological and Reuben and Riedl (2011) for an economic
contribution.
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2.1 Solving the cooperation problem in repeated interactions
The demand for social norms in repeated dilemma situations has extensively
been studied in the theoretical Rational Choice literature (Ullmann-Margalit
1977, Coleman 1990). The effect of infinite or indefinite horizons on the emer-
gence of cooperation norms, however, has largely been neglected by the ex-
perimentalists (see Gonzalez et al. (2005) and Bruttel et al. (2007) for some ex-
ceptions). This is surprising, as many game theoretical solutions to the coop-
eration problem rely on the assumption that we face an infinite, or at least in-
definite horizon (Taylor 1976, Bicchieri 1990, Ellickson 1991, Voss 2001). In fact,
our working definition of social norms relies on the fact that they emerge in
repeated interactions:
Definition 2.1. (Social Norm)
A social [cooperation] norm is a regularity R in a population P such that
R arises in recurrent interactions among the agents of population P
almost every member of P prefers to conform to R on the condition that
almost every other member of P also conforms to R
almost every member of P believes that almost every other member of P
conforms to R
R is a Nash equilibrium of the recurrent interaction. (Voss (2001:108), [brack-
ets added])
The theoretical possibility of cooperation gains emerges from the fact that
norm breaking behavior can be reciprocated in future interactions (Gouldner
1960). The Prisoners Dilemma (PD, top left of figure 2.1 on page 11) models such
a symmetric cooperation problem among two players, both having a dominant
strategy to defect, which results in a socially undesired state of mutual defec-
tion. If the game is played repeatedly, the question here is how to surmount the
players’ myopic self-interest in order to achieve a mutually beneficial long-term
cooperation. From a Rational Choice perspective, mere repetition of the PD does
not solve the issue: Even in the finitely repeated PD, backward induction forces
rational players into ruinous defection.
It is crucial, however, that the critical interactions are embedded in an indef-
initely long repeated context. And in fact, many of our daily interactions are:
We know that they will stop one day in the future, but we rarely know when
exactly this day will come. This uncertainty about the shadow of the future gives
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rise to a whole class of social norms which can pareto-improve the outcome of
the social dilemma.3
A long shadow of the future enables the actors to punish norm violations by
doing as they are done by: Defection in one period can be repaid by defection
in one or more subsequent periods. The most severe punishment strategies are
triggered by a singular defection of one player, which leads to eternal defection
by the other. We refer to this strategy as GRIM.
Definition 2.2. (GRIM)
A GRIM strategy for repeated games reacts to a single defection with eternal
defection.
It should be intuitively clear that GRIM makes norm breaking behavior ex-
tremely, though the size of the threat depends to a large extent on the likelihood
δ that players attach to the event of playing another period.4 The higher the
actors evaluate the chances that they will meet again and the longer the time
of punishment, the better the chances for cooperation. In this line of reasoning,
GRIM sets the lower limit of the threat level. If the emergence of cooperation
norms is not individually rational between actors using GRIM, it is not individ-
ually rational between actors using any other strategy (Abreu 1988).
Lemma 2.1. (Equilibria in PD (Axelrod 1984))
Mutual cooperation is a Nash equilibrium in the iterated PD for a pair of GRIM strate-
gies and a discount parameter δ if
δ >
T −R
T − P
Proof: See appendix A.
Note that this result was shown for the classical PD, which is a symmetric
game. Both players have aligned interests in switching from (D,D) to (C,C).
As we have pointed out already in the introduction, this need not be the case in
a more general framework.
3 By formalizing the folk theorem, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) can show that any sequence
of actions can be supported by a Nash equilibrium in the infinitely repeated game without
discounting. This seems rather farfetched in the context of social norms. It would translate into
arbitrarily complex norms which lead to patterns of action that can last over a large number of
interactions.
4 In this paper, we use the two concepts of uncertainty about future interactions and the dis-
counting of future gains as compared to present ones interchangeably. Usually, discounting is
applied to solve infinite games, whereas a fixed termination probability makes a game indefinite.
Note that discounting can also take place in indefinite games (Vogt and Weesie 2004).
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2.2 Solving the “coordinate to cooperate” problem in repeated
interaction
As we have already pointed out earlier, cooperation problems often do not only
face the problem of defection, but also the question of how to coordinate the
distribution of mutual benefits. We model this game as a generalization of the
PD, flexible enough to capture symmetric as well as asymmetric solutions to the
cooperation problem. Depending on the parametrization, This new game can
have egalitarian equilibria as well as asymmetric solutions, leaving one player
worse off. We will discuss the game shortly in general terms and introduce a
parametrization which combines elements of the PD and the Battle of the Sexes
game (see the top right side of figure 2.1. This new game will consequently be
termed the Battle of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (BOPD, see the bottom of figure
2.1).
The stage game of BOPD we will discuss here has the general pay-off rela-
tions T > a, b, c, d > P > S and T > α, β, γ, θ > P > S. The strategy combi-
nation (D,D) is the unique Nash equilibrium, but this equilibrium is pareto-
dominated by some combination of C1 and C2, which constitutes the social
dilemma. If we assume a = b = c = d and α = β = γ = θ, the BOPD col-
lapses to a PD with two instead of only one C-choice, so that the result from
lemma 2.1 still holds.
2.2 .1 The coordination problem
There are several ways how two players could cooperate in this kind of games,
but only few of them are theoretically feasible and still sufficiently simple to
assume that they could reasonably emerge. We therefore concentrate on the two
behavioral norms of cooperation in pure strategies and the norm of turn-taking.
Let us shortly focus on the C1 and C2 options of BOPD, which constitute a
Battle of the Sexes game if we assume that α > θ > β, γ and d > a > b, c. Both
players have an incentive to coordinate, either on C1, C1 or on C2, C2. However,
while the row player prefers C1, C1, the column player would like to coordi-
nate on C2, C2. Moreover, either of the two possibilities would make one player
worse-off than the other. Obviously, coordination is a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies, yielding the pay-off
pipure =
min(a, θ), to the worse-off player, andmax(d, α), to the better-off player. (2.1)
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Fig. 2.1. The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD, top left), the Battle of the Sexes (BoS, top right),
the general Battle of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (BOPD, bottom left), and an exemplary
parametrization of the BOPD (bottom right). In BOPD, the C option of the PD is sub-
stituted by two new options C1 and C2 containing a BoS.
There exists another equilibrium in correlated strategies. In the absence of
an exogenous signaling mechanism, this equilibrium is not feasible in the the
stage game. In repeated games, however, subjects can endogenously “signal
to each other via their choice patterns on previous plays. Introspectively, we
would suspect that, after some preliminary jockeying, the players would settle
on a pattern of alternation”(Luce and Raiffa 1989:94). If both players manage to
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coordinate on jointly alternating between C1 and C2, this turn-taking yields an
expected pay-off of
pic =

a+ d
2
, to the row player, and
α + θ
2
, to the column player.
(2.2)
The correlated equilibrium’s outcome is always between the two outcomes
in pure strategies.5 Note that all cooperative equilibria in BOPD are pay-off
asymmetric in the one-shot game. The cooperative pure strategies equilibria,
however, are pay-off asymmetric even in the repeated game, while the corre-
lated strategies can be symmetric, depending on the pay-off matrix.
2.2 .2 Feasible norms in the Battle of the Prisoners Dilemma
Under which conditions can these different equilibria emerge as norms in the
Battle of the Prisoners Dilemma? Remember that GRIM sets the shadow of the
future’s lower bound by immediately reacting on norm breaking behavior. We
could, however, think of more complex GRIM-strategies, which do not simply
react on a deviation from C, but rather on the deviation from a cooperative pat-
tern, such as turn-taking.
Definition 2.3. (GRIM*)
A GRIM* strategy reacts on any deviation from a cooperative pattern with eter-
nal defection, where a cooperative pattern is some combination ε of moves in at
least one instance of a super-game.
The GRIM*-strategy sets the shadow of the future’s lower bound for coop-
erative strategies other than pure cooperation. We can apply the same analysis
5 There exists an additional equilibrium in mixed strategies, but we will refrain from the discus-
sion of the mixed strategy as a candidate for a social norm implausibility reasons. The mixed
strategy equilibrium requires that players to mix their strategies such that the other player is in-
different between playing C1 and C2. Players calculate an optimal mixing proportion between
the two actions as a function of the other player’s pay-off:
p =

d− b
a− b+ d− c , for the row player, and
θ − γ
α− β + θ − γ , for the column player,
(2.3)
The expected pay-off from the mixed equilibrium is always below the pay-off obtained from
pure strategies, even if a player happens to accept the worse option, but it is a save option, as it
gives the same expected pay-off independent of the other player’s action.
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as for the PD and calculate the lower bound by taking the expected long term
outcome of the cooperative pattern as the benchmark:
Lemma 2.2. (Equilibria in BOPD)
Let pi∗(ε) be player i’s expected pay-off from some combination ε of moves in at least one
instance of a super-game of BOPD games. Then ε is a Nash equilibrium in the iterated
BOPD for a pair of GRIM* strategies if
∀i : δ > T − pi
∗
T − P .
Proof: See appendix A.
The possibility of cooperation depends exclusively on the discount factor
and the worse-off player’s temptation to defect. Even if the better-off player
would prefer to cooperate at a given discount factor, this cannot be an equi-
librium if the other player has an incentive to defect. Equation 2.4 reports the
respective worse-off player’s pay-offs for different cooperation norms in BOPD:
pi∗ =
{
min(pip), pure strategies
min (pic), turn-taking
(2.4)
If the repeated gains from mutual cooperation can outweigh the temptation
of a singular exploitation, it can be rational to stick to the cooperative solution
than to risk the unpleasant impact of defections.
Note that lemma 2.2 can also be applied to the PD. If we assume (T +S)/2 >
R, turn-taking yields a higher long-run pay-off in PD as compared to coopera-
tion in pure C-strategies. The critical discount factor δ for this cooperative norm
is thus given by
δ >
T − T+S
2
T − P >
T −R
T − P , (2.5)
which is a shorter shadow of the future than the one necessary for coopera-
tion in pure strategies.
2.3 Hypothesis on the emergence of cooperation norms
We will now propose a parametrization for the PD and the BOPD in order
to derive hypothesis which we will later test in an experiment. Figure 2.1 on
11 shows four different games, the symmetric and asymmetric PD (top row)
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and the symmetric and asymmetric BOPD (bottom row). The pay-off symmet-
ric game can be transformed to the pay-off asymmetric game by adding 10 to
the row-player’s pay-offs in the Ci-cells. In the PD, the pay-off from pure C-
strategies is 40 (or 50 for the better-off player in the asymmetric PD), which is
below or equal to the expected gains from turn-taking betweenC andD, return-
ing (100 + 0)/2 = 50. This gives rise to an efficient equilibrium in turn-taking
strategies also in the symmetric as well as the asymmetric PD.
Consider now the BOPD in bottom row of figure 2.2. Here, coordinating
on the C1, C1 yields a pay-off of 80(50) to the row(column)-player, while C2, C2
yields the reversed pay-off of 50(80). Thus, coordinating on a pure C1, C1 or
C2, C2 equilibrium is efficiency enhancing but lets one player always worse-off
as compared to other. In contrast to that, jointly alternating between both cells
will equalize the pay-offs after every even period in the symmetric BOPD, re-
turning (50+80)/2. Moreover, turn-taking can minimize the pay-off differences
even in the asymmetric BOPD as it yields (60+90)/2=75 to the row-player and
(50+80)/2=65 to the column-player, which is less than the minimal difference in
pure strategies of 20. Note that coordination on one cell as well as joint alterna-
tion are socially efficient, such that the only question here is how to distribute
the surplus.
The table in figure 2.2 reports critical discount factors δ for the emergence of
different cooperation norms. These discount factors are regarded necessary but
not sufficient conditions for the emergence of cooperation. Moreover, they can
also tell us which norms are likely to emerge under different pay-off structures.
Asymmetric pay-offs, for instance, have a positive effect on the emergence of
a pure (C2, C2) norm in the BOPD, as the discount factor falls from δ = .71 to
δ = .5. The same reasoning leads us to predict a positive effect of the shadow
of the future on the emergence of pure strategy norms. We can now derive hy-
pothesis about the ways people cooperate in symmetric and asymmetric social
dilemmas.
Hypothesis 1 (Games)
There is more
a cooperation in the BOPD as compared to the PD.
b turn-taking in the BOPD as compared to the PD.
c pure strategy behavior in the BOPD as compared to the PD.
Hypothesis 2 (Shadow of the future)
A long shadow of the future has
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symmetric 2×2 PD asymmetric 2×2 PD
necessary equilibrium for necessary equilibrium for
strategy δ δ = .7 δ = .9 δ δ = .7 δ = .9
pure (C,C) .85 – + .85 – +
turn-taking .71 + + .71 + +
symmetric 3× 3 BOPD asymmetric 3× 3 BOPD
necessary equilibrium for necessary equilibrium for
strategy δ δ = .7 δ = .9 δ δ = .7 δ = .9
pure (C1, C1) .71 – + .71 – +
pure (C2, C2) .71 – + .57 + +
turn-taking .5 + + .5 + +
Fig. 2.2. Four different social dilemmas investigated in the experiment. The symmetric
Prisoner’s Dilemma (top left), the asymmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma (top right), the symmet-
ric 3×3 Battle of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (bottom left) and the asymmetric 3×3 Battle of
the Prisoner’s Dilemma. All games are dilemmas, as mutual defection (D,D) is a domi-
nant strategy. The BOPD extends the PD by a Battle of the Sexes game in the cells C1
and C2 if actors want to move from mutual defection towards some form of cooperation.
The symmetric game can be transformed to the asymmetric game by adding 10 to the
row-player’s pay-offs in the C-cells. Necessary discount factors δ for different strategies
to be an equilibrium in the four games .
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a a positive effect on the emergence of cooperation in the BOPD and a positive
effect in PD.
b no effect on the emergence of turn-taking in the BOPD and no effect in the PD.
c a positive effect on the emergence of pure strategy norms in BOPD and positive
effect in PD.
Hypothesis 3 (Asymmetry)
Asymmetric pay-offs have
a a positive effect on the emergence of cooperation in the BOPD and no effect in
PD.
b no effect on the emergence of turn-taking in the BOPD and no effect in the PD.
c a positive effect on the emergence of pure strategy norms in BOPD and no effect
in PD.
2.4 Fairness norms as a predictor for the emergence of different
cooperation norms.
In addition to the cooperation problem, the players in the games investigated
here face an allocation problem. Evidently, cooperation can lead to efficiency
gains in the BOPD as well as in the PD. As the pay-offs are asymmetric, how-
ever, the fruits of cooperation can be distributed in different ways. How can
fairness-norms deepen our understanding of the emergence of specific cooper-
ation norms?
An important contribution to solve these question has been put forth by a
stream of literature on “social preferences” or fairness norms (Rabin 1993, Fehr
and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). In this line of thought, individ-
ual utility does not only arise from material outcomes, but additionally from
the comparison of own and other people’s pay-offs. Depending on the respec-
tive value subjects assign to each of these parameters, some subjects exclusively
maximize their own pay-offs (individualistic maximizers), minimize the dis-
tance between the own and the other player‘s pay-off (prosocial), maximize the
distance between the own and the other player‘s pay-off (competitive), or the
other player’s outcome (altruists). As maximizers and prosocials are the most
common types (Murphy et al. 2011), we focus exclusively on these two.6
6 A frequently discussed model of such a utility function was proposed by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), which has the following form:
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Hypothesis 4 (Fairness norms)
As compared to individualistic maximizers, the emergence of
a cooperation is positively affected by fairness norms.
b turn-taking norms is positively affected by fairness norms.
c pure strategy norms is not affected by fairness norms.
Although cooperation helps both types to maximize their earnings, individ-
ualistic types are probably more tempted to play the dominant strategy of defec-
tion, as they would not want to risk to leave with the sucker’s pay-off. Hence,
subjects adhering to fairness norms can be expected to cooperate more than
individualistic types. Similarly, as prosocials derive utility from balanced pay-
offs, turn-taking can be expected to be more prominent among them. Finally,
pure strategy norms have different effects for different games and asymme-
tries on prosocial types, also depending on their commitment to the norm. They
would for instance prefer cooperation over defection in the symmetric PD, but
for sufficiently large fairness concerns defection over cooperation in the asym-
metric case. We consequently predict similar probabilities for the emergence of
pure strategy norms between individualistic and prosocial types.
2.5 Methods
We designed a lab experiment in order to test the predictions derived for the
four games discussed in table 2.2. The experiment was conducted in an in-
centive compatible manner using the z-Tree software developed by Fischbacher
(2007). Our experimental subjects were 240 undergraduate students from a large
European university, recruited from a wide range of academic disciplines with
the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner 2004). 93 subjects were male and
247 female.
Ui(x) = xi − αimax [xj − xi, 0]− βimax [xi − xj , 0] ,
where xi is the player’s pay-off, xj is the other player’s pay-off, αi is a parameter of “envy”
and βi a parameter of “guilt”. The parameters αi and βi are usually assumed to be positive,
which restricts the model to prosocials and maximizers. Altruists could be modeled by assum-
ing negative values for α, as they actually derive utility from the other person being better-off.
Conversely, competitive types derive utility from other people being worse-off, which could be
modeled by a negative βi. See also Tutic and Liebe (2009) for a related modeling approach and
Aksoy and Weesie (2009) for a model and experimental evidence.
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2.5 .1 Experimental design
We employed a 2× 2× 2 factorial between subjects design in which we manip-
ulated the shadow of the future (δ = .7 and δ = .9), the asymmetry between
pay-offs for the players (pay-off symmetric and asymmetric players) and the
coordination problem (2× 2 PD and 3× 3 BOPD, for an overview see figure 2.2
and table 2.1).
Treatment Game Symmetric/Asymmetric Discount Factor N
2×2SymLow PD symmetric .7 30
2×2SymHigh PD symmetric .9 30
2×2AsymLow PD asymmetric .7 30
2×2AsymHigh PD asymmetric .9 30
3×3SymLow BOPD symmetric .7 30
3×3SymHigh BOPD symmetric .9 30
3×3AsymLow BOPD asymmetric .7 30
3×3AsymHigh BOPD asymmetric .9 30
Table 2.1. Treatment Conditions
Before the experiment, the instructions were presented on the computer
screen7, and were intended to familiarize the subjects with the game matrix and
the concept of the shadow of the future (figure A.1 in appendix A was presented
to the subjects to illustrate the prospect of future interactions). Subjects had to
answer some control questions in order to assure that everybody understood
the setup of the experiment. See Appendix 1.3 for the instructions.
2.5 .2 Phase 1: Social dilemma game
In phase 1 of the experiment, every subject played four super-games with con-
stant discount factor, asymmetry and coordination problem. After every super-
game the subjects were rematched to another parter they had not played with
before, and who had not played with anyone the subject had played with be-
fore. A super-game consisted of several repetitions of the same game until a
random draw terminated the game with a probability of 1 − δ. The subjects
were informed in the instructions that a game could alternatively be terminated
if it takes “too long”, which luckily was never necessary. The subjects had to
7 We used the software E-nstructions, see Schmelz (2010)
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choose between three resp. two different options presented as a normal form
game. We presented the games such that the experimental subject always had
to make their decisions as the row player and that the cooperative option with
the highest pay-off was in the upper left cell. Subjects received feedback about
the decisions of both players as well as a history of previous decisions in the
same super-game.
2.5 .3 Phase 2: Social value orientation
In phase 2 of the experiment, we elicited social value orientation using the so-
cial value orientation slider measure (see Murphy et al. (2011) for a very detailed
discussion and Rauhut and Winter (2010) for a different approach on measuring
fairness norms). This device is a measure to distinguish between very different
kinds of motivations, such as altruistic, prosocial, individualistic, or competi-
tive norms. It can be regarded a derivative of the ring measure introduced by
Liebrand and McClintock (1988), yet it is less prone to inconsistent choices. The
subjects were asked to play a series of dictator games between themselves and
some other person in the room they have not interacted with before, which al-
lows us to classify them into types. Figure 2.3 gives an overview about alloca-
tion decisions the subjects where facing. After they had submitted their deci-
sions, one of the allocations of one of the two interacting players was chosen for
payment. The results of this task will be presented elsewhere.
In order to prevent hedging across games, subjects where payed only one
super-game from phase 1 plus the outcome of phase 2.
2.6 Results
2.6 .1 Patterns of cooperation
We start our analysis with a qualitative look on the data in figure 2.4. The left
column depicts interactions in the 2×2 Prisoner’s Dilemma, the right column
interactions from the 3×3 Battle of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the top row the
subjects coordinated on turn-taking, either betweenC,D andD,C in the normal
PD, or between C1, C1 and C2, C2 in the BOPD. In fact, if subjects manage to
cooperate over a long time horizon, turn-taking is relatively common in the
2×2 PD game as we will see later. The reason for that may be that alternating
yields an average pay-off of 50 ECU per period, whereas pure C,C play yields
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Murphy, Ackermann & Handgraaf (2010) DRAFT v0.6 Measuring SVO
olution score to a nominal category may be desirable in some cases, and Slider angles can be trans-
formed into corresponding categories with ease.
It can be shown that the resulting angle for a perfect altruist would be 61.39◦. A prosocial DM
with inequality aversion would yield an angle of 37.48◦. A prosocial DM who endeavored to maximize
joint gain (and is inequality tolerant) would yield an angle between 37.09◦ and 52.91◦. The reason5
for this range is that this DM would be wholly indifferent across the entire SVO Slider item that has
a slope of -1 (e.g. the item with endpoints 100,50 and 50,100) as it has a constant sum. A perfectly
consistent individualist yields an angle between -7.82◦ and 7.82◦. The reason for this range is that this
particular DM would be wholly indifferent across the entire SVO Slider item that has an undefined
slope (endpoints 85, 85 and 85, 15). A perfectly consistent competitor yields an angle of -16.26◦. Given
Figure 8: This figure shows where in the self/other allocation plane the six primary items are from the
Slider Measure.
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the angles that result from idealized SVO types, proper boundaries between categories can be derived.
Altruists would have an angle greater than 57.15◦; prosocials would have scores between 22.45◦ and
57.15◦; individualists would have scores between -12.04◦ and 22.45◦; and competitive types would
have an angle less than -12.04◦. As it can be seen, these boundaries are not at intuitive locations. The
reason for this is that the Slider Measure only uses a subset of possible items from the allocation plane15
and these items are not symmetrically distributed around the whole of the ring. Because only an
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Murphy, Ackermann & Handgraaf (2010) DRAFT v0.6 Measuring SVO
Figure 9: This figure shows the location of the nine secondary items for the Slider Measure in the
self/other allocation plane.
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select which SVO me sures to use (Sli primary items and/or Slider secondary items); second the
researcher must input a list of subjects’ em ils. These subjects then receive an email invitation to par-
ticipate in online research. Each email invitation has a unique tokened link that when clicked upon
takes the subj ct directly to the SVO website. Once there, the subject is presented with instructions
and then a series of allocation choices. For each subject, the items are presented in a random order.5
Subjects record their choices by moving a slider back and forth, changing the joint allocations until
they find their most preferred outcome (see Figure 10 for a screen shot). Once they are satisfied with
the distribution, they finalize it by clicking the “Submit” button. Then the program takes them to
the next item or if they have answered all of the items, to a conclusion and “thanks for participating”
page. After all the subjects on the invitation list have participated (or a predetermined end date/time,10
whichever happens first) the researcher is sent via email a datafile with the subjects’ identifying infor-
mation, item order, all of their choices, summary scores, and transitivity verification.
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b)
Fig. 2.3. The social value orientation slider measure (figure taken from Murphy et al.
(2011)). The six primary items in a) elicit general social value orientations, while the
nine secondary items in b) allow to discriminat betw en conc rn for equality and
efficiency. The bold lines represent the decision tasks with bold circles at the end-points,
for instance the decision between any point on the line 50/100 for player i/j and 85/85 for
i/j (top right decision in a) ), or the decision between 85/85 for i/j and 85/15 for i/j (the
vertical bold line on the right in a)). The bold circles of the primary items represent the
four most common social ori tations found in the literature: ltruistic (50/100), prosocial
(85/85), individualistic (100/50), and competitive (85/15).
only 40 ECU (or 50 ECU to the row-player in the asymmetric case). The top-
right panel gives a paradigmatic impression of a short normative conflict which
is eventually resolved aft r p ri d t ree: The column-play r tries t establish a
pure C2-norm (which would be better for him than turn-taking or C1), while the
row-player starts with turn-taking. Finally, the column-player seems to agree
on “turn-taking” and follows the row-player until the interaction ends.
The central panel is an example of coordination on pure strategies of coop-
eration, that is C,C in the PD and C2, C2 in the BOPD. Note that the interaction
in BOPD took place in the asymmetric version of the game. The row player
constantly plays C2, which is the less preferred cooperative solution for him (60
ECU instead of 90 ECU), but more than the 50 ECU the column-player could ex-
pect from playing C1. Thus, C2 could be interpreted as a “friendly offer”, which
makes the cooperation stable over time.
The bottom panel is an example of how initially cooperative intentions are
undermined by a unilateral choice of D. The row-player’s behavior in the PD
is consistent with a GRIM-strategy: She pays the column-player’s first-round
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defection with defection in all subsequent rounds, notwithstanding column’s
tentative initiatives to re-establish cooperation. The bottom-right interaction in
the BOPD is an other interesting instance of normative conflict: The row-player
tries to force his partner into playing C1, who herself rather would like to estab-
lish the turn-taking norm, which she seemingly tries to enforce by a one-time
defection. This defection is in turn reacted upon by aD-choice of the row-player.
However, after some more unsuccessful trials to establish a consistent norm, all
efforts to establish a cooperation norm fail and both players choose D in almost
all future periods.
2.6 .2 Which cooperation norms emerge in the PD and in the
BOPD?
We continue by investigating the different forms of cooperation by means of a
series of random effects logistic regressions. The general model to be estimated
is given by
logit{Pr(yij = 1|xij )} = exp(xiβ)
1+ exp(xiβ)
, (2.6)
where
xijβ = β0 + β1game + β2delta + β3asymmetric + β4period + νj, (2.7)
and β0 is the intercept, game is a dummy taking the value 1 if subjects play
the 3×3 BOPD game, delta is a dummy indicating that the shadow of the future
is long, period is the respective interaction the subject is in, and asymmetric is a
dummy taking the value 1 if the game to be played is asymmetric. The subject
specific random intercept is denoted by νj and assumed to be drawn from the
distribution N(0, ψ). This random intercept accounts for the fact that the choices
of one person are likely to be correlated, which would violate the assumption of
uncorrelated errors in standard logistic regressions (Snijders and Bosker 1999a,
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005). Depending on the analysis, the dependent
variable yij is given by unilateral cooperation, or bilateral forms of cooperation,
such as the joint probability of playing the same pure strategy or alternating be-
tween two choices. All estimates in the following analysis rely on bootstrapped
parameters and confidence intervals, the reason being that confidence intervals
have been shown to be more robust than p-values and bootstrapped confidence
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Fig. 2.4. Some representative interactions in the experiment. The left column depicts
interactions in the BOPD, the right column interactions from the PD. In the top row the
subjects coordinated on turn-taking between C1, C1 and C2, C2 (left) and C,D and D,C
(right). The middle row is an example of coordination on a pure strategy of cooperation,
C2, C2 in BOPD and C,C in the PD game. The bottom row shows how initially cooperative
intentions are undermined by a unilateral choice of D.
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intervals have been shown to be more robust than those analytically derived
(Efron 1987).8
cooperation cooperation cooperation
sign general sign turn-taking sign pure strategies
fixed effects
game (3×3=1) + 1.178∗∗∗ + -2.986∗∗∗ + 0.949∗∗∗
[0.99,1.36] [-3.34,-2.63] [0.47,1.43]
high discount factor + 1.011∗∗∗ 0 1.898∗∗∗ + 1.610∗∗∗
[0.81,1.21] [1.44,2.35] [0.78,2.44]
asymetric + 0.0873 0 0.508∗∗ + 0.266
[-0.09,0.27] [0.17,0.84] [-0.22,0.75]
period – -0.0621∗∗∗ – 0.0435∗∗∗ – 0.0138
[-0.08,-0.05] [0.02,0.07] [-0.01,0.04]
intercept -2.690∗∗∗ -5.826∗∗∗ -8.418∗∗∗
[-2.92,-2.46] [-6.40,-5.25] [-9.58,-7.25]
random effects
var(intercept) 0.969∗∗∗ 1.923∗∗∗ 2.041∗∗∗
[0.83,1.11] [1.76,2.09] [1.82,2.26]
decisions 6078 6078 6078
subjects 240 240 240
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in brackets,∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.2. Different forms of cooperation are likely to emerge in different games. All
models are random effects logistic regressions controlling for correlated errors on the
subject level (see equation 2.7). The first model on the left predicts the general degree of
cooperation (i.e. non-D choices). The second model investigates the joint probabilities of
turn-taking between two choices, whereas the model on the right predicts cooperation in
pure strategies. The “sign”-columns list the theoretically expected signs. Coefficients and
confidence intervals are based on 1000 bootstraps.
Result 1 (Games)
There is
8 The method of bootstrapping draws B sub-samples of size N with replacement from the data
and estimates the respective model for every sub-sample (whereB is in our case 1000 andN the
number of observations in the data). The reported coefficients are the arithmetic means of the B
bootstrapped coefficients of every independent variable, while the confidence intervals are the
observed “inner” 95 % around the mean of the respective coefficients. See Efron and Tibshirani
(1993) for an introduction to the bootstrap.
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a more cooperation in the BOPD as compared to the PD.
b less turn-taking in the BOPD as compared to the PD.
c more pure strategy behavior in the BOPD as compared to the PD.
We start testing our hypotheses with a look at the overall level of coopera-
tive choices (see the left model in table 2.2). We define a cooperative choice as an
off-equilibrium choice in the finite game, that is playing C in the PD and C1 or
C2 in the BOPD. The respective dummy variable takes the value 0 if the subject
chooses D and 1 otherwise. We can confirm our hypothesis 1a concerning the
higher level of cooperation in the BOPD as compared to the PD by a positive
coefficient for the variable “game” in the left model of table 2.2. In fact, there
may be several reasons for this finding. If we assume some subjects to behave
purely random, the cooperation rate should still be higher in the BOPD, as two
instead of only one choice is classified as cooperative. More reasonable, how-
ever, is the fact that subjects react to the lower opportunity costs of cooperation:
While unilateral defection returns 100 ECU, cooperation in the PD returns 40
resp. 50 ECU, but up to 90 ECU in the BOPD.
In order to test how our experimental manipulations affect the emergence of
one or the other norm, we generated two dummy variables, "turn-taking" and
"pure strategies", and use them as dependent variables in equation 2.7. "turn-
taking" in the BOPD in some period t takes the value 1 if and only if both play-
ers’ decision in period t is either C1 or C2, and C2 or C1 respectively in the pre-
ceding period t−1. For the PD, it takes the value 1 in period t if and only if the
first player chooses C and the second player chooses D in period t, whereas the
first player had chosen D and the second player had chosen C in t−1. A coop-
eration norm in pure strategies is present if both players made the same coop-
erative choice for two consecutive periods. More formally, "pure strategies" is a
dummy variable, taking the value 1 in period t if and only if both players chose
C in t and t−1 in PD, or C1 in t and t−1 or C2 in t and t−1 in BOPD.
Hypothesis 1b and c predicted more turn-taking and more pure strategy play
in the BOPD as compared to the PD. These hypotheses, however, can only par-
tially be confirmed: The positive estimated coefficient for “game” in the second
model of table 2.2 confirms the theoretically predicted higher propensity of pure
strategy play in the BOPD. However, the Rational Choice theory fails to predict
the significantly lower frequency of turn-taking in the BOPD as compared to
the PD, as we can see from the negative estimate for “game” in the third model.
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2.6 .3 Which cooperation norms emerge under the shadow of the
future?
Our second experimental manipulation varied the shadow of the future.
Result 2 (Shadow of the Future)
A long shadow of the future has
a a positive effect on the emergence of cooperation in the BOPD and a positive
effect in PD.
b a positive effect on the emergence of turn-taking in the BOPD and no effect in
the PD.
c a negative effect on the emergence of pure strategy norms in BOPD and a posi-
tive effect in PD.
Hypothesis 2a is supported by a positive coefficient for the dummy "high
discount factor" in the first model of table 2.2. Note that the model controls for
the fact that interactions under a short shadow of the future are on average
shorter by adding the respective period to the regression. Moreover, this result
is robust for both games, as can be concluded from the first two decomposed
models in table 2.3.
Again, our hypotheses concerning the emergence of turn-taking or pure
strategy are mostly inconsistent with the data. We predicted a nil-effect for the
emergence of turn-taking, but pooling the data from both games returned a sig-
nificantly positive estimate for the shadow of the future (second model in table
2.2). The effect is mainly driven by the PD game, where turn-taking norms are
more likely if the shadow of the future is long. As predicted, we could not find
evidence for the same effect in the BOPD game (see models 3 and 4 in table 2.3).
2.6 .4 Which cooperation norms emerge under asymmetric
pay-offs?
Finally, asymmetric pay-offs do not play a role for the emergence of coopera-
tion which can be referred from insignificant estimate for asymmetry (see first
model in table 2.2). Decomposing both games, however, shows that this result
is inconsistent across games (see the first two models in table 2.3). In fact, asym-
metry has a negative effect in the PD, but a positive effect in the BOPD.
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Result 3 (Asymmetry)
Asymmetric pay-offs have
a a positive effect on the emergence of cooperation in the BOPD and a negative
effect in PD.
b a positive effect on the emergence of turn-taking in the BOPD and no effect in
the PD.
c a negative effect on the emergence of pure strategy norms in BOPD and a posi-
tive effect in PD.
How do asymmetric pay-offs affect the emergence of turn-taking norms? In
contrast to our prediction, the regression for the pooled data estimates a pos-
itive relationship between asymmetry and the emergence of turn-taking. The
third and fourth model in table 2.3 estimate the effect of the experimental ma-
nipulations separately for both games. The Rational Choice theory predicts no
difference between symmetric and asymmetric games (see hypothesis b), how-
ever, this effect is estimated to be positive for the BOPD, while it is not different
from zero in the PD.
We can observe an almost reversed pattern for the emergence of pure-
strategy norms: In contradiction to hypothesis 3c, asymmetric incentives pro-
mote the emergence of pure strategy play in the PD, but hinder their evolution
in the more complex BOPD, such that the pooled effect is not different from zero
(see models 5 and 6 in table 2.3 and model 3 in table 2.2).
2.6 .5 Fairness norms can explain the emerging cooperation norms
In phase two of the experiment, we measured the subjects fairness norms with
the svo-slider measure (Murphy et al. 2011). This measure consists of six “‘pri-
mary items” designed to classify subjects into the four categories altruistic, proso-
cial, individualistic and competitive. Nine “secondary items” refine the prosocial
types into joint maximizers, trying to maximize the joint earnings, and inequality
averse types, who try to minimize the pay-off differences between two players.
The classification algorithm adopted from Murphy et al. (2011) failed to classify
many of the secondary items, such that we focus in our analysis on the primary
items only.
In a nutshell, the classification algorithm for the primary items looks for the
subject’s position on the ring in figure 2.3 a) to find out the subject’s normative
type. To do this, we calculate the subject’s mean allocation to herself (A¯s) and to
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Fig. 2.5. Distribution of angles and types from the svo-slider measure.
the other person (A¯o), and subtract 50 in order to account for the midpoint of the
ring being at 50/50. We then determine the resulting angle vector by calculating
SVO◦ = arctan
(
A¯o − 50
A¯s − 50
)
. (2.8)
An altruist would have an angle of greater than 57.15◦, a prosocial type an
angle between 22.45◦ and 57.15◦, an individualistic type scores between -12.04◦
and 22.45◦ and a competitive type below -12.04◦ (for an extensive discussion of
the algorithm as well as for the justification for these boundaries see the corre-
sponding paper by Murphy et al. (2011:3)).
Figure 2.5 reports the distribution of angles and the resulting distribution
of types. A vast majority of subjects can be classified as individualistic (167 out
of 240 or 69 %), about 85 of them almost exclusively chose the option which
maximized their own pay-off. Another 71 (30 %) are classified as prosocial, only
2 (1 %) as competitive and no subject was classified as being altruistic. Due to
the small number of competitive players, we excluded them from the following
analysis.9
Can the types predict the content of the emerging norms? We test our hy-
potheses 4a-c by estimating a random effects logistic regression with dummies
for the types as dependent variables and the respective norms or cooperation
as independent variable. In addition to that, we include a dummy to control for
the partner’s type, taking the value 1 if both partners share the same type.
xijβ = β0 + β1prosocial + β2same type + νj, (2.9)
9 We ran the same regressions with and without competititive players and the results are robust.
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cooperation turn-taking pure strategies
individualistic ref. ref. ref.
prosocial 0.932∗∗∗ 1.517∗∗ 0.575
[0.438,1.426] [0.401,2.633] [-0.672,1.823]
partner has same type 0.242 1.275∗ -1.039
[-0.400,0.885] [0.131,2.420] [-3.227,1.149]
intercept -2.164∗∗∗ -6.110∗∗∗ -6.722∗∗∗
[-2.528,-1.800] [-7.025,-5.195] [-7.847,-5.596]
random effects
var(intercept) 1.082∗∗∗ 2.116∗∗∗ 2.093∗∗∗
[0.797,1.366] [1.820,2.412] [1.683,2.504]
decisions 6050 6050 6050
subjects 238 238 238
N_reps 1000 1000 1000
ll -2724.9 -1008.4 -574.7
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in brackets,
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.4. Emergence of cooperation norms as a consequence of different fairness
norms. Different forms of cooperation are likely to emerge for different types of actors.
All models are random effects logistic regressions controlling for correlated errors on the
subject level (see equation 2.9). The model on the left predicts the general degree of
cooperation (i.e. non-D choices) among prosocial and maximizing types. The second
model investigates the joint probabilities of turn-taking between two choices, given the
fairness types. The third model on the right predicts cooperation in pure strategies for the
two types. The “sign”-columns list the expected signs as predicted by “behavioral” theory.
Coefficients and confidence intervals are based on 1000 bootstraps.
The model takes the individualistic type as reference category and estimates
the difference in cooperation propensities (first model of table 2.4), the propen-
sity to establish a turn-taking norm (second model), and the propensity to es-
tablish a pure strategy norm (third model) for the other remaining types.
Result 4 (Fairness norms)
As compared to individualistic maximizers, the emergence of
a cooperation is positively affected by fairness norms.
b turn-taking norms is positively affected by fairness norms.
c pure strategy norms is not affected by fairness norms.
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As predicted by hypothesis 4a, the first model indicates that prosocial norms
increase the probability of choosing a cooperative option. Also results 4b and
4c are in line with our behavioral theory: Prosocial types are better capable of
implementing turn-taking but do not differ significantly in their propensity to
engage in pure strategy norms. Prosocial types have a desire to counterbalance
both players’ outcomes or to increase the global efficiency, such that they are
more likely to engage in turn-taking agreements, which does not hold for pure
strategy norms.
2.7 Discussion
This paper theoretically and experimentally studies the emergence of different
cooperation norms such as turn-taking or pure strategy play in a series of indef-
initely repeated normal form games. We study a pay-off symmetric and asym-
metric Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and compare it to a “coordinate-to-cooperate”
Battle of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (BOPD). The latter can be described as a 3×3
PD where subjects can gain additional surplus if they coordinate in a “Battle of
the Sexes” game on how to distribute these newly generated gains of cooper-
ation. We manipulate the asymmetry of the pay-offs and the length of the the
shadow of the future, i.e. the probability that another instance of the game is
played with the same partner.
The games studied here extend the existing literature on cooperation in so-
cial dilemmas with exogenous social inequalities by introducing different so-
cially efficient but pay-off discriminating equilibria. The pay-off asymmetry
gives rise to a normative conflict about which norm should be adhered to, which
is not affected by concerns for efficiency.
The hypothesis derived by means of game theory are quite successful in
predicting the general effects of our experimental manipulations: There is more
cooperation if the shadow of the future is long and if the opportunity costs of
cooperation are low as in the BOPD. Pay-off asymmetry has a positive effect on
cooperation in the BOPD, but other than predicted it has a negative effect on
cooperation rates in the PD.
However, game theory does not add much to the explanation of which norms
of behavior are likely to emerge. Most of the hypotheses concerning the emer-
gence of turn-taking norms or pure strategy norms are inconsistent with the
data. Instead, the type of emerging norms can be quite successfully predicted
by the fairness norms held by the interacting players.
We conclude that endogenous fairness norms are an important predictor for
the emergence of cooperation norms and the understanding of the equilibrium
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selection process.
A sociological perspective on measuring social norms by
means of strategy method experiments 1
Chapter three
The understanding of social norms is crucial for all disciplines in the social sci-
ences. The content, dynamics and effects of norms have been on the sociologi-
cal agenda since the beginning of the discipline (Durkheim 1997 [1897], Parsons
1937). The emphasis on social norms cumulated in the homo sociologicus, who is
a pure marionette of normative and role expectations (Dahrendorf 1958). This
notion has quickly been criticized as “oversocialized” (Wrong 1961). In con-
trast, economists have been working for a long time on the other side of the
road: Their conception of man as a homo oeconomicus considers a purely forward
looking egoistic maximizer, who can consequently be described as “underso-
cialized”. Only within the past decades, there has been fundamental research
on the integration of both concepts.
The theoretical progress in both disciplines is therefore dependent on an ac-
curate measurement of normative behavior. However, the methods for mea-
suring social norms have taken separate paths in economics and sociology. In
economics, behavioral experiments have been increasingly attracting attention.
Besides the “core topics” of economic research, e.g. auctions (Cox et al. 1982) or
price bubbles (Smith et al. 1988), also issues closer related to neighboring fields
have been investigated, such as risk attitudes (Kahneman and Tversky 1979)
or problems of collective action (Ostrom et al. 1992). Later, Fehr and Gächter
(2002) could demonstrate the relevance of social norms by illustrating the hu-
man’s motivation for ‘altruistic’ punishment in collective goods situations. This
evidence paved the way to analyze the heterogeneity of societies with regard
to the coexistence of homo oeconomicus and homo sociologicus (Gintis et al. 2001,
Fehr and Gächter 2002, Herrmann et al. 2008). By now, behavioral experiments
1 This chapter has been published as (Rauhut and Winter 2010) in Social Science Research.
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have become the leading tool for the empirical measurement of social norms in
economics.
In sociology, the economists’ experimental toolbox has long been neglected
for the understanding of social norms. This is surprising, given the promising
results from economics and the fact that experiments have a “sociological” tra-
dition (for reviews see Bonacich and Light 1978, Cook and Hegtvedt 1983, Kol-
lock 1998, Diekmann 2008). The undervaluation of the experimental method is
even more surprising considering the potential to rigorously test “social mech-
anisms” (Hedström and Swedberg 1996), and the high internal, construct and
statistical conclusion validity (Shadish et al. 2002). Furthermore, the sociological
insights achieved by behavioral experiments are quite remarkable.2 Instead of
lab experiments, sociological research rather relies on factorial surveys when it
comes to experimental techniques (see Wallander 2009:for a recent review). Fac-
torial surveys have been established as an experimental measurement of social
norms (Jasso and Rossi 1977, Jasso and Opp 1997).
We argue that different conceptions of and research interests in social norms
explain the focus on experiments in economics and on factorial surveys in soci-
ology. In this chapter, we will demonstrate how the relatively undervalued ex-
perimental measurement called strategy method (Selten 1967) can overcome the
relative weaknesses of both methods. It combines the investigation of many (of-
ten counterfactual) conditions with incentivized experiments. We will apply it
to the ultimatum game (Güth et al. 1982) and demonstrate how the sociological
concepts of conditionality, intensity and consensus of social norms can be experi-
mentally measured with the strategy method. By means of this, we will extend
the related studies in the field of economics (Fischbacher et al. 2001, Herrmann
and Thoeni 2009, Oxoby and McLeish 2004) to sociological research questions
regarding the conditionality of distributive justice norms with respect to indi-
vidual effort and to the question as to whether the importance of effort receives
normative consensus.
In what follows, we will present empirical evidence that the strategy method
is better capable of discriminating between different social norms than “usual”
experiments, just as factorial surveys are better suited than usual surveys to
measure the complexity of norms. The following section will present data gath-
ered with the strategy method and discuss this method’s advantages compared
to other methods. We will then derive hypotheses regarding different response
behavior for data elicited with the strategy method compared to the conven-
tional experimental method. Subsequently, we report the results of our method-
2 Scholars studied the effect of power (Cook and Emerson 1978) or reputation in social networks
(Raub and Weesie 1990), the effect of trust in business relations (Buskens and Weesie 2000), or
the behavioral impact of reciprocity (Diekmann 2004).
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ological experiment, which adjudicates normative behavior under both condi-
tions. The findings can be interpreted in line with previous comparisons be-
tween factorial surveys and observational studies. Finally, the results will be
discussed with aiming at more efforts in interdisciplinary research.
3.1 Towards methodological integration of economics and
sociology
The different measurement of social norms in economics and sociology may be
due to different research interests and as well to different jargons in the differ-
ent disciplines. If, for instance, the meaning of the term “social norm” differed
across academic fields, it would be no surprise that the measures of norms
were different as well. Many quantitative social scientists might agree to the
(economists’) definition of a social norm as
“1) a behavioral regularity; that is 2) based on a socially shared belief of how one
ought to behave; which triggers 3) the enforcement of the prescribed behavior by
informal social sanctions.” (Fehr and Gächter 2000:166)
Defined in this way, specific social norms can be measured in the labora-
tory with the so-called ultimatum game experiment (Güth et al. 1982). This game
can be regarded as a parsimonious measure for distributive justice and fairness
norms. One proposer and one responder bargain over a given amount of money,
called the cake. The proposer offers a share of the cake to the responder. If the
responder accepts the offer, she receives the share and the proposer can keep
the rest of the cake. If the responder rejects the offer, the cake is lost and nobody
receives anything (for illustration see figure 3.1).
Empirical results indicate that the ultimatum game meets the three criteria of
social norms stated above. Responders have normative expectations about the
proposer’s behavior so that low offers are frequently rejected. This rejection can
be regarded as informal sanctioning of norm violations. Proposers anticipate
such potential punishment and form respective beliefs. These beliefs trigger be-
havioral regularities, such that offers below 20 percent of the cake are rare and
close-to-equal splits are the most frequent outcome (Roth 1995). This matches
the definition of social norms given above that the behavior is 1) a regularity, it
is 2) based on socially shared beliefs, and 3) it is sanctioned in case of violations.
In the meanwhile, ultimatum game experiments have become one of the most
prominent laboratory measures for social norms and have even been applied
in anthropology for measuring cultural differences in normative behavior and
punishment of norm violations (Henrich et al. 2001; 2004).
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Fig. 3.1. Ultimatum Game. The first value in the squared brackets denotes the outcome
for the proposer, the second value denotes the outcome for the responder. The absolute
value of the cake is normalized to 1.
3.2 Measuring conditionality, intensity and consensus of social
norms
Traditional ultimatum game experiments have a major shortcoming with re-
spect to sociological research questions; social norms are rarely a yes/no de-
cision. A long history of sociological research emphasizes (at least) four addi-
tional aspects of norms:
“1) polarity, whether a norm is prescriptive, proscriptive, or bipolar; 2) condition-
ality, whether a norm holds under all circumstances; 3) intensity, the degree to
which individuals subscribe to the norm; and 4) consensus, the extent to which
members of a society share a norm.” (Jasso and Opp 1997:974)
A well developed sociological method for answering such questions is the
“factorial survey”. In factorial surveys “respondents are asked to judge descrip-
tions of situations which are complex sets of attributes. [...] For this purpose,
attributes (i.e. values) of dimensions are combined so that descriptions of sit-
uations ensue. Each of the possible and meaningful situational descriptions is
judged by respondents”(Beck and Opp 2001). Subjects answer to a systematic
set of counterfactual questions. Researchers can thereby elicit the conditional and
the unconditional parts of social norms by varying the relevant attributes.
While polarity is a linguistic property and depends on the accurate formu-
lation of the norm, the latter three aspects can (and should) be measured using
behavioral data. Strategy method experiments give us the opportunity to mea-
sure these dimensions in lab experiments. However, until now conditionality,
intensity, and consensus were primarily approached with factorial surveys in
sociology.
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The conditionality of norms refers to the question as to whether the norma-
tive expectations hold under all circumstances or rather depend on characteris-
tics of the situation or the protagonists. “Although norms are often formulated
unconditionally, in everyday life they actually hold only in certain situations,
and actors seem to be aware of this.” (Jasso and Opp 1997:948). In contrast to
the unidimensional measurement of distributive justice norms in the ultimatum
game, factorial surveys allow to consider conditionality.
Let us illustrate the criterion of conditionality in the framework of distribu-
tive justice norms. For example, equity norms assert that the individual “input”,
usually some kind of effort, is the only norm-relevant criterion and determines
the individual output to a certain extend. According to (Eckhoff 1974), most
norms of distributional justice are based on the principle of allocating resources
with respect to the criteria of need, status or effort. Those who contribute more,
who need more, or who have a higher status shall receive more (Homans 1961,
Blau 1964, Adams 1965, Cook and Emerson 1978). The equity norm may be de-
fined as follows: The more someone contributes to a common project, the higher
the share of the returns this person can claim. A vignette of a factorial survey
can measure this effort with the level of education or the hours worked per day
and ask whether a respective employee is perceived as underpaid, fairly paid or
overpaid for a given level of education and working hours (cf. Jasso and Opp
1997, Jasso 2006). The equity norm is thus a conditional norm in the sense that
the actions prescribed by the norm are conditional on a person’s relative level
of effort put into a project.
Moreover, a suitable measurement device should give us the possibility
to measure unconditional norms. The norm of equality is an example: Equality
norms can be described with fairness considerations that are independent of
criteria such as individual effort, need or status. Here, the material equality of
outcomes is the only criterion that ought to be satisfied. The measurement of
equality norms in a factorial survey would require that the respondents regard
education or the hours of work as being irrelevant for the justness of earnings
of employees. More specifically, equality norms prescribe that the return to be
claimed from a project ought to be unconditional of individual contributions.
The consensus of norms considers whether social norms are commonly shared
among subgroups. Consensus can be described with the homogeneity of accep-
tance concerning the validity of one particular norm within a population. The
introduction of a discriminating normative cue (e.g. effort) is a precondition
to distinguish whether somebody adheres to an equity or equality norm. Of
course, this precondition has to be measurable, which we will demonstrate by
using the strategy method. Thus, the measurement of the adherence to differ-
ent normative cues allows to make statements about the degree of normative
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consensus in the population.
Finally, the intensity of norms can be measured by applying the strategy
method. We can operationalize the intensity of norm adherence in the ultima-
tum game as the minimal acceptable offer of a responder. Consider a player who
personally believes in the norm of equality. However, she might consent to ac-
cept also slightly less than the equal split. The knowledge of the functional form
of her acceptance thresholds (i.e. equity or equality) and the deviation from the
normative principle allows us to estimate both the underlying norm and the
intensity of the player’s belief.3
Whereas factorial surveys have the advantage to address sociological ques-
tions regarding conditionality and consensus of norms, they suffer from the dis-
advantage of their entirely hypothetical character, resulting in relatively poor
proxies of behavior in real-world settings. Thus, the intensity of social norms
is easily over-estimated. Compared to behavioral experiments in sociology
or economics, altruistic and pro-social behavior reported in factorial surveys
are “low-cost” statements (Diekmann and Preisendorfer 1998, Diekmann and
Preisendörfer 2003, Rauhut and Krumpal 2008), because answers in a survey
are usually not associated with any consequences for the interviewee (Shepelak
and Alwin 1986, Eifler 2007, Groß and Börensen 2008, Nisic and Auspurg 2008).
Behavioral experiments avoid this problem of hypothetical results by relating
the decisions in the experiment to monetary consequences for the participat-
ing subjects; usually, however, with the drawback of a simplistic conception of
social norms.
3.3 An introduction to the strategy method
The measurement of social norms requires the investigation of interdependent
decision-making of a group of actors. In these strategic interactions, which can
be called games, the outcomes of one person depend on the own as well as on
other subjects’ decisions. These behaviors can be studied in game theoretical
experiments. As a matter of course, the respective implementation differs in
different experimental setups. In the “conventional” setup, henceforth referred
to as the response method, each actor is asked to decide for one out of a number of
alternatives. These decisions are matched with the respective decisions of their
interaction partners to determine the actual outcome for the involved actors.
For exemplification, consider a game with two players and two actions, “nice”
and “nasty”. One player decides for nice and the other for nasty with the result
3 The measurement of the intensity would of course also be possible using traditional ultimatum
games; but this comes at the expense of loosing information about the underlying principle.
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that the nasty player receives a comparably high outcome at the expense of her
opponent’s comparably low outcome.
The strategy method is an extension to the conventional response method.
It was introduced by Reinhard Selten (1967) in a game theoretical experiment
on oligopolies. The unifying feature of the method is that subjects can condi-
tion their decision on every possible action of the other subject.4 Every player
therefore submits a complete strategy before the game, stating how she will re-
act to the other player’s actions. More specifically, the player is asked how she
will react on every action the other player can – hypothetically and factually –
perform. Consider again a game with two players and two actions, “nice” and
“nasty”: The strategy method allows players to condition their behavior on the
strategy of the opponent by asking “How will you react, given the other player
is nice?” or “given the other player is nasty?” Given the other player’s decision
to act nice (or nasty), the first player’s choice is implemented by the computer.
Once a complete strategy is submitted, the outcome of both players is deter-
mined by matching the respective strategies.5
The strategy vector method is a further extension, being applied to asymmet-
ric games such as the ultimatum game. A game can be called asymmetric if the
strategy sets of the players are not identical, be it because of different informa-
tion sets or different experimental roles. In strategy vector method experiments,
the players are ignorant of their position (say A or B) in the game. Before the
start of the experimental game, the strategy vector method asks for every re-
action of the player if she is in position A and has to respond to any possible
decision of player B. Further, the reverse case is requested, asking for the re-
action in role B to all possible decisions of player A. When entering the game,
the actual roles are revealed and, like in the strategy method, the predefined
strategies for the respective roles determine the outcomes of the game.
4 To simplify the issue, we will discuss the 2-person case, but it is generally possible to apply
the strategy method to n-person experiments.
5 The strategy method in real life can be found for example in stock options: The holder of a
stock instructs her broker to sell the stock, if the value exceeds a pre-decided threshold. This
advices becomes effective only if the stock exceeds the threshold, and remains counterfactual
otherwise.
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3.4 Method
3.4 .1 Operationalization of conditionality, intensity, and
consensus with the ultimatum game
For the measurement of conditionality, consensus, and intensity, we carefully
extended the setup of the ultimatum game by introducing an element of effort.
We operationalized the conditionality of a norm as the extent of how strong
the offer and the acceptance depend on the effort of the participants. Offers
and acceptance thresholds of a player adhering to the unconditional equality
norm will not be affected by relative effort. Contrariwise, equity types should
show a positive correlation between a responder’s effort and the offer towards
this player, respectively this responder’s acceptance threshold. Further, inten-
sity can be regarded as the deviation from the action prescribed by the norm one
is adhering to. Thus, an acceptance threshold below the norm and a low offer
can be operationalized as low normative intensity. Lastly, we operationalized
consensus with the degree of heterogeneity regarding whether subjects adhere
either to equity or equality norms.
As a measure of effort, we introduced a knowledge quiz. The subjects re-
ceived five days before the experiment a seven page long text of a Wikipedia
entry on the Westminster Palace via email.6 An accompanying letter informed
the subjects that their preparation of the text will influence their possible earn-
ings in the experiment. We chose a rather specific topic to ensure that everybody
actually had to learn the text and nobody could benefit from her respective field
of studies (such as mathematics or paleontology). In the first step of the exper-
iment, the subjects had to answer respective knowledge questions. Therefore,
their different investments of time and effort in the preparation of the quiz re-
flected effort.
3.4 .2 Design of the strategy game
We applied the strategy vector method (Selten 1967) to the standard ultimatum
game (see Appendix 2.1 .1 for the instructions). In contrast to the “classic” ul-
timatum game, the subjects did not have full information about the amount of
money to be distributed and their respective roles. Although they knew how
6 Wikipedia contributors, "Westminster Palace," Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia,
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palace_of_Westminster (accessed May 04,2008
14:40)
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much they earned in the quiz, they were not told how much their opponent
won. The roles were not reveald until everybody made all the decisions, so that
each subject had to make the decisions for both roles respectively: If a player
earned x Euro in the quiz, the player was asked how much she would offer,
if she and the opponent together earned x Euro, if they together earned x + 1
Euro, . . . , x + 20 Euro. Figure 3.2 depicts an exemplary screenshot for the pro-
poser. On the next screen, the subjects were asked for their acceptance threshold
if they were in the role of the responder, given she and the opponent earned x,
x+1,. . . , x+20. The acceptance threshold denotes the minimum offer the respon-
der is willing to accept. After completing the questions, the computer matched
two players according to their results in the quiz. The roles of the proposer and
the responder were assigned at random and the computer compared the pro-
poser’s offer for the actual size of the cake with the corresponding threshold of
the responder. The money was paid, if the offer was as high or higher than the
responders acceptance threshold; otherwise the money was lost.
3.4 .3 Design of the response game
After completing the strategy game, but before learning about the outcome, the
participants played the conventional ultimatum game, which we previously de-
fined as the response game. The game was played with the same partner and in
the same role as the previous one: If a player was randomly assigned to be a
proposer in the strategy game, this player kept her role in the response game.
This exclusion of learning effects is an important feature of the design, as it pre-
vents that the subjects adjust their decisions to the decisions of their partner
in the strategy game. We also did not change the partners to hold the relative
effort levels constant and to yield high statistical power by allowing for within-
subjects comparisons. Note that the subjects were once again endowed with the
amount of money they earned in the quiz.
In the first stage of this game, the subjects learned about their roles. On the
following screen, the proposer was once again informed about the own effort
and, for the first time, about the responder’s effort. The proposer was then asked
for an offer regarding how to divide the money. This offer was transmitted to the
responder, who was also informed about the respective efforts. If the responder
accepted the offer, the money was divided accordingly; otherwise, the money
from the response game was lost. It was clarified that the decision from the
response game had no influence on the outcome of the preceding strategy game.
Only now, both players were informed about the outcome of the response game
and the strategy game. The subjects were paid at the end of both experiments.
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Fig. 3.2. Exemplary screenshot for a player in the role of a proposer in the strategy game.
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3.4 .4 Participants
The subjects were 92 undergraduate students of the University of Leipzig. 47
subjects were male and 45 female, coming from a wide range of academic disci-
plines. The subjects were invited to register for the experiments via posters and
flyers. The participants were randomly drawn from a subject pool with respect
to a balanced sex ratio. To ensure anonymity among interacting subjects, the ex-
periment was conducted in two separate PC-Labs. Subjects participated in the
experiment in groups of two (one proposer and one responder). Proposers and
responders were always assigned to separate rooms. Three of our experimental
sessions consisted of ten groups, one of nine groups and one of seven groups.7
3.4 .5 Procedure
The experiment was conducted using the computer programm z-Tree, devel-
oped by Fischbacher (2007). At the beginning of each session, the subjects were
randomly assigned to one of the computer terminals. Some general instructions
regarding the procedure were given on paper, informing the subjects about the
consecutive quiz. The subjects had to answer twenty questions concerning the
Wikipedia entry with the opportunity to earn up to 20 Euro (one Euro per ques-
tion). The average earnings of the participants in the quiz were 12.30 Euro (min:
0, max: 18, sd: 3,60). This money was at stake twice, once in the strategy and
once in the response game. The average return from these games were 12.15
Euro (min: 0, max: 23, sd: 4,11) in the response game and 8.03 Euro (min: 0,
max: 19, sd: 6.57) in the strategy game. After completing the quiz, the subjects
received the instructions for the strategy game. The understanding of the game
was examined with control questions. The subjects were not informed about
the existence of the subsequent response game until they made all the decisions
in the strategy game. The experiment started when there were no further ques-
tions to the experimenter. Communication was prohibited from that point.
3.5 Empirical demonstration of measuring conditionality,
intensity and consensus with the strategy method
We regard the major advantage of the strategy method in its capability to
measure more complex dimensions of those norms which shape our decision-
7 In sessions 1 and 4, fewer subjects showed up than expected.
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making. For illustration, consider the following situation in our response game:
The proposer and the responder earned 8 Euro each in our quiz. The proposer
offers 8 Euro to the responder, who accepts. What would the proposer have of-
fered, if the responder had earned only 3 Euro? What if he or she had earned
16 Euro? Would the responder have accepted an offer of 7 Euro, or an offer of
2 Euro? To put it differently: Is the proposer’s decision conditional or uncondi-
tional of effort? Or does the proposer generally believe that the division should
be independent of who contributed what? The response game can not answer
these questions in the situation of coincidental equivalence of inputs. The re-
spective data are often ambiguous, as they show only a single decision for a
very specific state within a game.
Figure 3.3 depicts representative cases from our data. The proposers’ deci-
sions in the response game are almost indistinguishable (see the upper panel in
figure 3.3(a)). Responder and proposer earned the same amount in the quiz, and
the proposer offers to split the cake equally. If we only had this data at hand,
we would probably presume that there is consensus about the applicable norm.
But the data from the strategy game reveal a different picture. Player 3 in the left
row offers half of the cake, if both contributed the same. If the contributions are
different, player 3 divides according to the equity norm such that relative con-
tributions equal relative outcomes. In this sense, the underlying norm of dis-
tributive justice is conditional on individual effort. In contrast, consider player
29 in the third column. This player also offers about 50% in the response game.
But the behavior in the strategy game reveals a different underlying norm, as
offers do not differ with differing relative contributions. Thus, player 29 does
not respond to the criterion of effort and adheres to our definition of the (un-
conditional) equality norm. Furthermore, the strategy method can reveal the
behavior of player 20 in the middle as violation of the normative imperative
of consistent behavior. As a proposer, player 20 offers according to the equity
norm as long as player 20’s relative contributions are higher than the respon-
der’s contributions to the cake. However, this player switches to the equality
norm, if the responder contributed more. Thus, player 20 picks the respective
norm that fits his/her interests best.
Apart from the measurement of underlying norms, the strategy method is
also capable to map the intensity of norm adherence. Player 73 on the very right
shows more or less consistent behavior, but the low offer reveals a low norma-
tive intensity. The same flexibility can be seen in the reaction of responder 92
in the right column of the lowermost panel. Her willingness to accept even the
lowest offer points in the direction of a very low identification with the norm.
The low intensity could of course also be measured with a low offer in the re-
sponse game, the underlying pattern would nevertheless stay uncertain.
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Fig. 3.3. Patterns of offers in the strategy game and the response game (a) and patterns
of acceptance in the strategy game and the response game (b). The upper panel in a) rep-
resents decisions from the response game, the lower panel decisions from the strategy
game. One column refers to decisions of the same proposer or responder respectively.
The abscissa depicts the responder’s relative contribution to the cake, given by CRCR+CP
where Ci describes the individual gain from the quiz and the index i the respective role
(R=responder, P=proposer). The ordinate describes the proposer’s relative offer to the
responder, given by OCR+CP , with O denoting the absolute offer. The upper panel in b)
describes whether the respective responder accepted the offer in the response game.
The lower panel describes the acceptance threshold of the same responder, which is the
smallest acceptable offer for a given relative effort of the proposer.
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Finally, the different patterns observed in figure 3.3 give a first glance on
the degree of consensus of the underlying norms. If the degree of consensus was
higher, we should not observe a multiplicity of norms applied in the same situ-
ation. For a deeper analysis of normative consensus, we would have to analyze
the distribution of types within our experimental population. As this is not in
the scope of this study, we refer to figure B.1(a) in appendix B, which gives an
overview over all proposers’ and responders’ decisions in the strategy game
and an impression of the frequencies of respective social norms.8
The situation is similar for the responders, as described in figure 3.3(b). The
response method only yields “yes/no”-decisions as a reaction to a unidimen-
sional stimulus. Therefore, the response game only provides relatively crude
information as to whether the offer was high enough in the case of acceptance,
or too low in the case of rejection. Parallel to the proposers, the strategy method
reveals the different patterns and more precise information. In conclusion, fig-
ure 3.3 illustrates the capability of measuring conditionality, consensus and in-
tensity of social norms by means of the strategy method.
An additional difference between strategy and response game is their dif-
ferent time needed. The strategy game lasted for about one hour, while the re-
sponse game was completed in 15 minutes on average (including instructions
and control questions). Time is a crucial factor in experimental research, as the
participants’ payment is calibrated on their time in the lab. However, the ad-
vantage of the strategy method with its generation of a multiple of the data
compared to response-method experiments can outweigh the time-factor. To
our experience, resources invested into strategy-method experiments usually
pay off in terms of the "data/money ratio".
3.6 The differences between measuring normative principles
and their intensity
3.6 .1 Derivation of hypotheses about differences between
strategy and response game
So far, we demonstrated with explorative data analyses the usefulness of the
strategy method for measuring social norms, in particular its capability to mea-
sure the sociologically relevant but fairly complex constructs of conditionality
and consensus. For further evaluation of the strategy method for measuring
8 For further discussion of heterogeneous populations with regard to social norms see also (Win-
ter et al. forthcoming)
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social norms, we discuss in the following the differences in measuring social
norms by means of the strategy method and the traditional response method.
We will derive hypotheses about such differences and will test these by means
of an experiment which can empirically adjudicate between them.
As we know from many examples in the social sciences, different measure-
ment techniques elicit different responses and can represent different dimen-
sions of the constructs in question. With regard to social norms, we can mea-
sure the normative principle people adhere to; however, we can also measure
the intensity with which people actually adhere to their principles. For example,
people may regard it as proper to consider the other person’s effort for sharing a
common resource; however, this normative principle may be largely abandoned
if people receive the chance to distort their normative principles in favor of their
egoistic motives (i.e. to offer and accept less in the ultimatum game). Thus, dif-
ferent measurements may frame the interview situation such that people either
elicit their normative principles or their intensity (see Figure 3.4).
From the strict perspective of rational-choice theory, the results from the
strategy and the response method should not differ, because the level of infor-
mation is similar in both treatments. However, we conjecture that both methods
differ in some of their psychological features. The response method is often de-
scribed as emotional or “hot”, while the strategy method is considered to be
more rational or “cold” (Brandts and Charness 2000, Loewenstein 1996). The
argument goes that being confronted with a variety of related decisions gen-
erates different behavior compared to one single decision. One reason for this
is that subjects may feel obliged to behave “consistently” (Oxoby and McLeish
2004). In other words, normative expectations are often calling for consistency
(Elster 1989) so that the response to a whole set of questions may elicit principles
instead of the level of compromises people would actually be willing to accept.
Thus, answering a set of questions instead of only one may prompt subjects
to elicit one single principle instead of evaluating for each (hypothetical) out-
come their norm and their threshold below which they would prefer to receive
nothing instead of committing a norm violation.
Previous studies support our conjecture about the differences in the strategy
compared to the response method (Andrew et al. 1994, Güth et al. 2007). We
agree with Roth (1995:323), who points out that “having to submit entire strate-
gies forces subjects to think about each information set in a different way than
if they could primarily concentrate on those information sets that arise in the
course of the game.”
In our view, the strategy method yields measurements which refer to a
“Rawlsian” perspective on social norms (Rawls 1971). The strategy vector method
simulates a “veil of ignorance”, because subjects are confronted with “all” states
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Fig. 3.4. Illustration of the difference between measuring normative principles and the
intensity with which these are adhered to. Panel (a) represents a person who adheres to
the equality norm, whose principle it is to offer half of the cake and to accept only half of
the cake. This person’s intensity of her norm adherence is, however, low so that she is
ready to offer and to accept less than half of the cake. Panel (b) represents a person who
adheres to the equity norm, whose principle it is to offer exactly the amount a person has
contributed to the cake. Due to a low intensity, this person is ready to offer and accept less
than what the principle prescribes. Different measures of norms may either elicit the nor-
mative principles or their intensity. In case of measuring the intensity, the measure should
elicit the least acceptable offer beyond which proposers and responders preferred to re-
ceive nothing. The arrows denote the potential differences between measuring normative
principles or their intensity.
of the world (Becker and Miller 2009). Facilitated by the ignorance of the respec-
tive future position in “society”, our design virtually puts the subjects behind
the “Rawlsian veil”. The elicitation of general principles instead of the willing-
ness for compromises will therefore be stronger in the strategy game compared
to the response game.
We apply these considerations to derive hypotheses about differences be-
tween the strategy and response method experiments. We expect that the two
methods have a different impact on offers than on acceptance decisions, which
is reflected in the two hypotheses we derive in the following.
Offers in both the strategy and the response game are made without any
knowledge of the opponent’s characteristics. Thus, offers are made under un-
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certainty. For a “rational”, reflected decision (be it selfish or norm adhering),
the proposer has to consider her fairness principle and the acceptance thresh-
old of her responder, i.e. the lowest offer the responder will be willing to accept.
Thus, in both the strategy and the response game, the proposer has to form be-
liefs about an unknown distribution of acceptance thresholds in the population
of responders. Hence, we expect no differences in offers between both meth-
ods, because both are identical in terms of revealing no information about the
responders.
Hypothesis 5 There is no difference in offers between response and strategy game.
The acceptance decisions in the strategy game are structurally similar to of-
fer decisions. Subjects do not receive any information about the opponents. This
will frame the situation such that subjects will elicit their normative principles.
However, for acceptance decisions in the response game, the situation is differ-
ent. The responders do receive information about the offer. They do not have
to elicit a principle for every hypothetical outcome but have to consider their
decision for one concrete offer. The emphasis is not on what subjects would in
principle do but rather as to whether they would be willing to accept one sin-
gle, concrete offer. This specificity triggers to think rather in terms of their least
acceptable offer than of their normative principle and whether they are “stub-
born” enough to reject anything below their principle. Hence, we expect sub-
jects to be more tolerant when confronted with concrete offers in the response
game in contrast to the strategy game, in which we expect subjects to be driven
more strongly by their normative principles, yielding to lower acceptance rates.
Hypothesis 6 The acceptance rate is higher in the response than in the strategy game.
3.6 .2 Analysis of offers in strategy and response game
In the following, we adjudicate offer behavior in the strategy and the response
game. In order to achieve a robust comparison, we consider in the strategy game
only those decisions that are payment-relevant; those decisions are excluded,
which asked for behavior with counterfactual pie sizes. This means that from
the 42 decisions of every subject in the strategy game, only 1 is considered in the
remainder. Furthermore, the number of players per role reduces to 46, as every
player plays either as proposer or as responder in the response game.
Result 5 Offers do not significantly differ between response and strategy game.
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First, we analyze aggregate effects such as the median offer in both experi-
ments and the respective variances. Figure 3.5(a) indicates that the (aggregated)
offers do not differ in both methods. A Wilcoxon signed rank test confirms this
impression (p=0.17).
(1) (2)
offer offer
b/p b/p
treatment (response = 1) 0.038 -0.012
(0.052) (0.910)
effort -0.013
(0.934)
treatment × effort 0.106
(0.625)
constant 0.434 0.440
(0.000) (0.000)
subjects 46 46
p-values in parentheses
Table 3.1. OLS regression estimating the differences in offers between strategy and
response game experiment. The variable “treatment” is a dummy variable, taking the
value 1 if decisions are elicited in the response game and 0 for those in the strategy
game. “effort” is given by the relative contribution of the responder to the common pool.
“treatment×effort” describes the interaction of both terms. The p-values regarding the
simple treatment effect (model 1) and the importance of effort (model 2) are above the
critical value of 0.05, yielding no significantly different offers in the two experiments.
We confirm these results with linear OLS regression models using treatment
(strategy vs. response experiment) as the only predictor for the offer. Model
(1) in table 3.1 demonstrates that this effect is not significant (b=0.038, p>0.05).
Moreover, we support the result of the null differences between the two ex-
periments with an interaction effect concerning the effort. We added effort as a
predictor and, more importantly, the interaction between treatment and effort.
As with the simple analysis, the experiments do not generate different proposer
behavior with regard to effort, as can be seen from the interaction term in model
(2) of table 3.1 (b=0.106, p=0.625).
We proceed with decomposing the aggregate results into single decisions.
Figure 3.5(b) depicts the differences between a proposer’s offer in the strategy
game and the same person’s offer in the response game. In 17 cases, proposers
did not react differently in both games, while another 17 proposers offered more
and 12 offered less in the response game than in the strategy game. The distri-
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Fig. 3.5. Offers in the strategy game and the response game on the aggregate level (left)
and differences in offers on the individual level (right). There are no statistically significant
differences on the aggregate level, but only 17 out of 46 proposers offer exactly the same
in both games. Twelve subjects offer less and 17 subjects offer more in the response
game than in the strategy game.
bution is slightly right-skewed, as there are more people giving much less in
the strategy game compared to the response game; however, the differences are
small.
3.6 .3 Analysis of acceptance decisions in strategy and response
game
While there are little differences with respect to offers, we find large differences
in the acceptance behavior of responders. About 40% of the responders rejected
the offer in the strategy game (17 out of 46) but only one responder rejected it
in the response game. A Pearson’s χ2-test reveals that this difference is highly
significant (p <0.001). We confirm these results with logistic regressions testing
the treatment effect. The results demonstrate highly significant differences (see
the treatment effect in table 3.2 with b=3.273 and p=0.003).
Result 6 The acceptance rate is significantly higher in the response game than in the
strategy game.
The calculation of the interaction effect between treatment and effort, as we
presented it for offers, is more difficult for acceptance behavior. In fact, the large
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differences in the two experiments cause such a reduced variance that we can-
not properly test the interaction. Therefore, we do not report respective inter-
action effects between treatment and effort, because these would lead to biased
and probably insignificant estimates due to little statistical power.
(1)
accepted
treatment (response = 1) 3.273
(0.003)
constant 0.534
(0.084)
subjects 46
p-values in parentheses
Table 3.2. Logistic regression estimating the effect of differences in acceptance of offers
between strategy and response experiment. The variable “treatment” is a dummy variable,
taking the value of 1 if decisions are elicited in the response game and 0 for those of
the strategy experiment. Model 1 demonstrates a significantly higher acceptance rate
of offers in the response game. Hence, the response method does induce significantly
higher probabilities of acceptance than the strategy method.
As with the offers, we confirm our results with decomposing the aggregate
results of the acceptance behavior into single decisions (Figure 3.6). The figure
compares only those 17 offers which were rejected in the strategy game to the
same responder’s reaction in the response game. This decomposition supports
that the response game elicits higher acceptance rates compared to the strat-
egy game. It happens frequently that offers which are accepted in the response
game are rejected in the strategy game. Figure 3.6 illustrates in addition the
magnitude of this effect. Even five or ten Euros less is accepted in the response
game, while it is rejected in the strategy game. The only one rejected offer in
the response game is an outlier in two respects. It is the only rejected offer in
the response game and the offer in the response game was even higher than in
the strategy game. In conclusion, the strategy method rather measures norma-
tive principles whereas the response method the intensity these principles are
adhered to.
3.7 Discussion
Our study investigated the potential of behavioral experiments to measure so-
cial norms. We extended the ultimatum game by implementing the “strategy
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Fig. 3.6. Differences between accepted and rejected offers in the response game and
the thresholds in the strategy game. All accepted offers in the response game were up to
10 Euro less than the responders’ threshold in the strategy game. The only rejected offer
was 4 Euro higher than the respective threshold in the strategy game.
method” and therewith extended the analysis of social norms in experimen-
tal economics to a sociological one by measuring sociological concepts such as
conditionality, intensity and consensus of social norms. The experiment started
with a real effort task, determining the individual amount of the participants’
bargaining money. Participants showed different levels of effort and had to
contribute their respective money in a common pool. Then, bargaining deci-
sions over this common pool were elicited using the strategy method, which
allows for the measurement of distinct social norms regarding fair divisions of
the common pool between proposer and responder. It could be shown that the
strategy method allows for the measurement of conditional bargaining norms
such that the proposed and requested amount of money was conditional on the
individual effort. Second, it could be demonstrated that the strategy method
enables the measurement of the level of normative consensus. The data shows
that a variety of social norms coexist in the population. For example, some ac-
tors adhere to equity norms, which prescribe that the common money should
be allocated according to the individual contribution, while others comply with
equality norms, prescribing equal divisions irrespective of effort.
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We evaluate the validity of our method for measuring social norms by a
methodological experiment, comparing results from the first experiment with
the strategy method with those from an additional, “conventional” ultima-
tum game experiment. In the second experiment, the same real effort task was
employed, but bargaining behavior was elicited with the so-called “response”
method. As predicted, the proposers’ offer did not differ between both exper-
iments, but more offers were accepted in the response game. We attribute this
difference to the fact that both methods measure different concepts. The strat-
egy method elicits the normative principles of the respondents, while the accep-
tance decision in the response game the intensity with which these principles
are adhere to.
Beyond the relation with previous experimental studies in economics, our
findings relate and confirm what is known from factorial surveys in sociology.
First, the lack of normative consensus regarding equity and equality norms of
distributive justice has been described by means of factorial surveys (Jasso and
Wegener 1999). Second, our findings from comparing the more “fictitious” strat-
egy method with the more “observational” response method are similar to pre-
vious findings, comparing the “fictitious” factorial survey with “observational”
field data. Recent comparisons regarding pro-social behavior demonstrate that
factorial surveys rather elicit normative expectations and general rules whereas
field studies evaluate whether subjects are actually willing to comply with these
rules in specific situations (Shepelak and Alwin 1986, Eifler 2007, Groß and
Börensen 2008, Nisic and Auspurg 2008). This finding that factorial surveys
elicit higher rates of pro-social behavior than those found in “the field”, relates
to our findings of higher rates of pro-social behavior in the strategy compared
to the response experiment with regard to the punishment of norm violators by
rejections of their offers.
In conclusion, the strategy method provides the social scientist with a rea-
sonable measure of social norms using counterfactual questions, which are nev-
ertheless associated with real, monetary consequences. Thus, controlled labora-
tory and field experiments should be considered as an additional tool in the
triangulated assessment of social norms. Findings from the laboratory comple-
ment results from non-experimental studies, revealing a more realistic picture
of norm-adhering behavior. The increased consideration of laboratory experi-
ments in sociology would foster the understanding of the micro-mechanisms
generating societal macro-outcomes, whose properties are though measurable
with conventional methods such as surveys, but hardly understandable with-
out the fine-grained complement of laboratory research.
How norms can generate conflict: An experiment on the
failure of cooperative micro-motives on the macro-level 1
Chapter four
Why is it that people consider our behavior as improper despite our best coop-
erative intentions? Should norm adherence not prevent us from running into
conflict? For instance, why is it that well-intentioned, expensive hospitality
presents are often rejected? For what reasons is a well-meant offer of a seat in a
bus angrily rejected by a sprightly elderly person? How to explain that getting
“straight to the point” in a business meeting is often perceived as unmannerly?
These everyday life examples are puzzling, considering that norms are of-
ten praised for their cohesive effects and regarded as a “lubricant” of social
order. Even scholars of opposed schools of thought seem to converge around
the idea that social norms emerge because they have positive consequences for
society. In the functionalist approach, norms bridge the tension between indi-
vidual self-interest and the functional prerequisites of society (Durkheim 1997
[1897]; Parsons 1937; Dahrendorf 1958). The rational choice literature studies
conditions under which individuals will overcome their self-interest in order
to contribute to cooperation norms in society (Taylor 1976; Ullmann-Margalit
1977; Bicchieri 1990; Coleman 1990; Ellickson 1991; Voss 2001). Interestingly, the
emphasis of the arguments in both traditions is on the positive societal effects
of social norms: “The view that norms are created to prevent negative external-
ities, or to promote positive ones, is virtually canonical in the rational choice
literature.” (Hechter and Opp 2001:xvi)
In our view, however, social norms do not only promote cohesion, they can
also undermine it. In this article, we take a new perspective on social norms.
In the following, we develop a theory of normative conflict which analyzes the
conditions under which social norms are likely to create transaction failures.
1 This chapter is joint work with Heiko Rauhut and Dirk Helbing and is accepted for publication
as (Winter et al. forthcoming) in Social Forces.
54
4 How norms can generate conflict 55
The main problem here is not to overcome self-interest but to agree on the norm
which should be followed. It is remarkable how little attention has been de-
voted to normative conflict, although there are numerous examples beyond the
everyday faux pas mentioned above. Below, we give examples of persistent,
severe, and harmful cases of normative conflict, all of which are relevant to ma-
jor fields in sociology such as the sociology of science, organizational sociology,
and economic sociology.
For example, while most academic disciplines are agreed on what makes a
“good” publication, two norms coexist in sociology: publishing in books and
publishing in peer-reviewed journals (Clemens et al. 1995). Publications have
an enormous influence in the respective fields as reputation, grant acquisitions,
or getting a job largely rely on publication records. Especially in mixed genre
departments, however, finding the right metric of merit may lead to conflicts
and prolonged faculty meetings due to conflicting opinions about what consti-
tutes a good way of communicating scientific results.
Similarly, multiple norms for signaling and receiving credit for authorship
coexist between and within different academic fields (Zuckerman 1968; Hudson
1996; Tscharntke et al. 2007), e.g., alphabetic ordering, bracketing (with the main
contributor as the first author and the supervisor at the end), ordering based on
merits (in a decreasing order based on relative contributions), or even multiple
first authors (with a footnote identifying all authors who contributed equally to
the work). If norms clash and authors cannot agree on which norm to apply to
order the names, fruitful collaborations may not come about and even finished
manuscripts might remain unpublished.
These kinds of conflicts are of course not limited to academia. In 1998, the
car manufacturers Mercedes-Benz and Chrysler Corp. merged to become Daim-
lerChrysler AG. In the following years, differences in the local norms of the
companies led to severe conflicts, with Chrysler’s employees being dissatisfied
with the bureaucratic regime concerning travel expenses and the like, while the
Daimler employees were dissatisfied with Chrysler’s reduced output (Weber
and Camerer 2003). By 2005, the new company had lost 50 billion of its value
until Mercedes-Benz finally sold its Chrysler shares in 2007.
In another case, the software company Microsoft wanted to merge with the
Internet pioneer Yahoo!, a deal widely welcomed on the stock markets. By the
time the negotiations became public, many employees at Yahoo! felt increas-
ingly uncomfortable with being part of Microsoft’s supposedly bureaucratic
system and preferred to work in the relaxed atmosphere of their current em-
ployer. After several meetings of the companies’ managements had been unsuc-
cessful in finding a price for a friendly takeover, a member of the Microsoft man-
agement excluded the possibility of a hostile takeover, stating: “They are going
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to burn the furniture if we go hostile. They are going to destroy the place.”1
These examples demonstrate the disintegrative character of social norms,
providing the underlying intuition of our theory of normative conflict. The nov-
elty of our contribution is threefold: First, we analyze how norms, each of which
may be perfectly fine, may cause problems if they conflict. Second, we show
how experimental data can be used to classify people according to their norms.
In particular, we introduce a new experimental design yielding fine-grained
measures of different normative types in the population and develop statistical
methods for extracting and disentangling these types. Third, we identify two
elements of norms, i.e., content (the basic rule to follow) and commitment (the
balance between self-interest and norm), and investigate which of them is more
responsible for conflicts.
Our analysis further contributes to the discussion of the micro-macro links
in sociology (Raub et al. 2011) by providing an in-depth understanding of
the emergence of normative conflict from cooperative intentions. This is done
by developing a game theoretical model of conflicting distribution norms for
which we assume heterogeneous populations regarding actors’ normative ex-
pectations. Here, normative conflict is understood as transaction failure resulting
from different expectations.
4.1 A perspective of normative conflict
To specify the concept of normative conflict, we can distinguish two elements
that constitute the structure of social norms. We define a social norm as a com-
monly known behavioral expectation of how an actor ought to behave, which is
enforced by sanctions in case of violations.2 Within a social norm, two elements
specify the factors that generate behavioral expectations: the kind of action that
should be, on the one hand, and the intensity of the action, on the other. We
term the first element normative content. The normative content may be defined
as the kind of behavior that is prescribed or proscribed in a given situation. It
provides information about which of the situation’s characteristics should be
evaluated when choosing an action. We term the second element level of nor-
mative commmitment, indicating that social norms imply commitments. Nor-
1 Steve Lohr: “Microsoft’s Failed Yahoo Bid Risks Online Growth”, New York Times, May 5,
2008.
2 For a discussion of different definitions of social norms, see Opp (2001) and Elster (1989); for
a current review on social norms, see Rauhut and Krumpal (2008); for literature on the punish-
ment aspect, see Yamagishi (1986) and Heckathorn (1989); and for a microscopic foundation of
coordination norms, see Helbing (1992) and also Young (1993).
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mative expectations usually commit actors to restrict their self-interest in favor
of some other person’s or group’s well-being. Consequently, we define this level
of normative commitment as the extent to which an actor ought to sacrifice her
own interests to comply with the norm. The level of normative commitment
is not fixed. While some norms may require strong restrictions, others are less
demanding.
The level of normative commitment and the normative content are triggered
by normative cues. These serve as context-specific signals, specifying which of
the many possible norms should be applied to what extent. However, these sig-
nals can be fuzzy and there are sometimes many and ambiguous cues. Hence,
choosing the right cues constitutes an important factor for successful coordina-
tion.
Paradoxically, actors may adhere to social norms, believe they behave cor-
rectly and, nevertheless, have conflicts with each other. Consequently, we can
define normative conflict as the transaction failure resulting from actors holding
(at least) partially exclusive normative expectations of how they ought to be-
have in a given norm-relevant situation. We demonstrate with some examples
how normative conflict emerges due to actors’ adherence to different normative
contents or different levels of normative commitment. The distinction between
content and commitment of a norm enables us to classify two different types
of normative conflict, which we illustrate in the following by referring to social
norms of distributive justice.
The first source of normative conflict could be that each of a number of actors
regards a different commitment as appropriate. It is inherent in many social
dilemmas and public goods problems. It may also lie in a social context where
people share a norm but some of them act to some extent as free riders. A robust
finding states that the gradual decline of cooperation is driven by the fact that
there are some people who do not want to contribute their fair share, even if
they accept the need to provide the good (Yamagishi 1986; Ostrom et al. 1992).
Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) study this dynamics, showing that only minor
undercutting leads conditional cooperators to reduce their efforts. Thus, few
shirkers can lead to a global emergence of conflict on the macro-level.
The second source of normative conflict may be the adherence to differ-
ent normative contents. For example, when it comes to performance-related
salaries, blue-collar employees consider harmful working conditions as an im-
portant determinant, while white-collar employees stress value creation (Hy-
man and Brough 1975) . In another study, soldiers differed in whether military
merits or the fact that someone was married and had children should be consid-
ered important for an early demobilization after World War II (Stouffer 1949).
Thus, attributes of working conditions, family status, or having children may
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serve as cues which determine the allocation of scarce goods (such as money or
demobilization).
Conflict may also emerge if some people do not accept certain cues which
are claimed to be valid by other groups. Think of a group of employees in a
firm calling for equal pay in contrast to a second group demanding a payment
scheme solely based on added value.
4.2 Bargaining norms as an exemplification of normative
conflict
We further elaborate our concept of normative conflict by exemplifying it in
the framework of distributive justice norms. The general class of questions we
consider belong, for example, to the type of distribution of work in households
(Sanchez 1994; DeMaris and Longmore 1996; Wilcox and Nock 2005), the fair-
ness of relative wage differences (Fehr and Gächter 2000), or the criteria for the
allocation of organ donations (Elster 1992; Gross and Kriwy 2008).
In these contexts, social norms can be thought of as a function mapping in-
dividuals’ characteristics to expected outcomes. However, it is often not clear
(i) which of these characteristics serve as a valid cue, (ii) and whether there is
consensus about the validity of the respective characteristics and (iii) about the
implied degree of normative commitment.
4.2 .1 Conditional and unconditional bargaining norms
The greatest emphasis in the literature has been placed on identifying which
individual characteristics are considered (to be) valid in a certain context. In
a seminal work, Eckhoff (1974) identifies some fundamental norms commonly
applied in social exchange situations. These norms, or “rules,” can be roughly
distinguished as to whether they do or do not take individual characteristics,
such as a person’s needs, efforts, or status, into account.
Some norms can be considered unconditional as they do not condition on in-
dividual characteristics and treat people as equal (Jasso and Opp 1997). We term
these norms equality norms. The demand for these norms often increases when
harmony in a group is paramount (Leventhal et al. 1980) and when people re-
peatedly interact over a long period of time. As long as the persons involved
are not too different with respect to need, status, or investments in a project,
equality norms are the method of choice. Equality norms are cognitively unde-
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manding, exemplified by the fact that young children often apply the equality
norm, while older children are capable of using more sophisticated rules.
Other norms allocate resources conditional on individual characteristics. They
prescribe, for instance, allocations as a function of status or the centrality in
networks. 3 Wages are often influenced by these rules such as seniority-based
salary (Stainback et al. 2010). footnoteThe status of the owner can also affect the
perceived value of a good. At auctions, golf clubs owned by John F. Kennedy
sell for much higher prices than “ordinary” golf clubs (Thye 2000, Thye et al.
2005). Under different circumstances, need has been found to be the only valid
criterion; nevertheless, efforts and merits are relevant in other contexts. The al-
location of organs is an important application of this norm (Elster 1992). There
is a lively debate about who should receive an organ if demand exceeds supply.
Should the chances of survival, the time on the waiting list, or the responsibility
for taking care of own children count as valid cues? The acceptance of cues also
depends on the selector’s characteristics (Ubel et al. 2001), and the need may be
perceived as more important among close friends rather than strangers (Lamm
and Schwinger 1980).
Among the conditional norms, the merit-based equity norm is the most rel-
evant for our study and has been extensively studied in equity theory. Equity
norms assert that the individual input is the only valid criterion which deter-
mines the output. Those who invest more effort will be compensated more gen-
erously ( Homans 1961; Blau 1964; Adams 1965; Cook and Emerson 1978). By ef-
fort we understand individual contributions in terms of time, endeavor, energy,
or other valuable individual resources to achieve a goal. Adams’ (1965) classi-
cal definition of equity refers to the equivalence of the quotient of outcome and
effort (Oi/Ei = Oj/Ej) for all involved actors i, j. As Harris (1976) points out,
this formulation of equity is rather simple, but it captures the relevant point.
4.2 .2 Normative conflict over commitments
In many situations, there may be a general agreement that allocations should
be made on the ground of individual efforts. But there is disagreement about to
what extent this cue should bind the decision maker. If two persons agree that
3 Status value theory (Berger et al. 1972) defines fair compensations from the more abstract
perspective of “what is just for someone with my status” rather than by comparing interact-
ing agents. It thereby considers structural aspects of a situation or society which are somewhat
disregarded in exchange theory. Status value theory aims at explaining why something is con-
sidered fair, while our study rather investigates people’s reactions toward unfairness. Of course,
this has consequences for the concept of norms. While status value theory asks “what is nor-
mal,” we ask how one should be treated compared to an interaction partner.
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an equality norm should be applied, they may still run into conflict if one of
them tries to take advantage and claims a bigger share (see fig. 4.1 (a)). The same
kind of conflict may emerge if both agree on an equity norm but one of them
discounts the other person’s effort and offers a smaller share (see fig. 4.1 (a)).
The conflict over commitments arises over balancing the norm with individual
self-interest, and it may be present even if all actors agree on the same norm.
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Fig. 4.1. Illustration of normative conflict resulting from the adherence to different nor-
mative commitments (a and b) or different normative contents (c). In (a), the normative
conflict arises between one person adhering strongly to the unconditional equality norm
and another adhering only weakly to that norm. The same applies in (b) for the equity
norm, which is conditional on relative contributions to a “project.” In (c), the conflict is
caused by the different requirements of the unconditional (equality norm) and the condi-
tional equity norm.
4.2 .3 Normative conflict over contents
Apart from the normative commitment, we have identified the different norma-
tive contents as a source of conflict. In the framework of bargaining norms, it
there is no doubt that equity and equality norms can solve a cooperation prob-
lem – probably even equally well. Moreover, both norms have the same impli-
cations if effort levels are about equal: outcomes should be split equally. But if
inputs are different, both norms imply different allocations (see fig. 4.1 (c)). A
low contributor claiming equal shares would not agree on getting only his input
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share. However, someone with an equity norm who contributed larger amounts
would not agree on handing over more than the other’s input share. In this case,
cooperative intentions are not enough to reach a cooperative solution. Thus, a
population has to coordinate on one principle to avoid conflict. Normative con-
flict over contents results from the balancing between two distinct and at least
partially exclusive norms. This kind of conflict may exist even if all actors fully
comply with their respective norms in the absence of any self-interested reason-
ing.
4.3 Derivation of hypotheses on normative conflict
4.3 .1 A general model of normative behavior and its application
to the ultimatum game
In this section, we formally derive the existence of normative conflict from a
simple and tractable model which has become prominent in the experimental
literature on social norms. We prove two propositions, namely that (i) norma-
tive agreement is always possible if subjects agree on the same normative cue
and that (ii) conflict may be unavoidable if there is disagreement about the un-
derlying cue. To sketch the proof of proposition (ii), think of someone who made
a major contribution to a common project and believes she should be compen-
sated accordingly. The less willing she is to accept an equal split, the stronger
her commitment to the equity principle. The interaction may result in conflict
if her interaction partner contributed only little but strongly claims an egalitar-
ian allocation. We prove the existence of a threshold as a function of individual
contributions and the commitment to the norm. Conflict is likely to emerge if
the differences in contributions go beyond this threshold.4
To investigate these questions, we apply general theories of normative be-
havior and analyze conditions under which alternative norms are in conflict
with each other. Christina Bicchieri (2006) has formulated such a general model,
which is flexible enough to allow for an analysis of normative conflict. Unlike
other models of normative behavior,5 Bicchieri’s model is flexible with respect
4 The reader who is not interested in the details of game theoretical reasoning may proceed
directly to section 4.3 .3.
5 There are a number of models of normative (or fair) behavior, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999);
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000); Rabin (1993); Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004); Falk and Fis-
chbacher (2006); Frohlich et al. (2004).
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to normative content, thereby allowing the analysis of conflict between different
normative contents.6
The workhorse of our theoretical as well as experimental investigation of
normative conflict is a variant of the ultimatum game experiment (Güth et al.
1982). The classical ultimatum game is regarded as a parsimonious measure for
distributive justice and fairness norms: a proposer and a responder bargain over
a given amount of money pi, called the pie. The proposer offers a share of the pie
to the responder. If the responder accepts the offer, she receives the share and
the proposer may keep the rest of the pie. If the responder rejects the offer, the
pie is lost and nobody receives anything.
Empirical results indicate that the ultimatum game meets the three criteria
of social norms stated above. Responders have normative expectations about
the proposer’s behavior so that low offers are frequently rejected. This may be
regarded as costly punishment of norm violations. Proposers anticipate such
potential sanctions and form respective beliefs. These beliefs trigger behavioral
regularities such that offers below 20 percent of the pie are rare and close-to-
equal splits are the most frequent outcome (Roth 1995). This matches our defi-
nition of social norms given above, according to which there is 1) a commonly
known behavioral expectation 2) among the responder and the proposer, 3)
which is enforced by sanctions in case of norm violations (here: rejection of the
offer).
The conflict resulting from different norms can only emerge when there is
room for at least two reasonable social norms. We therefore extend the ultima-
tum game by introducing an additional task, namely the production of the pie
in the beginning. The proposer and the responder may in this way build claims
with respect to their efforts.
For the simplicity of the argument, assume that the utility of player i ∈
[p =proposer, r =responder] of a share of the pie x ∈ [0, pi] can be evaluated
as a function of the material outcome x, the content Ni of her norm, and the
commitment ki ≥ 0 to her norm.7 The general formulation of normative behav-
ior allows to include different normative contents Ni for the proposer and the
responder, facilitating the analysis of normative conflict. Norm Ni denotes the
amount a player thinks he or she should receive under his/her norm. To define
the content of Ni, we utilize two well-established distinct streams of research in
behavioral economics and sociology. Probably the most cited formulation of an
equality norm is the model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). It implicitly
attributes egalitarian norms to the subject’s utility function which regards
6 The model is more complex in its general form and accounts for a variety of games. We refer
to chap. 1 of Bicchieri’s book for a more general discussion.
7 The way we model utility has not been undisputed. For a discussion, see Binmore and Shaked
(2010); Fehr and Schmidt (2010); Eckel and Gintis (2010).
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Nequality =
1
n
× pi (4.1)
as the normative solution (which reduces to 50 : 50 in the case of n = 2
players).
However, other players may have internalized the equity norm instead.8 In
this case, a player takes the relative effort into account when evaluating the
material outcome in the light of her normative expectation. The previously in-
troduced equity norm is thus given by the respective relative effort
Nequity = ei =
efforti∑n
j=1 effortj
× pi. (4.2)
For the following discussion we normalize the size of the pie to 1 such that
we can denote the proposer’s effort by ep and the responder’s effort by 1− ep.
Furthermore, players can be committed to “their” norm to a different ex-
tent. The model assumes for the normative commitment ki ≥ 0. If ki is equal
to zero, norms do not play a role, while for players with large ki social norms
have profound behavioral implications. For the following analysis we assume
common knowledge of the players’ efforts, their norms Ni, and their normative
commitments ki.9
In case the responder rejects, both players’ utility is given by
Up,reject = Ur,reject = 0.
If the responder accepts an offer x,
Up,accept(x,Np, kp) = 1− x− kp max[Np − (1− x), 0] (4.3a)
is the proposer’s utility, and
Ur,accept(x,Nr, kr) = x− kr max[Nr − x, 0] (4.3b)
the responder’s utility.
8 For a related formulation of a utility function, see Frohlich et al. (2004))
9 Relaxing the assumption of common knowledge does not qualitatively change the results;
however, a more advanced version of a Bayesian game theoretical analysis would be clearly
beyond the scope of the present article.
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However, in the case of full commitment (ki →∞), utility is reduced and be-
comes negative for even smallest deviations from the “normative share.” Play-
ers do not discount their utility, however, if they receive more than expected,
which is implied by the maximum of Eq. (4.3a) and Eq. (4.3b).10 Consequently,
players only care about norm violations if they receive less than if their norm
is followed. A responder accepts an offer x if her related utility is at least zero,
otherwise she rejects. Given the common knowledge of the norms and the nor-
mative commitment pursued by each player, a rational proposer would make
an offer that maximizes her utility but keeps the utility of the responder non-
negative.
If the responder is not committed to any norm so that kr = 0, the utility of x
is simply given by f(x) = x. Then, the acceptance threshold is given by standard
game theory with t∗ = 0. The proposer anticipates this and will therefore offer
zero. If kr is positive, the responder’s utility of x decreases if she receives less
than what she expected.
If we plug the equality norm (4.1) and the equity norm (4.2) into the util-
ity functions (Eqs. 4.3a and 4.3b), four cases can occur: both players share the
equity norm, they share the equality norm, the proposer holds the equity and
the responder the equality norm, or the proposer holds the equality and the re-
sponder the equity norm. In case the proposer holds the equity norm, Eq. (4.3a)
becomes
Up,accept(x,Np, kp) = 1− x− kp max[ep − (1− x), 0],
while for the responder who holds an equity norm, Eq. (4.3b) becomes
Ur,accept(x,Nr, kr) = x− kr max[er − x, 0].
For the case of an equality norm, the proposer’s utility is given by
Up,accept(x,Np, kp) = 1− x− kp max[1/2− (1− x), 0]
,
and the responders utility is given by
Ur,accept(x,Nr, kr) = x− kr max[1/2− x, 0].
Solving the responder’s utility function Ur,accept(x,Nr, kr) = 0 with respect to
x returns the responder’s acceptance threshold
10 To keep the model tractable, we exclude the case where subjects feel guilt about being better
off than their norm prescribes. However, the qualitative results of the analysis do not change
when allowing for the consideration of guilt.
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t∗ =
krNr
1 + kr
. (4.4)
If x < t∗, the utility of acceptance is smaller than the utility of rejection so
that the responder will reject even positive amounts.
4.3 .2 Application of the model to study normative conflict
We can now investigate the macro-level results of interacting players. The first
two cases prove that, given the restriction of complete information, normative
conflict does not emerge if players share the same norm.
Proposition 4.1. If proposers and responders share the same norm, that is, if Np =
Nr = 1/2 or if Np = ep and Nr = (1 − ep), and if the normative adherence (as given
by Np, Nr, kp, kr) is common knowledge, there is no normative conflict, i.e., there exists
an offer x ≥ t∗ which will be presented by the proposer and accepted by the responder
for all kp and kr.
Proof: See Appendix C.
On the other hand, proposers and responders may adhere to different norms,
which can cause normative conflict even under complete information. Intu-
itively speaking, an equity proposer with a high effort level will not agree to
offer the equal split to an equality responder because she has contributed too
little. Conversely, an equality proposer who has contributed only a little will
not agree to offer only her effort level. Figure 4.2 is meant to illustrate the argu-
ment in an intuitive way.
Normative conflict between holders of different norms occurs if the differ-
ences in efforts are too extreme. What “too extreme” means depends on the
normative commitment of the two players. We therefore have to evaluate the
model in (4.3a) and (4.3b) from the other side: as we already know the accep-
tance threshold for the responder, we are interested to see for which differences
in efforts the proposer’s utility of an accepted offer is still positive. Plugging the
acceptance threshold of the responder into the utility function of the proposer
and solving this equation with respect to the proposer’s effort, ep yields the crit-
ical threshold θ of relative effort. If an equity proposer contributed more than
the threshold (ep > θ) or an equality proposer less than the threshold (ep < θ),
both parties receive a higher utility from a rejected rather than an accepted offer.
Proposition 4.2. Let θ be the critical threshold of the proposer’s relative effort given by
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Fig. 4.2. Illustration of normative conflict due to different normative contents. The θ de-
notes the threshold of relative effort beyond which conflict is inevitable for holders of
different norms and sufficiently high normative commitments. In (a), the normative con-
flict between an equality proposer and an equity responder occurs if the responder con-
tributed more effort than the critical threshold θ. In this case, a decreasing commitment
to the equity norm reduces the responder’s claims, though not as much as the proposer
would be willing to offer. In (b), the situation is reversed. The proposer holds an equity
norm while the responder holds an equality norm. Conflict is inevitable, if the responder
contributed less than the critical value θ but has an acceptance threshold of almost 50%.
θ =

kpkr − kp − 2
2kr + 2kpkr
>
1
2
if Nr = (1− ep), Np = 12 ,
kp > 1, and kr > 2(kp−1) ,
kpkr + 2kp + kr + 2
2kp + 2kpkr
<
1
2
if Nr = 12 , Np = ep,
kp > 1, and kr > 2(kp−1) ,
1 otherwise.
(4.5)
If Np = ep, Nr = 1/2, and ep > θ, rejection is a subgame perfect equilibrium for
certain values of kp and kr. If Np = 1/2, Nr = (1− ep), and (1− ep) > θ, rejection is
a subgame perfect equilibrium for certain values of kp and kr.
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Proof: See Appendix C.
In summary it can be said that normative conflict as a result of different nor-
mative contents emerges if the differences in efforts are above a specific thresh-
old. This threshold is given as a function of the different norms subjects adhere
to and the respective commitment to their norm. On the other hand, even peo-
ple adhering to different norms are able to avoid conflict if they are sufficiently
tolerant or do not differ too much from each other with respect to their norm-
relevant criteria such as effort.
4.3 .3 Hypotheses
Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate that normative conflict does not occur if
proposer and responder adhere to the same norm and have common knowl-
edge about their normative types. This holds for all effort levels and normative
commitments. If proposer and responder hold different norms, however, nor-
mative conflict is inevitable if their differences regarding efforts and normative
commitments are too large.
These propositions follow from assuming common knowledge about the
players’ types. Relaxing this assumption would have to take into account the
fact that neither the respective norms nor the respective commitment to the
norms are commonly known. In this case, a proposer would have to maximize
her expected utility over (priors of) distributions of norms and commitments.
We performed preliminary theoretical analyses for this case, which yielded re-
sults qualitatively similar to the results in the previous section. There is more
normative conflict among holders of norms with different contents than differ-
ent commitments. Further, the predicted rate of normative conflict is higher for
the case of incomplete information. The conclusion from both theoretical anal-
yses, both with common knowledge and without, is the following:
Hypothesis 7 There is more normative conflict over contents than over commitments.
We can derive a second hypothesis from our formal analysis of normative
conflict. In the ultimatum game with efforts, normative conflict over contents
means that players regard effort as either important or unimportant for their
normative evaluation. Therefore, if two players do not differ in their effort lev-
els, normative conflict does not arise. In contrast, if the differences in their effort
levels are large, the likelihood of conflict is high. This conjecture is illustrated in
figure 4.2, leading us to conclude the following:
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Hypothesis 8 The larger the differences between the efforts of proposer and responder,
the higher the probability of normative conflict.
4.4 Method
4.4 .1 The ultimatum game
In order to test our theory, we conducted a variation of the ultimatum game
experiment (Güth et al. 1982). In this game, a proposer and a responder bargain
over a given amount of money (the pie). The proposer offers a share of the pie to
the responder. If the responder accepts the offer, she receives the share and the
proposer can keep the rest of the pie. If the responder rejects the offer, the pie
is lost and nobody receives anything. This experiment is one of the most par-
simonious methods for measuring normative behavior. A high offer is usually
regarded as adherence to a fairness norm and the rejection as a punishment for
violating the norm. Appendix 2.1 .1 contains the full instructions.
4.4 .2 The real effort task
Our first variation of the ultimatum game introduced a real effort task by requir-
ing subjects to invest their own time prior to the experiment. Thus, each subject
could decide on her own to invest spare time in order to earn more money later
on. Five days before the experiment, subjects received a seven-page text of a
Wikipedia entry on the Westminster Palace by email.11 An accompanying letter
informed subjects that prior reading of the text would influence their possible
earnings in the experiment. We chose a rather specific topic to ensure that ev-
eryone had to learn the text and nobody could benefit from her respective field
of study (such as mathematics or paleontology). At the beginning of the labo-
ratory experiment, subjects had to answer twenty questions about Westminster
Palace. There were five answer categories, one of which was correct. For each
correct answer, subjects earned 1 euro. Thus, the maximum earning was 20 euro,
and purely random answers had an expected mean return of 4 euro. In the ul-
timatum bargaining part, the joint earnings of two randomly drawn players
were pooled to form the pie. This procedure was designed to induce a feeling
of personal effort and inherent monetary earnings. The effort, in particular, was
11 Wikipedia contributors, "Westminster Palace," Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, http://
de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palace_of_Westminster (accessed May 04, 2008 14:40)
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real in the sense that subjects had to spend their own spare time in preparation
for the experiment. In contrast, previous experiments measured effort based on
subjects’ performance during a fixed time in the lab, which was equal for all
subjects who had agreed to participate in the experiment.12
4.4 .3 The strategy vector method
Our second variation of the ultimatum game introduced an enhanced method
for measuring normative behavior on an individual level, called the strategy
vector method (Selten 1967; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Falk and Fischbacher 2002).
A “conventional” ultimatum game using efforts asks a proposer to offer her
responder a certain amount of money. The responder can accept or reject this
individual offer while both players know each other’s particular effort levels.
This method only allows to test offers and their acceptance for two particular
effort levels. In contrast, our implementation of the strategy vector method al-
lows to measure the offer and the acceptance for every possible combination of
effort levels. For illustration, consider the following example. From the pool of
all subjects, two subjects, i and j, were matched by the computer.13 Player i was
informed that she earned 10 euro in the quiz but not yet about player j’s effort
level and her actual role. Instead, we asked her about all decisions for every
possible effort level in both roles. In a first step, she was asked in the role of
proposer how much she offered if her responder j contributed 0 euro, 1 euro,
2 euro, . . . , 19 euro, 20 euro. In a second step, the roles switched, and player i
was asked about the minimal offer she was willing to accept if her proposer, j,
contributed 0 euro, 1 euro, 2 euro, . . . , 19 euro, 20 euro, which we refer to as
the “acceptance threshold.” Player i and player j similarly entered 21 decisions
as proposers and 21 decisions as responders. In a third step, the computer de-
termined the joint pie size of players i and j. Suppose that player i contributed
10 and player j 15 euros to the pie. The computer then compared whether the
proposer’s offer for the responder’s effort of 15 was at least as high as the re-
sponder’s acceptance threshold for a proposer’s effort of 10. The money was
paid out, if the offer was as high as, or higher than, the responder’s acceptance
threshold, otherwise the money was lost. Summing up, it can be said that the
12 For instance, Gächter and Riedl (2005) and Rauhut (2009) implemented a general knowledge
quiz without the opportunity to prepare for it beforehand and Frohlich et al. (2004) let subjects
proofread a text to correct spelling errors.
13 We matched two players from two separate rooms according to their results in the quiz. We
implemented two setups: the rule “best against best” enhanced the variance in the stake size
and the rule “best against worst” enhanced the variance between subjects.
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strategy vector method had the advantage that 21 decisions could be returned
in the role of proposer and 21 decisions in the role of responder for each subject
(rather than just 1 decision in the “conventional” ultimatum game).
4.4 .4 Discussion of the strategy vector method
There are three issues surrounding this discussion. 1) The strategy vector method
is often used in experiments as a means to avoid deceiving subjects while still
making sure that all combinations of interactive decisions can be observed
which are relevant for the researcher.14 However, the strategy vector method
is known to elicit decisions which may differ from decisions elicited under the
classical response method, as applied in the standard ultimatum game described
in section 4.4 .1. Entering all decisions at the same time encourages a linear ap-
proach to the task. This may result in an overestimation of consistent equity
or equality behavior and neglect that subjects actually have “psychological cut-
offs,” for example, that less than 30 percent is not worth much and more than
80 percent is almost like receiving everything.
2) Entering decisions for both roles could further trigger a sort of Rawlsian
thinking so that subjects tend to be put (“too much”) into the shoes of other sub-
jects, provoking overly normative behavior. Moreover, Rawlsian thinking may
be especially important for subjects in the role of proposer. This is why we let
subjects enter the proposer decisions prior to the responder decisions. In that
sense, they have not been “in the other’s shoes” yet so that “Rawlsian” bias will
be negligible. Answering all questions on one screen could also lead to a con-
sistency bias if subjects make one decision based on a principle rather than 21
decisions for every size of the pie. However, even if these biases existed, they
would support the isolation of normative beliefs in a payoff-relevant environ-
ment.
3) A third issue of the strategy method is known as the distinction between
“hot” vs. “cold” (Brandts and Charness 2000). The cold, partially hypothetical,
character of some of the decisions in the strategy vector ultimatum game could
make the responder more rational, i.e., in accepting lower offers. In turn, low of-
fers in the classical ultimatum game sometimes result in emotional rejections of
offers that are judged unfair. In a comparative study,Rauhut and Winter (2010)
find that proposers’ offers do not differ in fact but responders are willing to ac-
cept lower offers when asked directly as compared to elicitation via the strategy
method.
14 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this argument to us.
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4.4 .5 Procedure and participants
The experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software developed by Fisch-
bacher (2007). At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly as-
signed to one of the computer terminals. General instructions regarding the
procedure were given on paper. Subjects were informed about the knowledge
quiz, and it was once again pointed out that reading the text would have con-
siderable influence on their performance in the quiz and respective monetary
earnings. After completing the quiz subjects received the instructions for the
ultimatum game experiment. Next, they had to respond to test questions re-
garding the rules of the game up to three times, allowing us to verify whether
they had understood the rules. The experiment started when there were no fur-
ther questions to the experimenter. Communication was prohibited from that
point onward. After completing the ultimatum game experiment, subjects were
individually paid at their seats at the end of the session.
The participants were 92 undergraduate students of the Universität Leipzig
from a wide range of academic disciplines. Forty-seven subjects were male and
45 female. The experiment was conducted in two separate computerized labo-
ratories. The subjects were matched such that proposers and responders were
located in separate rooms. Three of our experimental sessions consisted of 20
subjects, one of 18 and one of 14 subjects.15
4.5 Measures
The content, commitment, and conflict of norms is measured as follows. The
content of a player’s norm is measured by the degree to which the relative of-
fer determines his or her decision. We discuss the classification for proposers,
but classifying responders follows the same criteria. The strategy method elicits
every offer for every relation of effort levels between proposer and responder.
These response profiles allow to estimate for each proposer an individual linear
function of how her relative effort determines her respective offer. This function
can be expressed by an individual regression model for each proposer, specify-
ing the relative effort as the explanatory and offer as the outcome variable. The
regression yields two parameters, intercept and slope, whose values are used
to classify proposers into those who adhere to the content of the equality or eq-
uity norm and those who do not adhere to social norms but to selfish reasoning.
More specifically, we can measure the content of the norm as follows:
15 In sessions 1 and 4, fewer subjects showed up than expected.
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Fig. 4.3. Classification of proposer and responder types. Subjects are assigned to types
according to specific thresholds. The respective thresholds for slope,intercept, and
slope2 are determined using a kernel density estimation.
Content of equity norm: The offer/acceptance function of an equity player is
characterized by a steep slope regarding how effort determines offers and ac-
ceptance thresholds, respectively.
Content of equality norm: The offer/acceptance function of an equality player
is characterized by a flat slope regarding how effort determines offers and ac-
ceptance thresholds, respectively. The intercept is relatively high and close to
the equal share of 50 %.
No norm adherence: Egoistic players are characterized by a flat slope and a low
intercept.
Normative conflict: Our measure of conflict is the rejection of an offer.
We measure norm-related conflict over contents by the rejection of an offer
made by a responder of a different normative type. In contrast, a rejection of
an offer among similar normative types represents norm-related conflict over
commitments. Our measurements are illustrated in figure 4.3.
4.6 Results
We explore the empirical patterns of normative conflict step by step using Cole-
man’s scheme of micro-macro links (Coleman 1990). First, we investigate the
macro-level structure of normative conflict by specifying necessary conditions
on the macro-level for normative conflict to emerge. Second, we investigate the
micro-level roots of normative conflict by classifying proposers and responders
into normative types. This utilizes our measurements of normative types and
normative conflict introduced in the previous measures section. Third and fi-
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nally, we examine how different individual normative behaviors aggregate to
normative conflict on the macro-level.
4.6 .1 Macro-level conditions for normative conflict
For the measurement of normative conflict in the case of ultimatum games with
efforts, four conditions have to be met so that a profound empirical analysis of
normative conflict becomes feasible. We examine the empirical validity of these
conditions by employing multilevel models. These quantify the impact of effort
on the proposer’s offer and the responder’s acceptance threshold and, more
importantly, on the variance in the subjects’ level of normative commitment in
their consideration of effort. Multilevel modeling takes into account that the 21
decisions per subject are not independent of each other. The multilevel models
applied in our analysis estimate the average effect of effort on the individual
level (fixed effect). Further, they estimate the standard deviation of the effect of
effort across individuals in the population (random effects). Moreover, multi-
level models estimate the average intercept and the standard deviation of this
intercept across individuals in the population.16
The first condition for measuring normative conflict requires that subjects
have to perceive the ultimatum game as a norm-relevant situation. Thus, almost
every subject has to believe that almost every other subject has a “normative”
expectation and not a selfish one. A selfish expectation would correspond to
the game theoretical concept of subgame perfect equilibria, and players with
“normative” expectations offer considerable amounts and reject low offers.17
Result 7 On average, proposers offer considerable amounts of money and low offers are
frequently rejected.
The empirical results of Table 4.1 confirm the first condition: subjects do un-
derstand the game as a norm-relevant situation. There is significant empirical
16 Put more technically, consider the offers and acceptance thresholds as a function of the re-
sponder’s relative effort
yij = (β1 + ζ1j) + (β2 + ζ2j)x2j + ij ,
where β1 is the population intercept, ζ1j and ζ2j are idiosyncratic error terms following the
distribution ζij ∼ N(0, ψ), xij is the relative effort of the responder, and ij is an independent
measurement error. The fixed effects part estimates β1 and β2, the random effects part estimates
ψ for ζ1j and ζ2j. For introductions to multilevel analysis, see Snijders and Bosker (1999b) and
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2005).
17 For empirical literature on typical ultimatum game outcomes without the consideration of
efforts, see Roth 1995; Cameron 1999; Hoffman et al. 1996; Oosterbeek et al. 2004; Güth et al.
2007.
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Proposer’s Responder’s
relative offer relative threshold
Fixed effects
N=1931 decisions
Intercept 0.33∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.025)
Responder’s relative effort 0.29∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.037)
Random effects
J= 92 subjects
Standard deviation intercepts 0.20∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.018)
Standard deviation responder’s efforts 0.39∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.027)
Correlation (responder’s efforts / intercepts) -0.84∗∗∗ -0.60∗∗∗
(-0.090) (-0.065)
Log-likelihood 2478.7 2950.4
Observations 1931 1931
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.1. Linear multilevel models for the impact of the responder’s efforts on the pro-
poser’s offers and responder’s relative acceptance thresholds. Effort, offers, and accep-
tance thresholds are normalized. This normalization expresses the efforts of responders
relative to the efforts of proposers (scaling from 0-1). Further, the offers and acceptance
thresholds are expressed in relation to the pie sizes (scaling from 0-1).
evidence that most players are guided by social norms rather than by playing
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of offering and accepting the smallest
possible amount. The intercept of the proposer shows that even in case the re-
sponder contributes nothing, proposers offer 33% of the pie, on average. Fur-
thermore, the responders’ positive intercept of 31% in the fixed effects part of
the model reveals that responders are punishing norm violations at own cost,
supporting that responders perceive the ultimatum game as norm relevant.
The second condition requires that effort has a significant impact on sub-
jects’ fairness decisions. This is in contrast to typical ultimatum game bargain-
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ing experiments, in which endowments are supposed to compensate the efforts
of subjects, i.e., the time spent in the lab (for an overview, see Güth 1995). In
these typical scenarios, the efforts are usually the same for all subjects, so that
the straightforward allocation norm is to split the pie equally. In contrast, our
method of generating different efforts to obtain the endowment introduces ef-
fort as an additional normative cue. This triggers the behavioral expectation of
an equity norm. Thus, at least for some subjects, effort should have a signifi-
cant impact on the fairness decisions in the ultimatum game, which establishes
a precondition for normative conflict.
Result 8 The higher the responders’ effort, the higher their least accepted offer, and the
higher the proposers’ offer.
Result 8 supports the second condition. A substantial fraction of subjects re-
gard the criterion of effort as norm relevant. In addition to the proposers’ and re-
sponders’ intercepts, the relative contribution to the common pool significantly
affects both, the offer and the acceptance threshold: if a responder contributed
the full pie, she receives a 29% higher offer and has a 15% higher acceptance
threshold than if the proposer contributed the full pie. The empirical relevance
of effort, therefore, provides the precondition for heterogeneity in normative
expectations.
A third macro-level condition is that subjects have to differ in their evalua-
tion of effort as a norm-relevant criterion. In more formal terms, the normative
conflict over contents requires heterogeneity of the population in their adher-
ence to different normative contents. In our context, some subjects have to ad-
here to the equity norm and others to the equality norm. This heterogeneity can
be measured if some subjects evaluate effort as important for their offer and
acceptance decisions (the “equity players”), while others do not consider it as
important (the “equality players”).
Subjects will be classified as equity types while those with no or just a weak
effect of effort will be classified as equality types.
Result 9 The population is heterogenous in terms of the effects of subjects’ efforts on
offers and acceptance thresholds.
Result 9 is supported by the large and significant standard deviation of the
responder’s effort in the random effects part of Table 4.1.
Fourth and finally, normative conflict over commitments requires that some
actors believe the norm should strongly restrict the pursuit of self-interest, while
others only believe in mild restrictions. We suspect that different levels of nor-
mative commitment occur in situations in which actors have opposing interests.
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Such asymmetric situations are given if an actor who is worse off claims that she
ought to be compensated by someone who is better off. The ultimatum game is
an ideal representation of such asymmetric situations. Equity players with a
low commitment can be understood as players who do not fully compensate
the opponent’s effort. Equality players with a low commitment can be under-
stood as players who do not claim the full equal split but are satisfied with less
than that.
Result 10 The population is heterogenous in the subjects’ reaction to low effort levels.
Result 10 is supported by the large and significant standard deviation of the
intercept in the random effects part of Table 4.1. Based on Results 9 and 10, we
infer the existence of three distinct types of normative behavior in our popula-
tion: equality players with high intercepts and low slopes, equity players with an
inversed pattern of low intercepts and high slopes, and egoistic players with low
intercepts and low slopes. While the first two types can be explained by norma-
tive behavior, egoistic players do not adhere to a norm but rather to the game
theoretical standard solution of the game. Moreover, the strong negative corre-
lations between intercepts and slopes suggest that equality and equity players
are more frequent than egoistic players.
In the following, we investigate the distinct types of normative behavior in
more detail by graphically exploring all data points for the bivariate relation
between effort and offer and between effort and acceptance threshold. Figure
4.4 illustrates the proposers’ offers (top) and responders’ acceptance thresholds
(bottom) for given responders’ efforts. In the top figure, it can be seen that most
offers cluster around the two lines corresponding to the equity and the equality
norm. But not all proposers adhere to pure equity or equality norms. There are
also a few “hyper-fair” offers (in the upper left corner). Further, a large fraction
of offers are located between the equity line and the equality line (lower left
and upper right corner) or even below both lines (lower right corner). Thus,
some proposers are biased by self-interest. Although some proposers increase
their prospective share by making moderately low offers, few of them play the
subgame perfect equilibrium solution and offer the minimum amount.
Among the responders, there are surprisingly many who adhere to the
equality norm and are willing to punish offers below 50% with rejection. This
is an unusual finding, as many previous studies report that offers of 40% and
above are almost always accepted. In contrast to the results for proposers, the
“attraction” to pure equity and equality norms is not as pronounced for respon-
ders. As a result, the variance in the responders’ decisions is much higher. Fur-
ther, the histogram on the left shows that 20% of the acceptance thresholds are
below 20%. The respective players are willing to accept very low offers, some-
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Fig. 4.4. Proposer’s relative offers as a function of responder’s relative effort (top) and
responder’s relative acceptance thresholds as a function of the responder’s relative ef-
fort (bottom). The responder’s contribution on the abscissa is maintained for proposer’s
offer and responder’s threshold, resulting in a reflected distribution of points. The his-
tograms on the left show the distribution of the relative size of offers (top) and acceptance
thresholds (bottom). The axis labels depict percentages. The distinct normative types are
illustrated by additional lines for equality and equity norms. Most offers cluster around
these lines, although there is considerable noise too. Responders cluster less around eq-
uity and equality lines. They show more risk-averse behavior than proposers, indicated
by a third cluster of considerably lower acceptance thresholds.
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times even if they contributed much more than their proposers. This pattern can
be found in the cluster at the very bottom of figure 4.4.
4.6 .2 The micro-level roots of normative conflict
How can we understand the structures on the macro-level by micro-level be-
havior? We continue our evaluation of the necessary conditions of normative
conflict by examining the individual decisions and find surprisingly clear pat-
terns. Figure 4.5 depicts four typical proposer profiles and figure 4.6 four typical
responder profiles. Player 2 (upper left) represents a pure equality player. In the
role of proposer (fig. 4.5) and of responder (fig. 4.6), player 2 offers and claims
always 50% of the pool, regardless of the differences in effort between proposer
and responder. In the upper right part of figure 4.5 and 4.6, player 3 shows
pure equity behavior. Player 3 always offers exactly as much as the responder’s
effort and always demands at least her effort as a responder. A third type of
players are those who play the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Player 13
(lower left) constantly offers and accepts the smallest possible positive amount
of 0.50 euro. Consequently, we call this player type the egoist. We even found
another type, showing an intriguing hybrid behavior between self-interest and
norm compliance. This fourth type plays according to the equity norm as long
as she is a relatively high achiever but switches to the equality norm if she is a
relatively low achiever. Note player 20 as proposer and player 36 as responder
of this type on the lower right of figure 4.5 and 4.6. We call these players cherry
pickers as they seem to adhere to norms but “pick” the norm which serves their
self-interest best.
In order to classify the subjects into normative types, players have been cat-
egorized according to their reaction to the responder’s effort. We classified the
player’s proposer and responder behavior separately, looking at the offers [and
acceptance thresholds] in the role of proposers [and responders]. Our devel-
oped classification algorithm is based on our logic outlined in the Measures
section. The abstract idea of classifying individuals into normative types is im-
plemented by using OLS regressions which take effort as a predictor for indi-
vidual offers and acceptance thresholds. We made sure that the algorithm is not
biased by our theory by imposing the normative types on the empirical data but
rather assigns subjects to types in a purely data-driven way. More specifically,
our approach classifies the individual strategies according to the respective in-
tercepts and slopes of individuals’ regressions. We categorized players with a
low slope and a high intercept as equality, with a low slope and a low inter-
cept as egoist, with a high slope as equity, and with a quadratic slope as cherry
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Fig. 4.5. Offers of selected players. The larger figures depict individually observed strate-
gies. We find 54% (n=50) equality proposers (upper left), 39% (n=36) equity proposers
(upper right), 3% (n=3) egoistic proposers (lower left), and 3% (n=3) cherry picker pro-
posers (lower right). The insets depict the superposition of all individual decisions in the
population classified as belonging to the corresponding type.
picker. We refer to appendix C for an extensive discussion of our classification
algorithm.
The insets in figures 4.5 and 4.6 describe the resulting distribution of differ-
ent proposer and responder types. More than half of the proposers adhere to
equality norms and about 40% to equity norms, while cherry pickers and ego-
istic proposers are the exception (3% each). Subjects are more risk averse if they
are in the role of the responder: while 48% adhere to the equality norm, the frac-
tion of equity players are only 25% and the fraction of egoistic responders reach
20%. The proportion of cherry pickers is again small (3%) as a result of the strict
definition.
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Fig. 4.6. Acceptance thresholds of selected players. We find 52% (n=48) equality re-
sponders (upper left), 25% (n=23) equity responders (upper right), 20% (n=18) egoistic
responders (lower left), and 3% (n=3) cherry pickers (lower right). The insets depict the
superposition of all individual decisions in the population classified as belonging to the
corresponding type.
4.6 .3 Aggregation of norm adherence on the micro-level to
normative conflict on the macro-level
In the following, we confront our theory of normative conflict and the respec-
tive derivation of our two hypotheses with our empirical data. From here on, we
focus only on those subjects who are either equity or equality types in the role
of proposer or responder because these types are predominant in our data.18
This means that any given proposer/responder can be described by her norm
(equity or equality) and her respective commitment to that norm. A player ad-
hering only to some degree to equity is nevertheless classified as equity and not
as a combination of equity and equality. In the statistical analysis below, we take
18 The other types are too rare for an analysis of conflict: we identify 3 proposers and 3 respon-
ders as cherry picker types and 3 proposers and 18 responders as egoistic types.
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all possible interactions into account and not just those pairs who were actually
matched in the experiment. Note that this procedure does not bias our results
because each subject had to respond as proposer and responder before they were
actually assigned to a role and matched with their opponent, i.e., no learning
effects could occur.19 Thus, we can base our estimation on 4,830 interactions be-
cause each of the n = 70 subjects can be matched as proposer with each of the
other subjects as responder, resulting in n(n−1)
2
= 2, 415 interactions. Conversely,
each subject can be matched as responder with each of the other subjects as
proposer, resulting in additional n(n−1)
2
= 2, 415 interactions. As this procedure
implies that each subject made several decisions that are not independent, we
correct for inflated standard errors by clustering for subjects. Comparable anal-
yses taking only the actually realized matches in the experiment into account
yielded similar results but with larger standard errors.
Result 11 There is more normative conflict over normative contents than over norma-
tive commitments.
To support Result 11, we simulated the interactions of each proposer with
each responder using our empirical data. Figure 4.7 describes the relative fre-
quencies of the different forms of normative conflict. In confirmation of Hypoth-
esis 7, our concept of conflict over contents is the more prevalent source of con-
flict compared to the case of conflict due to different commitments. From 2,263
interactions among holders of different normative contents, 39% (885 cases) end
in rejection, while in only 32% (822 out of 2,567) of the interactions, conflict
emerges among holders of different levels of normative commitments. A logit
model confirms the general results from figure (4.7), estimating significantly
higher probabilities of conflict if actors do not share the same normative con-
tent (robust standard errors, z = 5.14, p < 0.001).20 The percentage of content-
related conflict is even higher if only equality proposers are considered (44%
or 426 out of 959 interactions), whereas the relative frequency of conflict due to
commitment between equality proposer and equality responder is significantly
lower (31% or 605 out of 1,939 interactions result in conflict, z = 3.82, p < 0.001).
However, the picture is slightly different for equity proposers. Here, it does not
make a difference whether the responder shares the norm or not. Conflict arises
in 217 out of 628 interactions (35%) when the responder shares the proposer’s
19 We excluded one case as an influential outlier because this subject contributed zero to the pool
and showed extreme behavior by offering everything as proposer and demanding everything as
responder. The previously reported results yielded no differences on account of the exclusion.
20 We checked the robustness of the result by applying a clustered logit model as well as a robust
and a clustered probit model. They all returned qualitatively similar and statistically significant
results.
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norm, just as in the case when the responder adheres to the equality principle
(36% or 459 out of 1,304 observations, z = 0.18, p = 0.861). Overall, the data sup-
ports our claim that conflict due to different normative contents is an important
notion to understand the interrelation between social norms, cooperation, and
conflict. The insignificance of the last result, however, somewhat challenges our
general theoretical claim but may well be a result of the strategy method, which
is sometimes criticized for its hypothetical character.
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Fig. 4.7. Frequency of conflict in a situation where proposer and responder adhere to
different normative contents or commitments. N denotes the absolute frequency of the
respective interactions. The y-axis denotes the relative frequency of a conflict occurring,
measured by the rejection of the offer.
Finally, we confirm effort as the underlying source of normative conflict as
stated in Hypothesis 8. The differences between the proposer’s and responder’s
effort spark off the conflict over alternative norms, as illustrated in figure 4.1.
To put it differently, the normative conflict between an equality and an equity
player increases with increasing differences in their effort levels.
Result 12 The larger the differences between the proposer’s and responder’s efforts, the
higher the probability of normative conflict, indicated by higher rejection rates.
Result 12 is supported by figure 4.8 and the corresponding logistic regression
model. Note that the data refers to all potential interactions between all players
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in each role. The regression calculates the probability of conflict as a function
of the difference in relative effort between proposer and responder. Our find-
ings confirm Hypothesis 8 that normative conflict is significantly more likely
for unequal effort levels. The probability plot on the left of figure 4.8 reveals
that about 25% of the subjects end up in conflict if their efforts are similar, while
55% do so if their efforts are dissimilar, namely when one party contributed
almost everything and the other almost nothing.
conflict
intercept -1.172∗∗∗
(0.148)
difference in
relative effort 0.017∗∗∗
(0.005)
interactions 8190
clusters of subjects 92
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Fig. 4.8. Logistic regression quantifying the impact of differential effort on conflict. The
larger the differences in the relative effort contributed to the common pool, the higher
the probability of conflict. The table on the left reports logit estimates and standard er-
rors while the figure on the right displays the corresponding changes in the probability of
conflict. The grey area represents the 95% confidence bounds for the logit coefficient “dif-
ference in relative effort.” Relative effort i is measured in percentages with the own con-
tribution divided by the total contribution of the respective interaction between proposer i
and responder j. We take absolute values of the differences in effort, i.e., |i − j |, and
therefore do not differentiate whether the proposer or the responder contributed more.
The number of interactions is calculated by all possible interactions between each sub-
ject in the role of proposer and all other subjects in the role of responder. Clustering of
subjects in these interactions is taken into account by calculating robust standard errors.
4.7 Discussion
This chapter outlines a new theoretical perspective on social norms in which
conflict is considered as an inherent component of such norms. The hetero-
geneity of norms is a potential source of conflict, counteracting the widely dis-
cussed capability of norms to promote cooperation. Our empirical confirmation
is based on a strategy ultimatum game in which actors apply different norms of
distributive justice if they differ in their effort for a common project.
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A substantial fraction of our subjects hold an equality norm and demand
an equal share of the pie irrespective of their effort. Another substantial, but
slightly smaller fraction hold an equity norm and demand the share that cor-
responds to their effort. We show the empirical relevance of normative conflict
when both players decide to be cooperative and contribute a “fair” share to the
common good but hold different norms of what they consider to be fair. We
explain this disagreement by the adherence to different normative contents.
Furthermore, our evidence demonstrates another source of normative con-
flict. Our empirical data reveal that the adherence to similar norms is by no
means sufficient to achieve cooperation. In fact, people have to agree on the ex-
tent to which social norms should restrain their self-interests, i.e., they have to
commit to a norm to a similar extent. Even though they might agree that, in
principle, a specific norm should be followed, “undercutting” is regarded as le-
gitimate by some while it is unacceptable for others. Thus, different degrees of
normative commitment form a second important source of normative conflict.
Our experimental results show that conflict resulting from different normative
contents is more prevalent than conflict resulting from different normative com-
mitments.
Our research can be related to the research on group dynamics. Friedkin
and Johnsen (1999) propose a dynamic model of emerging consensus or persis-
tent disagreement, in which the opinions of peers in a network can influence
each other to a certain extent. Both, opinion dynamics and the content of social
norms, can be regarded as a result of a bargaining process. However, there are
also some important differences in the two approaches. For one, social norms
often go along with material interests, while actors are usually assumed to have
shared interests when it comes to opinion dynamics. Furthermore, while Fried-
kin and Johnsen chose a dynamic approach, our study can be regarded as a
static investigation of the final stage of conflict. More research on the dynamic
component of normative conflict could help to close this gap and promote a
better understanding of the evolution of normative content.
In a more general context, the “cultural diversity” of social norms is remark-
ably ambivalent. On the one hand, the plurality of social norms can be enrich-
ing, refreshing, and help society to adjust to different situations and changing
conditions. The recognition of alternatives to habits and behavioral standards
we take for granted opens our eyes for the arbitrariness of certain norms and
our often non-reflective tendency to follow traditional rules. This heterogeneity
of normative behavior affects creativity and innovation in society, stimulating
the increase of individual and public welfare. On the other hand, cultural di-
versity may also endanger cooperation and social order even if all members
of society adhere to normative expectations. The coexistence of distinct norms
4.7 Discussion 85
may generate conflict despite cooperative intentions, which may, in turn, lead
to an evolutionary process in the emergence of normative content. The constant
struggle in society for the power to define the validity of norms is often accom-
panied with hypocritical rethoric to convince the disadvantaged to adhere to
norms that promise seemingly great benefits. In view of the complexity of these
social conflicts and cleavages, future research will need to address the relations
between material interests, the internalization of norms, and selfish behavior.
For instance, do actors with higher incomes tend to pursue equity norms, and
do actors with more power promote norms that preserve existing power struc-
tures? We need both, laboratory studies to test the theoretical relations on the
micro-level and surveys to evaluate the social structure of normative conflict.
We believe that our new perspective on normative conflict is a fruitful tool to
uncover the double edge of social norms in promoting cooperation on one side
but conflict on the other.
The emergence of norms from conflicts over just
distributions 1 
Chapter five
Why is it that well-intentioned actions can create persistent conflicts? What is
the reason that norm adherence is often not enough for the creation of social
order and that even the overcoming of self-interest does not suffice for the es-
tablishment of lasting cooperative relations?
For example, wage schemes depend heavily on social norms employers and
employees adhere to (Elster 1989). For some people, fixed, equal wages are ap-
propriate, while others call for the consideration of individual effort (e.g. piece
rate wages), or regard the individually created added value as important. Also
combinations of these input and output measures are possible and can create
normative conflicts among holders of more complex rules with those of simpler
rules.
Also everyday examples support the notion that well-intended, cooperative
actions can create normative conflicts: Consider a Ph.D. student has a common
lunch with her supervisor and both want to signal their cooperative intentions.
However, they may experience tensions or even conflicts if they want to split
their bill based on different rules, be it an equal split, based on their individual
consumption, status based (the professor pays), or even combinations of these
rules (e.g. the professor pays the drinks but the meal is paid individually).
We believe that the emergence of norms should be understood as a process
of conflict in which actors bargain over different rules regarding how mutual
cooperation should be achieved. In this perspective, norms are typically subject
to negotiations and continual bargaining. The emerging macro-level system of
norms therefore heavily depends on the micro-level dynamics of how actors
reach agreements concerning which norm ought to be followed. The inherent
1 This chapter is joint work with Heiko Rauhut and Luis Miller and is currently under review
at the American Sociological Review.
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dynamical nature and the mechanisms of normative conflict have not been fully
addressed yet in the literature on social norms.
The dynamics of normative conflict and the resulting emergence of norma-
tive systems can be illustrated by examples from the sociology of science: While
most academic disciplines have agreed on what makes a “good” publication,
two norms co-exist in sociology: publishing in books and publishing in peer-
reviewed journals (Clemens et al. 1995). Publications have enormous influence
on the field, as reputation, grant acquisitions, or getting a job largely rests on
publication records. Especially in mixed genre departments, however, finding
the right merit metric may lead to conflicts and prolonged faculty meetings due
to conflicting opinions about what constitutes a good way of communicating
scientific results. Time-consuming bargaining can go on, wastes resources and
persist, because actors adhere to different norms.
Similarly, multiple norms for receiving credit for authorship co-exist be-
tween and within different academic fields (Zuckerman 1968, Hudson 1996,
Tscharntke et al. 2007). Alphabetic ordering, bracketing (with the main contrib-
utor as the first-author and the supervisor in the end), ordering based on merits
(in a decreasing order based on relative contributions), or even multiple first-
authors (with a footnote identifying all authors who contributed equally to the
work). If norms clash and authors cannot agree on which norm should apply
for the ordering of names, fruitful collaborations do not come about and even
finished manuscripts can remain unpublished.
Our contribution investigates the evolution of norms from normative conflict.
While previous analyses focused on demonstrating the existence of normative
conflict (Winter et al. forthcoming), it remains open how ongoing bargaining
over norms at the micro-level leads to convergence of which norms at the popu-
lation level. We develop a measurement of the persistence of normative conflict
by using a bargaining experiment in which we introduce different normative
cues, resulting in the adherence to different norms and expectations. Our design
builds up on experimental work by Gantner et al. (2001), Winter et al. (forthcom-
ing) and Rauhut and Winter (2010). The novel experimental design proposed
here allows to study the dynamical interplay between micro-level bargaining
over norms and the emergence of normative systems at the macro-level.
5.1 A conflict theory of norm emergence
We illustrate our theory by referring to the example of normative conflict among
co-authors. For the sake of simplicity, suppose two scientists co-author an aca-
demic article. Before submitting the article for publication, they have to decide
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who the first author of the paper should be. Let us further assume that the sit-
uation is ambiguous in the sense that there is no predominant norm in the field
regarding the order of authors.
In such situations, several cues may be relevant. A cue is defined as a vari-
able which determines the kind of behavior that is prescribed or proscribed in a
norm-relevant situation. For example, if the co-authors are equal in every way,
they may consider an alphabetical order of their names to signal equal contri-
butions. However, if the co-authors differ in their effort, their status or other
variables, these cues may determine the order of their names (cf. Tscharntke
et al. 2007).
A different number of considered cues may lead to the emergence of dif-
ferent norms. In this respect, we distinguish between less complex or uncondi-
tional norms and more complex or conditional norms. Unconditional norms do
not require information about the context of the decision, for instance informa-
tion about individual contributions to the article. A paradigmatic example is the
equality norm (Winter et al. forthcoming). Equality norms aim at ex post equal-
ity, which would relate to an alphabetical or random ordering of authorship in
our example. In contrast, conditional norms do require information about the
context of the decision. An example of a conditional norm is the equity norm,
which states that “the value of what a member of a group receives from other
members should be proportional to his investments” (Homans 1961:237). In our
example, credit for authorship would be received for effort or in other cases for
status.
The process of normative conflict and the emerging normative system can be
understood as feedback cycles between micro- and macro-level: A larger num-
ber of normative cues at the macro-level makes the situation more ambiguous,
leading to more normative conflict at the micro-level which eventually results
in the emergence of different norms at the macro-level. This mechanism is de-
picted in Figure 5.1.
Our idea is that the multiplicity of cues leads to heterogeneity in beliefs and
in norms among individuals (the meso level, see (Maines 1982)). For example,
co-authors who agree on a conditional norm could still have different beliefs
whether to condition on status (seniority), on actual contributions (effort put
in the article) or on the achieved level of improvement of the article (generated
outcome from the effort). This heterogeneity in beliefs may lead to conflict at the
meso level, which we call normative conflict. Normative conflict is thus defined as
conflict due to the adherence to different normative beliefs. Of course, a larger
number of normative cues does not necessarily lead to more ambiguity. It is
particularly likely that normative conflict arises from ambiguous situations, if
the actor’s norms are not readily on display. Sometimes, we can quite reliably
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infer an individual’s norms from specific signals, which may reduce the extent
of normative conflict. A monk wearing a cowl signals rather unambiguously his
religious norms, whereas a random person’s beliefs may be harder to assess.
Normative conflict is instantiated at the meso level, i.e. among interacting
individuals. We can understand the structure of conflict from bottom-up by in-
vestigating the micro level. More precisely, we distinguish between initial be-
liefs and norms of individuals and their resulting actions. In our example, in-
dividuals may hold different beliefs regarding how much effort, status or im-
provement different co-authors accomplished and which of these cues are valid
for the respective norm they hold.1 The interplay of norms and beliefs then
determines the ordering of names a person considers appropriate. Normative
conflict emerges at the meso level if the co-authors reach different conclusions
regarding which order of authors should be applied.
In a nutshell, normative conflict emerges in ambiguous situations in which
multiple cues lead to heterogeneity in beliefs and actions at the individual level.
If there is no commonly shared hierarchy of cues, individuals will not a priori
agree on one focal norm and conflict emerges at the meso level. Therefore, our
first hypothesis concerns the purported relationship between ambiguity of the
situation and the extent of normative conflict.
Hypothesis 9 The more normative cues, the stronger the normative conflict.
We conjecture that more normative cues will increase the strength of normative
conflict as each cue triggers different norms. In our experiment, the number of
normative cues is varied in the treatments and the strength of normative conflict
is measured by the length of the negotiation (the number of bargaining rounds).
Normative conflict is essentially a dynamical concept and contributes to the
understanding of the emergence of norms. In most situations, the bargaining
process triggers an updating of the beliefs and norms. In our example, an initial
conflict may be followed by a change of the co-authors’ views regarding the
appropriate order of their names. This is illustrated by the right-hand side of
Figure 1. After conflict at the interaction level, beliefs and norms are updated
at the micro level, and a new round of bargaining begins. Back again at the
micro level, individuals decide once more. In our example they reconsider the
order of co-authors. Theoretically, the process of beliefs-actions-updates could
1 Note that two important forces can influence the decision. The self-serving bias can shape indi-
vidual beliefs in a way that boosts own efforts and minimizes contributions of others (Babcock
et al. 1996). In a similar fashion, the Thomas Theorem (Thomas and Thomas 1928, Merton 1995)
highlights to focus rather on subjective beliefs than objective contributions for the investigation
of the roots of normative conflict.
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be infinitely repeated, but in the real world and in experiments there usually
exists a “natural” end to this process.
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Fig. 5.1. A multilevel theory of the dynamics of normative conflict
We term the feedback loops between individual and interaction level as the
negotiation of norms and the ones between interaction and population level as
emergence of norms. The relationship on the population level regarding how the
ambiguity of the situation affects the complexity of the emerging norm can be
understood by the dynamical negotiation of norms at the interaction and indi-
vidual level (Figure 1).
Taking into account the previous bargaining process, parties may finally
agree or disagree on which norm to follow. It is important to note that this pro-
cess of normative negotiations does not necessarily end up in agreement. The
long-term result of this process may also be persistent conflict. In contrast, if
parties reach an agreement, a specific norm has emerged. We understand with
norm emergence a process of convergence such that a sufficiently large number
of interaction partners repeatedly update their beliefs and consequently adopt
the same norm as the solution to their social interaction problem. Therefore,
our hypothesis about the relationship on the population level considers how
the ambiguity of the situation affects the complexity of the emerging norm. A
large number of cues may lead to many conflicts and finally to a simpler emerg-
ing norm than a lower number of cues.
Hypothesis 10 The more ambiguous the situation, the less complex the emerging norm.
We conjecture an inversely u-shaped relationship. More ambiguous situations trig-
ger a larger extent of normative conflicts, which eventually results in less complex
(unconditional) norms. In contrast, simpler situations trigger less conflict and al-
low the emergence of more complex (conditional) norms.
5.2 Application on distributive justice and definition of fairness norms 91
5.2 Application on distributive justice and definition of
fairness norms
To test our two hypotheses about normative conflict, a laboratory study in the
specific domain of distributive justice was conducted. At least since Homans
(1961), sociologists have investigated the normative principles of distributive
justice. Homans (1961) and a number of other social scientists (Adams 1965,
Selten 1976, Cook and Hegtvedt 1983, Güth 1988) proposed an equity norm, for
which “the received benefits of a group member should be proportional to her
investments” (Homans 1961:237). The dilemma is that people “differ in their
ideas of what legitimately constitutes investment, reward, and cost, and how
these things are to be ranked.” (Homans 1961:246). This may create transaction
failures when several parties disagree due to their different conceptions of what
they consider as valid measures of equity or proportionality.
Recent experimental studies demonstrate that people adhere to different
normative standards. Gantner et al. (2001) show that several equity standards
are applied in bargaining situations. Frohlich et al. (2004) find that, besides
selfishness, two main behavioral norms determine individual decision making
in distributive justice problems; egalitarianism and equity. Equity is by far the
most often observed behavioral pattern in their experiments. Cappelen et. al
(2007) report similar results. They propose a pluralism of fairness ideals, where
the concept of equity is decomposed into the liberal egalitarian and the lib-
ertarian ideal. Liberal egalitarianism denotes input equity, for which actors are
rewarded according to their previous effort. Libertarianism denotes output eq-
uity, for which actors are rewarded according to their achievements for the joint
good, regardless of the effort with which this achievement was produced.
Our operationalization uses the set of normative principles proposed by
Cappelen et al. (2007). More specifically, three fairness norms will be consid-
ered.
1. The equality norm states that the common good should be divided equally
and actors’ contributions to the good should be ignored. This ensures ex
post equality of outcomes.
2. The equity norm demands that the common good should be distributed in
proportion to actors’ efforts into providing the common good. Equity refers
to the input of efforts and not to actual contributions to the good.
3. The libertarian norm considers actual contributions to the good. This prin-
ciple refers to output equity, meaning actors’ contributions to the common
good. Accordingly, the good should be distributed in proportion to partici-
pants’ actual contributions, which can be a function of individual effort, but
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also of other factors for which the individual is not accountable for. Com-
mon examples include luck, genetic disposition, or parents’ socio-economic
status.
An unintended consequence of people following different normative stan-
dards at the micro level is normative conflict at the macro level. Actors can have
the best intentions and do their best, but nevertheless, their behavior can be
perceived as improper. In this view, in a context where several standards are
possible, social norms are not only promoting cooperation and social welfare,
as previous theoretical and empirical literature has posited; they can also un-
dermine it.
5.3 Method
5.3 .1 Procedure and participants
The experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software developed by Fisch-
bacher (2007). The subjects were 72 male and 116 female undergraduate stu-
dents from a large European university, recruited from a wide range of aca-
demic disciplines with the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner 2004).2 The
average earnings per subject were 14.19 Euro (σ2 = 3.28) and ranged from a
minimum of 2.56 Euro to a maximum of 25.11 Euro, including a show-up fee of
2.50 Euro.
5.3 .2 Experimental design
Our measurement of the persistence of normative conflict uses a recursive ran-
dom bargaining protocol. It introduces a larger number of different normative
cues as in Gantner et al. (2001) and Winter et al. (forthcoming). Our design con-
sists of two stages. In stage 1, the subjects earn money in a real effort task, in
stage two they bargain with changing partners about how to split the joint earn-
ings.
2 We ran 7 sessions with 3 sessions involving 32 subjects, two session involving 30 subjects, 2
sessions involving 16 subjects. Matching groups consisted of 16 subjects with two exceptions of
matching groups of 14 subjects.
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5.3 .3 The real effort task
At the beginning of each session, the subjects were randomly seated in cubicles
with computer terminals. Some general instructions regarding the procedure
were given on the computer screen (Schmelz 2010) and read out loud to ensure
that everybody understood them and to demonstrate that everybody had re-
ceived the same instructions. In the following real effort task, subjects had to
answer 20 questions on a seven-page long text of a Wikipedia entry on the West-
minster Palace, which they had received five days in advance by email.3 There
were five answer categories, one of which was correct. For each correct answer,
subjects had the opportunity to earn experimental currency units (ECU), which
were later transformed into Euros at an exchange rate of 100 ECU = 1 Euro. An
accompanying letter informed the subjects that their preparation of the text will
influence their possible earnings in the experiment. Thus, every subject could
decide on her own as to invest spare time in order to earn more money later on.
5.3 .4 The bargaining game
In the bargaining part, the joint earnings of two randomly drawn players were
pooled to form the pie. This procedure was designed to induce a feeling of per-
sonal effort and inherent monetary earnings. In particular, the effort was real in
the sense that subjects could spend their own spare time.
After completing the quiz, the subjects received the instructions for the bar-
gaining game experiment sketched in figure 5.2. In our game, two players bar-
gained over several periods over the sum of money jointly produced in the quiz.
In each period, both players could offer a share of the pie to the other player.
At the same time, they entered an acceptance threshold, stating what the other
player had to offer at least so that the offer was acceptable. As soon as both
players submitted their respective offers and acceptance thresholds, the com-
puter randomly chose one of the offers with equal probability. This offer was
compared to the other player’s threshold and was accepted if it was at least as
high as the other player’s threshold. In case of acceptance, the accepting player
yielded the offer and the offering player received what was left on the joint ac-
count. If the offer was below the responder’s threshold, the game proceeded
to the next period and the pie shrinked by 2(t−1) ECU in each period t. Note
that the costs of delay are an increasing function of the length of bargaining,
meaning that disagreement is cheap in the beginning and becomes increasingly
3 Wikipedia contributors, “Westminster Palace”, Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, http://
de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palace_of_Westminster (accessed May 04,2008 14:40)
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expensive over time. Players continued this bargaining process until they either
reached agreement or no more money was left on the account.
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Fig. 5.2. The bargaining game among two players A and B
The bargaining game was repeated 10 times with one initial unpaid trial
period with random matching in matching groups of 16 subjects. Before the be-
ginning of the experiment, subjects had to answer test questions regarding the
game. This allowed us to verify that the participants understood the rules. For
exclusion of wealth effects, one of the 10 potentially payment-relevant rounds
was randomly selected for payment. The experiment started when there were
no further questions to the experimenter. ppendix D contains the full instruc-
tions.
5.3 .5 Treatments and measures
For the measurement of the dynamics of normative conflict, we introduced cues
which were designed to trigger norms of equity, equality or libertarianism.
The different normative cues were implemented in three different treat-
ments, ranging from only one cue up to three cues. Equality was implemented
in the C-treatment, where we transferred 1200 ECU for each player to the joint
account. In this case, all norms prescribed an equal split. In the E-treatment,
we implemented heterogeneity in efforts by composing the “pie” from the in-
dividual earnings in the quiz. Only if subjects were sensitive to equity or effi-
ciency norms, they would condition their behavior on the other player’s effort.
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In addition to heterogeneous efforts, the F-treatment implemented efficiency by
randomly assigning subjects to different efficiency factors, which subjects kept
throughout the experiment. These factors were used as multipliers of the sub-
jects’ contributions to the common pool, such that the contributions of half of
the subjects in treatment F were tripled, while the other player’s gains from the
quiz were counted only once. In this respect, some subjects were more efficient
than others. Here, only those subjects who were sensitive to the libertarian norm
would take this factor into account, while subjects adhering to the equity norm
would only rely on the other player’s relative earnings from the quiz. Those
interested in equality would split the pie equally. Table 5.1 gives an overview
over the treatments and the respective composition of the pie.
treatment pie ECU per efficiency pie size
answer factor
C (control) given 10 – 2400
E (effort) produced 100 – e1 + e2
F (efficiency) produced 50 φl : 1, φle1 + φhe2
φh : 3
normative cue
egalitarian equity libertarian
C (control) X
E (effort) X X
F (efficiency) X X X
Table 5.1. Overview of treatments and number of normative cues in a given treatment.
The number of normative cues increases from C to E to F. φl refers to the low efficiency
factor and φh to the high efficiency factor.
Offers and acceptance thresholds were submitted on a single screen, where
the provided information depended on the treatment. In all treatments, sub-
jects were informed about the remaining size of the pie, the initial transfers to
the joint account, and a table describing the pie size for all bargaining rounds.
In addition to that, the E-treatment provided the absolute and relative contri-
butions from correct quiz answers of both players. In the F-treatment, subjects’
also learned about the efficiency of their contributions, i.e. their earnings from
the quiz multiplied by the subjects’ respective efficiency factors.
Subjects submitted their offers and acceptance thresholds with sliders on the
computer screen, which automatically calculated and displayed the resulting
absolute and relative distribution. After submitting the offers and thresholds,
subjects proceeded to the information screen. This screen displayed both play-
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ers’ offers, the own acceptance threshold, which offer was selected and whether
this offer was accepted.
Table 5.2 relates the theoretical constructs from figure 5.1 to the operational-
ization of the dependent and independent variables and to the statistics in the
results section.
theoretical construct operationalization statistics
ambiguity of situation treatment variables (not applicable)
(number of cues)
heterogeneity of heterogeneity of mixture-model
norms offers/thresholds (figure 5.5)
initial beliefs not measured evidence from the
initial norms directly video lab
actions offer / threshold exemplary interactions
(figure 5.3)
normative conflict rounds of bargaining cdf-plot,
until agreement random effects poisson
model (figure 5.4)
final (dis-)agreement no agreement logit model (table 5.3)
until the end
complexity of offer/threshold mixture model
prevailing norm (figure 5.5)
Table 5.2. Overview of theoretical constructs, their operationalization and corresponding
statistics
5.4 Results
5.4 .1 The bargaining process
Figure 5.3 gives an exemplary impression of the bargaining process. The figure
depicts the decisions of two players (black and grey) until they reach an agree-
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ment in the F-treatment. Both players answered the same number of questions
correctly, however, the black player’s contribution was tripled, such that this
player effectively put in 75 %, while the other player contributed only 25 %. A
black/grey circle depicts the relative offer of the black/grey player towards the
other player in shares of the pie, while a black/grey cross depicts the respective
player’s acceptance threshold.
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Fig. 5.3. An exemplary interaction between two players (grey and black). The dot (•)
represents the respective player’s relative offer, the cross (×) the relative acceptance
threshold.
The grey player offers and accepts around 50 % for quite some time, which
corresponds to our definition of an equality player. The black player, on the
other hand, adheres to the libertarian norm by offering only slightly less than
25 % and accepting about 75 %. This fits what the player effectively contributed
to the pie.
We chose the display of this case due to the long duration of the bargaining
process, which exemplifies severe normative conflict. No player wanted to give
in first and their hassle would probably have continued if there would have
been money left on their accounts after the 12th round.
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As a manipulation check, we video-taped subjects in our video lab during a
pre-test session of this experiment. The conversations among the bargainers of-
ten referred to fairness arguments and would become increasingly angry when
the counterpart made unappropriate offers.
5.4 .2 Consequences of normative conflict: Costly delays
Our hypothesis 9 states that the strength of normative conflict increases with the
number of normative cues. Figure 5.4 gives a first “eye-ball”-test of this claim,
plotting the number of rounds until agreement was reached for all treatments.
In all treatments, a considerable fraction of interactions already ended in the
first period because agreements were immediately reached. However, from pe-
riod two onwards, the bold line representing treatment C is always above the
two other lines, meaning that subjects in this treatment found an agreement
faster than those in the other two treatments.
In addition to the cumulative density plot in figure 5.4, we estimated a ran-
dom effects poisson regression model in order to test our claim more systemat-
ically (see the table in figure 5.4).4 We chose a random effects model in order to
adjust for correlated errors in multiple decisions of single individuals. Because
rounds of bargaining are discrete count-data, we used a poisson model and not
a linear random effects model.
The regression results generally confirm hypothesis 9. The strength of con-
flict (measured by bargaining rounds) is significantly higher in the F-treatment
involving three cues compared to the C-treatment involving just a single cue
(t = 4.20, p < 0.001 if controlled for subject specific errors and t = 2.00, p < 0.05
if controlled for subject and group). In addition, the difference between the E-
treatment (two cues) and the C treatment is significant (t = 2.30, p < 0.05
and t = 1.76, p < 0.10, respectively). However, the difference between the E-
treatment and the F-treatment is not statistically significant, meaning that the
average time until subjects find an agreement is about equal in the two treat-
ments.
5.4 .3 Macro emergence of norms (mixture model)
Our second hypothesis states that the complexity of a situation has an inverse u-
shaped effect on the emerging norm. To test this hypothesis, we statistically ex-
4 All statistical tests were performed using STATA 10.1.
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F-treatment 1.312∗∗∗ 1.224∗
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Fig. 5.4. Cumulated density plot of the strength of conflict in different treatments. The
horizontal lines represent the share of interactions in which an agreement has been found
in the respective period displayed on the X-axis. The table shows two random-effects
poisson models. Model (1) controls for subject specific errors, model (2) additionally for
group specific errors. They demonstrate a significantly higher strength of conflict in the
F-treatment (p < 0.001 and p< 0.05, respectively) and in the E-treatment (p < 0.05 and
p< 0.10, respectively) compared to the C-treatment. The dependent variable strength of
conflict is measured by rounds of bargaining.
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tract the prevalent norms at the macro-level from micro-level data. We assume
that the data are generated by three different types of players, corresponding
to the fairness norms introduced above. By using this assumption, we can esti-
mate the evolving population composition over time. Technically speaking, we
estimate the proportion of the different types in a finite mixture model. These
models have been originally introduced by Pearson (1894), but have only re-
cently become popular by the increase in computational power.5 In sociology
and social psychology, these models have also been known as “latent class” or
“structural equation” models (Harrison and Rutström 2009).
Our analysis is based on a simplified version of the random behavioral ap-
proach proposed by Conte and Moffatt (2010). To estimate the parameters of
interest, we define utility functions for up to three different types of decisions
and estimate the respective proportions of normative types λj, j ∈ {equality, eq-
uity, libertarian} in the population.
As a first step, we formally define the three norms Ni, i ∈ {equality, equity,
libertarian} which we expect to find in the population. Let pi denote the size of
the pie, ei subject i’s relative effort, and φi subject i’s efficiency factor. Than the
respective norms Nk are given by
Nequality =
pi
2
Nequity =
ei
ei + ej
pi
Nlibertarian =
φiei
φiei + φjej
pi.
(5.1)
Moreover, decisions are usually a balance between norm adherence and in-
dividual interests, meaning that normative expectations are often undercut. We
formally account for that observation by introducing a global “norm-adherence
term” δ, describing how much the average offer falls below the respective fair-
ness norm.6 Finally, decisions are often prone to little errors, which we capture
by an error term i ∼ N(0, σ2).
The desired share of the pie x˜ is a function of the player’s norm, her adher-
ence to the norm and a random error term:
5 See McLachlan and Peel (2000) for an introduction and a survey of the development of mixture
models, and Aitkin and Rubin (1985) for an application to hypothesis testing.
6 Conte and Moffatt (2010) call it the “ selfishness premium”.
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(x˜|Nequality, δ, σ) = pi
2
+ δ + ,
(x˜|Nequity, δ, σ) = ei
ei + ej
pi + δ + ,
(x˜|Nlibertarian, δ, σ) = fiei
fiei + fjej
pi + δ + .
(5.2)
As a matter of fact, our experimental design does not allow us to discrimi-
nate between all types in every treatment. Consequently, we can only estimate
the share of those types we can clearly identify in a given treatment, resulting
in different models for different treatments. From the different utility functions
introduced above, we can construct the following models, where the likelihood
contribution of a single decision xi is given by:
L(λequality, λequity, δ, σ|X) =
g=equity∑
j=equality
λj
1
σ
φ
(
(pi − xi)−Ni − δ
σ
)
(5.3)
for the E- treatment with the two distinguishable types equity and equality,
and
L(λequality, λequity, λlibertarian, δ, σ|X) =
g=libertarian∑
j=equality
λj
1
σ
φ
(
(pi − xi)−Ni − δ
σ
)
(5.4)
for the F-treatment, where we can identify the three types equality, equity
and libertarians.
Given our experimental data matrix X , we can maximize the likelihood of
the functions 5.3 and 5.4 and jointly obtain estimates for the population shares
λequality, λequity (and λlibertarian in the F-treatment), as well es the norm-adherence
δ and the variance of the errors σ.7
Figure 5.5 displays the offers and thresholds in the C treatment and further-
more the estimated mixing proportions of normative types λj in the other two
treatments. In the C-treatment, we can observe a convergence towards the equal
split, both in offers and even more pronounced in acceptance thresholds. In the
7 Non-convergence is a common problem for the estimation of mixture models with a numeric
maximum-likelihood procedure if the proportion of one or more types in the population is
small (i.e. ∃Λi : Λi → 0). This is the case for the offers in period 9 and the acceptance thresh-
olds in period 6 and 10 in treatment F (see the right side of figure 5.5). In this case, we restrict
Λlibertarian to 0 and estimate equation 5.3 instead of equation 5.4. This is reflected in Figure 5.5
by disconnected symbols at the respective periods.
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Fig. 5.5. Distribution of different types of proposer decisions (top) and responder deci-
sions (bottom) as estimated in model 5.3 and 5.4. The horizontal axis denotes the 10
repetions of the bargaining game, the vertical axes the relative share of types in the
population. Types in the C-treatment are not estimated but decisions are represented
by box plots (outliers omitted). The model assumes two types in the E-treatment (equity
and equality), and three types in the F-treatment (equity, equality and libertarian). In the
treatments C, behavior converges towards the equal split. In the E-treatment, there is co-
existence of equity and equality norms. In the F-treatment, the equality norm becomes
increasingly prominent over time and the libertarian norm vanishes.
E-treatment, the equity and the equality norm co-exist throughout the whole
experiment.8 In the E-treatment, both norms for offer behavior co-exist without
convergence over time. For acceptance thresholds, there is also co-existence of
both norms. In the F-treatment, the complex situation leads to the emergence
of a simple equality norm, as stated by hypothesis 10. Though already preva-
lent in the beginning, the estimated share of equality offers approaches roughly
80 % in the end. The same is true for acceptance thresholds: The equality line is
8 Note that the share of “equity-offers” is sometimes as high as 76 % (period 1), or as low as
23 % (period 2).
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above the equity line most of the time. Furthermore, it is constantly increasing
from period four onwards.
To connect the two analyses in figures 5.4 and 5.5, we estimate the probabil-
ity of severe conflict in a logit model. It follows from our theory that the conver-
gence towards a single norm (as observed in treatments C and F, see figure 5.5)
reduces the probability that the complete pie is lost after ongoing, persistent
conflict. Although the number of these “worst-case” outcomes is small com-
pared to the overall number of interactions, a respective random intercept logit
model can still be estimated. This model adjusts for correlated errors within
individuals and matching groups. In addition, we correct for the fact that one
interaction consists of one interaction among two players, which means that our
sample size is half compared to an individual-level analysis.
no solution
fixed effects (1) (2)
constant -5.686∗∗∗ -5.573∗∗∗
(-6.67) (-5.65)
E-treatment 2.016∗ 1.799+
(2.48) (1.70)
F-treatment -0.168 -0.0510
(-0.16) (-0.04)
random effects
subject, j=94
var(intercept) 1.545∗∗∗ 1.135∗
(3.51) (2.24)
matching group, k=12
var(intercept) 0.960∗
(2.04)
Observations 940 940
t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0.10
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 5.3. Random effects logistic regression. The dependent variable represents
whether a bargaining couple did not find a solution in the bargaining process until the
end where all money was gone due to bargaining costs. Model (1) controls for subject
specific errors, model (2) additionally for group specific errors.
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The results show that there are no significant differences between treatment
C and treatment F, but the likelihood of severe conflict is significantly higher
in the E-treatment.9 This confirms the robustness of our mixture model: The
likelihood of conflict decreases if a population converges towards a norm. This
means that the collective convergence to a shared norm reduces the costs of nor-
mative conflict. Such convergence can be easier achieved in simple or complex
situations and is more difficult for moderately complex situations.
5.5 Discussion and open questions
We have outlined a new theory of norm emergence. Our perspective draws on
the idea that the content of norms is negotiated in social interactions. If actors
base their behavior on different normative premisses, their interactions can gen-
erate serious transaction failures, which we refer to as normative conflict. Once
an interaction does not work as expected and conflict emerges, “the right course
of action” has to be negotiated in a dynamical process. Our theory introduces
macro-level variables, like the complexity of a situation, in order to predict the
content of the emerging norm. Therefore, our theory opens the black box of
“path dependence”, a term often referred to in the theoretical debate about the
emergence of norms.
The concept of bargaining is essential in our theory of norm emergence. Our
theory bridges bargaining concepts in economics and sociology. In economics,
bargaining is a rigorous and therefore rather narrow concept which can be rep-
resented in simple formal models (Nash 1950, Rubinstein 1982). In sociology,
the concept of bargaining is applied to a much greater variety of social phe-
nomena, for instance, to the meaning of certain words (i.e. sociolects), rules of
proper behavior or dress codes. Our general idea of norm emergence certainly
refers to the broader sociological concept. Our theory can be generalized to a
whole range of areas such as how we dress, talk, eat or even die. In order to test
our hypotheses, however, we have to operationalize our theory into a tractable
model of normative conflict. Therefore, we chose a specific formal bargaining
model which can be experimentally tested.
The experimental results give a first corroboration of our proposed theory of
norm emergence. Under the structural conditions of either simple or complex
situations, the population converges towards a simple, widely shared norm. In
9 Note that the estimate of the E-treatment is significantly different from zero if we estimate
a two-level model and only control for dependence of errors on the subject level. It is only
marginally different from zero if we additionally control for the dependence of errors on the
matching group level.
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contrast, in moderately complex situations, convergence is unlikely and sev-
eral equally reasonable and prominent norms co-exist. The robustness of our
findings should be further tested in the the lab and in the field: Which norms
emerge, if the information about individual claims is unreliable or fuzzy? Does
this change the bargaining process and if so, how? Our theory could be applied
to very different kinds of norms and tested with a number of different research
designs, which could substantiate our general theory.
Summary 
Chapter six
I shall come back to the four questions I raised in the introduction to summa-
rize the answers in more general terms than I already did in the summaries and
discussions at the end of each chapter. While I found some interesting answers
to those questions, also new ones were raised along the way. Though yet unan-
swered, I will discuss these newly raised issues that still have to be dealt with.
How do fairness norms affect the emergence of different
cooperation norms?
I introduced the topic of normative conflict in terms of a cooperation problem,
which could potentially be solved by social norms. Many of the “usual sus-
pects” that threaten cooperation went along with this problem: Complexity of
the environment, uncertainty about the future, narrow individual self-interest.
What really threatened the emergence of norms, however, was less the question
whether to cooperate at all, but rather the disagreement about how to cooper-
ate. In this study, I confronted my participants with a simple cooperation game
in which they had to coordinate on one or the other action in order to increase
the gains of cooperation. There was, however, a serious obstacle to cooperation:
Coordinating on one solution was more profitable than not coordinating, even
efficient. It was, however, unfair as one person was always better off than the
other. These pay-off asymmetries opened the door for a number of different
cooperation norms.
I was able to show that sustainable cooperation could emerge, but in order
to predict the distinct emerging cooperation norms, one has to learn more about
the actors’ fairness norms. Knowledge about game theory helps to say something
about the fundamental effects of opportunity costs or the uncertainty about the
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future. Yet, the particular emerging norm could only poorly be predicted by sim-
ple game theory. Some cooperation norms appeared unacceptable to some due
to the associated highly unequal outcomes. We should widen our scope and in-
vestigate the interaction between different kinds of norms, rather than following
the well-trodden, yet isolated trails.
The existing more sophisticated game theoretical work, which could be eas-
ily adapted to move into this direction, should not stay unmentioned. As others
have pointed out elsewhere, norm emergence could be regarded as an equilib-
rium selection process (Binmore and Samuelson 1994, Gintis 2005). Yet, most
equilibrium selection models I am aware of restrict themselves to quite narrow
criteria such as risk dominance or payoff dominance. Seeing the issue from a
social norms perspective could bring about a norm-based equilibrium selection
theory as a promising candidate in the arena.
How can we measure social norms of fairness?
Given these results, the reliable measurement of social norms plays a pivotal
role for future research. I have discussed the distinct strengths and weaknesses
of existing measures at length in different sections of this book, and when look-
ing for an appropriate measure of fairness norms, I came to the conclusion
that experimental economics and empirical sociology should join forces and
apply the strategy method to elicit social norms. Just like the factorial survey,
well known to sociologists, the strategy method allows the participants to con-
dition their behavior on actions of others. And just as “normal” experiments,
well known to economists, the strategy method is about real actions with real
consequences rather than fictional decisions. Why is this important for the mea-
surement of social norms?
First of all, similar actions may be influenced by completely different norms.
The possibility to condition onto different actions of others thus enables us to
learn more about human behavior in counterfactual situations. Secondly, nor-
mative behavior often has to adhere to the higher order norm of consistency (El-
ster 1989). Consequently, the response to a whole set closely related questions
strictly speaking elicits one decision, just as the ordinary experiment does. Un-
der the strategy method this decision is, however, very different from that taken
in classic games. The latter is a decision about how much to offer or whether to
cooperate or not. The strategy method decision, on the other hand, is a decision
about a normative principle: How should situations like this be handled? Ev-
ery single entry in the strategy method experiment is just a function of this one
normative decision.
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It should be clear that the reliability of this measure will have to be evaluated
against other measures. Do people react to this measure in a similar way at two
different points in time? How much does the measure tell us about their behav-
ior outside the lab, and how much about people’s ideals? In order to make the
strategy an accepted measure for a wider audience of practitioners, the results
have to be cross-validated with survey data, other experimental measures, and
field data.
How can we model and elicit normative conflict?
The core of the theory of normative conflicts can be found in chapter 3.7 ,
which proposes a model of normative conflicts and introduces an experiment
for its empirical investigation. It outlines a new theoretical perspective on social
norms, in which conflict is considered as an inherent component to them. The
heterogeneity of norms is a potential source of conflict, counteracting the widely
discussed capability of norms to promote cooperation. The model proposed in
this chapter is at its core a game theoretical one, but it has some “fixes” to factor
in different normative beliefs. This simple model is able to produce some very
interesting hypotheses about the emergence of normative conflict.
Yet, it is a static deterministic model with common knowledge of all the
individuals’ characteristics. An extension of this model should certainly relax
the assumption of shared knowledge about individual types and should instead
introduce idiosyncratic beliefs about the distribution of types in the population.
In a later step, it could be explored how the model evolves if one relaxes the
assumption of rational maximization.
In the second part of the chapter, I reported the results of a simple experi-
ment: The experimental subjects earned money in a time-consuming task with
comparably high opportunity costs. Later the participants of the experiment
bargained over this money in a strategy method ultimatum game as intro-
duced in the previous chapter. One major empirical finding of this chapter is
certainly the widespread heterogeneity of fairness norms for exactly the same
situation. Substantial fractions of the experimental subjects have completely dif-
ferent ideas about what should be the appropriate course of action.
I was surprised, however, by the huge extent of normative conflicts in these
experiments. Though I expected some heterogeneity, I wouldn’t have expected
that conflict rates of up to 50 % could be traced back to normative conflict. A sec-
ond noteworthy dimension if normative conflict should be taken into account.
Two persons may have similar ideas about an underlying normative principle,
but disagree about the extent to which this principle should be fulfilled. What is
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considered completely sufficient by one person may be simply not enough for
the other. The normative conflict sparks off from differing interpretations about
how strong the norms should restrict the self-interest. This notion of normative
conflict is closer to the common interpretation of norm breaking behavior as a
conflict between social demands and individual desires. It seems, though, that
this problem is less prominent: " In only some 30% of the cases where both play-
ers agreed on the same normative principle, the transaction would fail due to
one person letting down the other’s expectations.
How do norms evolve through normative conflict?
So far, I have considered fairness norms as exogenous super-individual restric-
tions. The last chapter broke with this assumption and outlined a new theory of
norm emergence. This perspective built on the idea that the content of norms is
negotiated in social interactions. If actors base their behavior on different nor-
mative premisses, their interactions can generate serious transaction failures,
which I referred to as normative conflict. Once an interaction does not work as
expected and conflict emerges, “the right course of action” has to be negotiated
in a dynamic process.
The last chapter’s first important result is the theoretical idea that social
norms manifest in interaction, but they can also change and adopt each time
their validity is challenged. They do transcend the individual as social forces,
exist as shared ideals, but only the actions and beliefs of individuals create,
change, and bury them. In this interpretation, they create a negotiated order, a
term coined by the interactionists’ organizational sociology (Strauss 1993).
Another interesting finding here is the importance of structure for the emer-
gence of norms. Structure is usually seen as relatively stable, such as organi-
zations or institutions. The concept of structure can also be translated into the
experimental jargon as the rules of the games, including the provision of infor-
mation. The experimental results suggest a close, inverse u-shaped relationship
between the complexity of structure, i.e. the degree and sources of social strati-
fication, and the complexity of specific social norms. Or put differently: Simple
situations call for simple solutions, complex situations for complex solutions,
but very complex situations are solved by relatively easy norms.
Of course, the robustness of these findings should be further tested in the
the lab and in the field: What kind of norms emerge where information is un-
reliable or fuzzy? Does this change the bargaining process and if so, how? On
a theoretical basis, the aggregation process from individual actions to widely
shared beliefs could certainly be investigated more carefully. But it has been
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noted elsewhere that the lack of explicit aggregation models is one of the loose
ends in macro-micro-macro based explanations in sociological thought (Hed-
ström and Bearman 2009).
With some questions answered, yet many more left open, it remains to repeat
an intelligent person’s saying: “As the circle of light increases, so too, does the
circumference of darkness.”
Appendix
Appendix A
Proofs and instructions for chapter 2
1.1 Proof of lemma 2.1
Lemma 2.1. (Equilibria in PD (Axelrod 1984))
Mutual cooperation is a Nash equilibrium in the iterated PD for a pair of GRIM strate-
gies and a discount parameter δ if
δ >
T −R
T − P
Proof. The proof has to show that the gains from mutual cooperation outweigh
the gains from one-sided defection followed by eternal defection of the other
player. Mutual cooperation returns R for all periods, whereas unilateral defec-
tion yields T > R for one period and due to GRIM only P < R for the sub-
sequent ones. However, future periods are discounted by δ. Hence, we have to
investigate for which δ the following inequality holds:
R + δR + δ2R + . . . ≥ T + δP + δ2P + . . .
R
1− δ > T +
δP
1− δ
Some straightforward computation gives the critical value of
δ >
T −R
T − P ,
for which both players in the PD have no incentive to deviate from C. Con-
sequently, cooperation is an equilibrium in the infinitely repeated PD for suffi-
ciently large δ.
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1.2 Proof of lemma 2.2
Lemma 2.2. (Equilibria in BOPD)
Let pii(ε) be player i’s expected pay-off from some combination ε of moves in at least one
instance of a super-game of BOPD games. Then ε is a Nash equilibrium in the iterated
BOPD for a pair of GRIM* strategies if
∀i : δ > T − pii
T − P .
Proof. The proof is equivalent to the case of the prisoner’s dilemma. Let pil(ε)
be the the worse-off player’s and pih(ε) the the better-off player’s expected per
period outcome from some cooperative pattern in BOPD, with T > pih(ε) ≥
pil(ε)) > P . We take the minimum of pii(ε), as the worse-off player has to be
better of when adhering to the cooperative equilibrium than switching to de-
fection. Deviating from ε would yield (at best) T for one period, followed by P
for the rest of the game such that the expected return is given by
Ui(ALL-D|GRIM∗) = T + δP
1− δ ,
whereas adhering to ε would yield
(Ui(ε|GRIM∗) = pil(ε))
1− δ .
The pay-off relation
Ui(ε|GRIM∗) > Ui(ALL-D|GRIM∗)
holds for the worse-off player if and only if
pil(ε)
1− δ > T +
δP
1− δ
δ >
T − (pil(ε))
T − P .
Since pih(ε) ≥ pil(ε), neither of the players can gain by deviating from ε if δ is
sufficiently large. Hence, ε is an equilibrium in BOPD.
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1.3 Instructions chapter 2
We only included the instructions for the symmetric case of the PD [and the
BOPD in brackets] with a long shadow of the future [and a short shadow of
the future in brackets]. The asymmetric instructions were designed such that
the most preferred cooperative cell was in the top-left cell. See table A.1 for an
example. The numbers in the instructions were adopted accordingly. All figures
were originally bigger in size.
for the better-off player for the worse-off player
Col
Row C1 C2 D
C1
50
90
40
50
100
0
C2
40
50
80
60
100
0
D
0
100
0
100
30
30
Col
Row C1 C2 D
C1
60
80
40
50
100
0
C2
40
50
90
50
100
0
D
0
100
0
100
30
30
Table A.1. Asymmetric BOPD as presented to the experimental subjects.
Instructions (originally in German)
Welcome and thank you for your participation in this experiment!
Please read these instructions carefully. You will receive a show-up fee for
your arrival on time of e2.50. In the following experiment you will earn ad-
ditional money, depending on your decisions and the decisions of other par-
ticipants. During the course of the experiment, all amounts are stated in ECU
(experimental currency units). At the end of the experiment, all earned ECU
will be converted and paid in cash using the following exchange rate:
50 ECU = 1e
From now on, please do not talk to your neighbors, switch of your cell
phone, and remove unnecessary things from your desk. It is important that you
follow those rules – otherwise we have to exclude you from the experiment and
1.3 Instructions chapter 2 115
any compensation. In case you have a question, please raise your hand and we
will answer your question personally.
The following experiment will consist of two phases, and a questionnaire
at the end of the experiment. At the beginning of each run in Phase 1, you are
randomly matched with a person with whom you have interacted yet. You will
then interact repeatedly with this person in each phase.
Phase 1
In phase 1 you will play the same kind of game with four different people.
Each run of a game can have many different rounds. At the end of each run of
Game 1 will be assigned to another person with whom you have not played
before.
Game 1
In each run, you will interact with a person in a game. You repeatedly be
asked to decide between two options A and B [three Options A,B, and C]. How
many ECU you get for your choice depends on your own as well as on the other
person’s decisions. You will both make the same decision simultaneously and
without knowing what the other person will choose.
Table 1 shows you how many points you and the other person will receive.
The bold number indicates your pay-off, the number in italics indicates the
other person’s pay-off. The intersection of a row and column are the payoff
for the chosen option. If you for example select row A, and the other person
chooses column B [C], you will get 0, and the other person will get 100.
Col
Row C D
C
40
40
100
0
D
0
100
30
30
Table 1: Your Pay-off: bold on position 1, other person’s pay-off: italic on position 2. The
intersection of a row and column display the payoff for the chosen options. . If you for
example select row A, and the other person chooses column B [C], you will get 0, and the
other person will get 100
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your
choice
other
per-
son’s
choice
you re-
ceive
other
person
receives
A A 40 40
B 0 100
B A 100 0
B 30 30
Table 2:Your pay-off and the other person’s pay-off in a well-arranged form.
You have two [three] options: A and B [A,B, and C]
If both of you choose option A, you will receive ECU 40 [80] and the other
person receives 40 [60] ECU. If you choose option A, and the other person
chooses Option B [C, you will receive 0 ECU and the other person receives 100
ECU. If both of you choose option B, both of you will receive 30 ECU.
Table 2 shows the pay-offs in a well-arranged form.
Figure 1 shows the decision-screen on which you will later make the deci-
sions. Simply click on one of the blue boxes A or B [A,B, or C] and confirm with
the continue-button. The table below shows the history of decisions taken by
you and the other person up to this round.
Decision screen Phase 1
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How often you will play this game with the same person?
Within a run, you will be playing this game for an indefinite number of
rounds with the same person. A random mechanism in the computer will de-
cide whether the game will continue or not.
When does a game end?
After each round, the computer draws a random number between 1 and 100.
If this number is below 90 [70], you will play another round in which you can
earn ECU. If the number is at 90 or above, the game will end and the so-far re-
ceived earnings will be credited to your account.
You will reach the next round with a probability of 90% [70%], the respective
round after the next round with a probability of 90%×90%=81% [70%×70%=49%],
the round after the next round with a probability of 90%×90%×90%=73%
[70%×70%×70%=34%], etc. Figure 2 shows how likely it is to play another 5
rounds, another 10,20,50 rounds. Please remember that these probabilities do
not change. It is as likely to play another 5 rounds in Round 2 as it is in the 20th
round
0 .
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0 .
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this 20 40 60
Fig. A.1. Probability of playing future rounds
A game can be stopped by the experimenter when a maximum time is ex-
ceeded.
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After each decision, we will inform you of your respective choices, the re-
spective payments and account balances for this game.
An example
Round 1:
You choose A
The other person chooses B [C]
You receive 0, the other person receives 100
Random number: 66, the game continues.
Round 2:
You choose B [C]
The other person chooses A
You will receive 100, the other person receives 0
Random number: 12, the game continues.
Round 3:
You choose B [C]
The other person chooses A
You will receive 100, the other person receives 0
Random number: 21, the game continues.
Round 4:
You choose A
The other person chooses A
You receive 40 [80], the other person receives 40 [60]
Random number: 92, the game ends.
Your pay-off: 0 +100 +100 +50 = 250 ECU
Other person’s pay-off: 100 +0 +0 +40 = 140 ECU
Additional repetitions of the game
After one repetition with the same partner has ended, you will be matched
to another person with whom you have not played yet. You will play Game 1
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four times for different numbers of rounds with four different people.
Phase 2
At the beginning of this phase, you will again be matched to another person
with whom you have interacted yet. You will then repeatedly be asked to split
ECU between you and this person.
You will see a slider on the screen as in Figure 3. Please move the slider po-
sition to the desired allocation. You will make fifteen of these decisions with
different amounts of ECU.
The person randomly assigned to you will make the same decisions.
After both of you have made your decisions, the computer will randomly
select either one of your decisions or a decision of the other person. The respec-
tive allocation will then be credited to your accounts.
Fig. A.2. Decision Phase 2 Screen
Questionnaire
After you have completed Phase 1 and Phase 2, you are kindly asked to fill
in a shourt questionnaire.
Pay-off
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After you finish all phases and you have filled out the questionnaire, the
computer will randomly select one run of Game 1 for payment. You will also
receive the chosen allocation from phase 2. All other runs from Phase 1 and the
remaining choices from Phase 2 will not be paid out.
Thank you for your patience and participation in this experiment!
Appendix B
Complete strategy profiles and instructions for chapter 3
2.1 Instructions chapter 3
2.1 .1 Instructions for the strategy method game
Instructions (originally in German)
Welcome
As a participant in the following experiment you can earn money.As a first
step, please answer some quiz questions that deal with the text youhave re-
ceived a week ago. The better you prepared the text, the more money you can
earn in this quiz. After the quiz you will make a number of decisions. You will
bargain over the money that you have earned the quiz. The result is your final
profit in this study.
Once all study participants have arrived, we will start the quiz.
When you are ready for the quiz, click OK.
[Quiz]
What will happen now?
You will play two games and fill out a questionnaire. The games determine
how much money you will take home.First you will read the rules of a game
and answer some control questions to make sure that you understand the rules.
Following this, you will play Game 1. Before you get told how much you have
earned in this game, you will read the rules and play Game 2. Only then will
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you learn about your total earnings. The last part of the experiment will be a
questionnaire.
What’s it about?
You will now play a game for two people. Your counterpart is in another
PC-pool and is connected to you via the computer network. Who will play with
you is determined randomly by the computer. Both of have earned money quiz.
Your money and your counterpart’s money is put into a pot. The game is about
how to split this pot.
How is the money divided?
In the following game, there are two roles. The proposer decides how to
split the pot. He sends an offer via the computer to the recipient. The proposer
may offer the recipient the whole pot, a part of the pot or nothing at all. The
receiver then decides whether he wants to accept that offer or to reject it. If the
receiver accepts, she will get the offered amount while the rest of the pot goes
to the proposer. If the receiver rejects, then both receive no money at all, and
the money earned in the quiz is lost. Neither you nor your counterpart knows
in which role you are. You and your counterpart will therefore make decisions
for both roles. Only after these decisions are submitted, the computer will de-
termine your roles.
You will play a variation of this simple game.As described, it is still not de-
cided what role you will have later. Please read the attached instructions care-
fully for both roles.
The proposer.
You and your counterpart will first make the decisions for the role of the
proposer. You know already how much you earned in the quiz. However, you
not yet know how much your counterpart earned in the quiz. He could have
earned anything between 0-20 Euro. The more your counterpart earned, the
larger the pot you are supposed to split. Since the "real" size of the pot is not
known to you, you will make a number of offers, one for the case that your
counterpart has earned 0 ehas earned a 1 e, etc. The offers can be submitted in
50 cent steps.All in all, you will make 21 decisions in the role of the proposer
about how much you offer to your counterpart. The 21 questions will have this
form:" You’ve earned X e.You jointly earned T e.If I’m in the role of proposer,I
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will make the following offer :___"Once you understand that part, then click
"Continue" and see how the screen is the decision for the proposer.
[screenshot proposer, see figure 3.2 on page 41]
The receiver.
After that, you and your counterpart will make the decisions for the role
of the receiver. Also in the role of the receiver you do not know how much
your counterpart has earned. You will make 21 decisions about how much your
counter part at least has to offer you in order for you to accept. The 21 questions
will have this form:"You’ve earned X e.You jointly earned T e.If I’m in the role
of the receiver,I will accept an offer ofat least: ___ "On the next screen you will
see how to specify the minimal amount you are willing to accept in the the role
of the recipient.
[screenshot respondersee figure 3.2 on page 41]
When is an offer accepted?
As described above, you do not know the size of the pot yet. Suppose, that
the pot is of size T (it is at least as much money in the pot as you earned, and a
maximum of your earnings + 20 efrom your counterpart). First you make your
decisions for all possible sizes of the pot for case that you are the proposer, and
then in for the case that you are in the role of the receiver. Only when you have
completed the lists, the computer will assign the roles.Suppose now that you
have earned 10 euro, and that your opponent has also earned10 e. Together,
you have therefore earned 20 euro. The computer will then consult the list of
the proposer to see how much of the proposer is offering, for the case that the
pot has size 20 e. Then the computer consults the list of the receiver to see how
little the receiver is willing to accept an offer if the pot is of size 20. The com-
puter then compares these two values. The offer is accepted, if the proposer’s
offer is at least as high as the value submitted by the receiver. Only when an
offer is accepted, both players get paid. When an offer is rejected, neither player
gets money.In the following examples, a large X is a large number, and a small
x for a small number (X> x, X = X).
Example 1:
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You were randomly assigned the role of the proposer.You made the follow-
ing decision for the case that you are the proposer:
"Together you have earned T eIf I’m in the role of the proposer, then I will
the make the following offer: x "
The other person, the receiver, made the following decision:
"Together you have earned T eIf I’m in the role of the receiver, then I will
accept an offer of at least: X "
In this case, your offer was not accepted because the offer x is below the
amount of X, you would at least have had to offer the receiver for the size of the
pot T.
Example 2:
You were randomly assigned the role of the receiver.You made the following
decision for the case that you are the receiver:
"Together you have earned T eIf I’m in the role of the receiver, then I will
the accept the following offer: x "
Your counterpart, the proposer, made the following decision:
"Together you have earned T e. If I’m in the role of the proposer, then I will
make the following offer: x "
In this case, you would have accepted your counterpart’s offer because the
amount x. is just as much as the amount x you where willing to accept for the
size of the pot T.
Summary of the rules.
1. You have completed the quiz and earned money.
2. This money and your opponent’s earnings are put into a pot.
3. Fill in the list for the proposer. You have to enter how much you would like
to offer for every possible size of the pot.
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4. Fill in the list for the receiver. You have to enter how little you are willing to
accept for every possible size of the pot in order to accept an offer.
5. The computer assigns the rolls.
6. The computer calculates the size of the pot.
7. The computer checks the proposer’s list for his offer for the actual size of the
pot
8. The computer checks the responder’s list to see how much the recipient at
least must be offered to accept an offer.
9. The computer compares these two values. If the proposer’s value is at least
as high as that of the recipient, the recipient gets the offered amount and the
proposers the rest of the pot. If the proposer’s value is below the receiver’s
value, both receive no money and the money from the quiz is lost.
10. The game is played only once.
Please make your decisions.
2.1 .2 Instructions for the response method game, proposer
Thank you for filling in the tables. Before you will learn about the outcome of
this game, you will play yet another game. Game 2 is a simple variant of game 1
The following game is independent of the previous game! If your offer has been
accepted from the previous game, then you get the money from the previous
game in any case.This game was already presented earlier. There are again two
roles, the role of the proposer and the role of the receiver. You will play in the
same role with the same counterpart. You are in the role of the
PROPOSER
This role has been assigned to you for both games. Both of you will receive
the same amount again you earned in the quiz. In game 2, you won’t fill out
any table, but make only a single decision instead. You will soon learn about
how much you and your counterpart earned in the quiz. You will then be asked
to make an offer how to allocate the amount T between you and your coun-
terpart. If you have submitted your offer, the receiver learns how much he has
earned and how much both of you have earned together. He will then be asked
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to decide on your offer. If he accepts the offer, he receives the amount you have
offered him. If he rejects, both of you will receive no money.
Example:
You made the following decision:
You earned t e.
Together you have earned T e.
I offer the recipient the following amount: x
Your counterpart, the receiver, made the following decision:
You earned b e.
Together you have earned T e.
The proposer has offered you the following amount: x
Do you accept this offer? yes
In this case the receiver would have accepted your offer. You would get T -
x e, the receiver would get x e.
2.1 .3 Instructions for the response method game, responder
Thank you for filling in the tables. Before you will learn about the outcome of
this game, you will play yet another game. Game 2 is a simple variant of game 1
The following game is independent of the previous game! If your offer has been
accepted from the previous game, then you get the money from the previous
game in any case.This game was already presented earlier. There are again two
roles, the role of the proposer and the role of the receiver. You will play in the
same role with the same counterpart. You are in the role of the
RECEIVER
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This role has been assigned to you for both games. Both of you will receive
the same amount again you earned in the quiz. In game 2, you won’t fill out
any table, but make only a single decision instead. You will soon learn about
how much you and your counterpart earned in the quiz. The receiver will then
be asked to make you an offer how to allocate the amount T between you and
himself. If the proposer has submitted his offer, you will learn how much he
has earned and how much both of you have earned together. You will then be
asked to decide on the proposer’s offer. If you accept the offer, you will receive
the amount you were offered by him. If you reject, both of you will receive no
money.
Example:
Your counterpart, the proposer, made the following decision:
You earned t e.
Together you have earned T e.
I offer the recipient the following amount: x
You made the following decision:
You earned b e.
Together you have earned T e.
The proposer has offered you the following amount: x
Do you accept this offer? yes
In this case you would have accepted the offer. You would get x e, the pro-
poser would get T - x e.
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Fig. B.1. Strategy profiles of all participants in the strategy game. The upper panel de-
picts the offers in the role of the proposer, the lower panel the acceptance threshold of
the same player in the role of the responder. The abscissa depicts the responder’s rel-
ative contribution to the cake, given by CRCR+CP , where Ci describes the individual gain
from the quiz and the index i the respective role (R=responder, P=proposer). The or-
dinate describes the proposer’s relative offer O to the responder, given by OCR+CP (a))
and the respective relative threshold T as a responder, given by TCR+CP . We can classify
the behavior according to equity and equality norms. Adherence to equity norms is re-
flected by a diagonal line from the lower left to the upper right, i.e. the offer/threshold is
strictly increasing in effort. Adherence to equality norms is reflected by a horizontal line,
i.e. offer/threshold is independent of the effort.
Appendix C
Proofs and classification algorithm for fairness types in
chapter 4
3.1 Proof of proposition 4.1
Suppose Np = Nr = 1/2 and x = Nr, which gives kr max[Nr − x, 0] = 0 for
the responder, meaning that the responder is not discounting her utility. Con-
sequently, her utility is non-negative for any x ≥ 0 so that she will accept. The
reverse is also true for the proposer: kp max[Np−(1−x), 0] is equal to zero so that
her overall utility of offering x = 1/2 is non-negative for non-negative pie-sizes
and greater than the utility of rejection for positive pie-sizes.
Assume now Np = Nr = 1/2 and x > Nr. Then kr max[Nr − x, 0] is equal
to zero and Ur = x − kr max[Nr − x, 0] is increasing with x and strictly positive
for positive pie-sizes, which leads to the responder’s acceptance. The proposer,
however, discounts her utility due to kp max[Np−(1−x), 0] > 0, so that the utility
is decreasing in x and becomes even lower than the utility of rejection if kp is
large enough. As we have shown, it is not necessary for the proposer to offer
x > 1/2, as x = 1/2 will be accepted and gives greater utility to the proposer
than offering x > 1/2. Consequently, the proposer will never offer x > Nr.
Finally, consider that Np = Nr = 1/2 and x < Nr. Then, the responder’s
discount term kr max[Nr − x, 0] > 0 can become greater than x for kr > 1,
which would lead to rejection, as Ur = x − kr max[Nr − x, 0] is lower than
the utility of rejection. Thus, the proposer would have to offer at least the re-
sponder’s threshold of t∗ = krNr/(1 + kr) ≤ Nr, which would be accepted. As
t∗ ≤ Nr = Np = 1/2, the proposer’s discount term −kp max[Np − (1 − t∗), 0] is
zero, which makes the proposer’s overall utility strictly positive. Hence, there
exists an optimal offer t∗ ≤ 1/2 which will be accepted by the responder.
The same argument holds for the case of equity norms given by Np =
ep, Nr = (1− ep).
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Thus, if the norm is shared and the responder’s commitment is known by
the proposer, she can always make an offer which is acceptable for both, so that
normative conflict due to different commitments is excluded. 
3.2 Proof of proposition 4.2
Recall, that a proposer offers x ≥ t∗ if Up,accept > Up,reject = 0.
We first analyze the case of a high-contributing equity proposer (ep > 1/2
and Np = ep with kp > 1) and a low-contributing equality responder (1 − ep <
1/2 and Nr = 1/2 with kr > 2(kp−1) ).
Case 1: According to his norm, the responder claims at least the threshold
t∗ = kr
2+2kr
≤ 1/2. The proposer only offers at least this threshold if the utility of
the proposer’s part of the pie is higher than her indifference point of a rejected
offer, which returns a utility of zero. We can plug the responder’s threshold into
the proposer’s utility function and by rearranging the formula we obtain the
critical threshold in relative effort θ, beyond which conflict is inevitable:
1− kr
2 + 2kr
− kp
(
ep −
(
1− kr
2 + 2kr
))
≥ 0
1
kp
− kr
2kp + 2kpkr
≥
(
ep +
kr
2 + 2kr
− 1
)
1
kp
− kr
2kp + 2kpkr
+
2kp + 2kpkr
2kp + 2kpkr
− kr
2 + 2kr
≥ ep
kpkr + 2kp + kr + 2
2kp + 2kpkr
≥ ep := θ
If the proposers effort ep > θ, the utility from offering t∗ is below zero (
which is the utility of rejection). Hence, it is in these cases a (degenerated) sub-
game perfect equilibrium to offer any x < t∗, leading to rejection.
We now treat the case of a low-contributing equality proposer (ep < 1/2 and
Np = 1/2 with kp > 1) and a high-contributing equity responder (1 − ep > 1/2
and Nr = 1− ep with kr > 2(kp−1) ).
Case 2: Now, the responder claims at least kr(1−ep)
1+kr
, which the proposer is only
willing to offer if the utility of the proposer’s part is higher than zero. Plugging
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the responder’s point of indifference into the proposers utility function yields
in this case a threshold θ of
1− kr(1− ep)
1 + kr
− kp
(
1/2− (1− krep
1 + kr
)
)
≥ 0
2 + 2krep − kpkr + kp + 2krkpep
2(1 + kr)
≥ 0
kpkr − kp − 2 ≤ ep(2kr + 2krkp)
kpkr − kp − 2
2kr + 2kpkr
≤ ep := θ
If the proposers effort ep < θ, the utility from offering t∗ is below zero ( which
is the utility of rejection). Hence, it is in these cases a (degenerated) subgame
perfect equilibrium to offer any x < t∗, leading to rejection.

3.3 Classification algorithm for fairness types
We have developed a sorting algorithm to assign each subject to a distinct strat-
egy type of equity, equality, egoist or cherry picker. At first, we estimated two
ordinary OLS regressions for each subject separately. The first univariate re-
gression estimated the effect of each additional unit of relative effort on the
proposer’s offer (slope) and an intercept which corresponds to the proposer’s
offer for the case that the responder contributed nothing (intercept). A sec-
ond, bivariate regression estimated the quadratic slope between effort and offer,
adding the responders squared effort as an independent variable (effort2).
A negative slope for effort2 characterizes cherry picker proposers, a positive
slope of effort2 cherry picker responders. Thus, all players can be categorized
by the values of their slope, intercept and effort2.
In the next step, we define critical values to assign the subjects to dis-
tinct types. We estimated Epanechnikov kernel densities for the distribution
of slope, intercept and effort2 among all subjects. The distribution of
slope and intercept is bimodal for responders and proposers. We define
the critical values as the minimum between the two local maxima. The shape of
the distributions and the critical values are given in figure C.1. For most of the
subjects, the additional quadratic term does not contribute explanatory power.
This means that most subjects do not abandon their normative expectations, if
stakes are raised. A straightforward method to choose the relevant critical value
is to separate at one standard deviation above zero for the responder and one
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Fig. C.1. Kernel density estimations and histograms of the distribution of the individual
regression parameters defining the critical values. The variables “slope” and “intercept”
are determined using OLS regressions on the individual level (the player) with offer or ac-
ceptance threshold as dependent variable and responders’ relative effort as independent
variable. The variable effort2 is determined using the same OLS regression and adding
the squared effort as independent variable. The critical values are given in brackets at
the minimum density between the maxima of the bimodal distribution of “slope” and “in-
tercept” and +1/-1 standard deviation for responder/proposer for effort2. The vertical lines
describe the respective critical values.
standard deviation below zero for the proposer. By this, we assign only those
subjects to the cherry picker type, who obviously play this strategy.
Consequently, subjects with the slope below the critical value and the
intercept above the critical value are called equality player. Those with the
slope and the intercept below the critical value are egoistic types. If a pro-
poser has a slope above the critical value and the player’s effort2 is above
the critical value, the player is referred to as equity type. We call proposers who
do not react on a squared effort (low slope of effort2) but show a strong reac-
tion on additional effort of the responder (high slope)"cherry pickers".
The definitions are the same for responders, but with two obvious minor
adjustments: We call those players equity, who are below the critical value of
effort2, while players above this critical value are called "cherry pickers".
Appendix D
Instructions chapter 5
[In brackets: C-treatment]
[Bold in brackets: E-treatment]
[Italics in brackets: F-treatment]
Instructions (originally in German)
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment!
Please read these instructions carefully. They are identical for all partici-
pants. For being in time you will receive a show-up fee of 2.50 e. During the ex-
periment you will have the opportunity to earn additional money. How much
depends on your decisions in the experiment, as well as on the decisions of
other participants and random moves. All amounts in the experiment will be
displayed in ECU (experimental currency units). All earned ECU will be ex-
changed into Euro at the end of the experiment and cashed out according to the
following exchange rate:
100 ECU = 1e
Please avoid talking to your neighbors from now on. Switch off your mobile
and remove all unneeded things from your desk. It is important that you act
according to these rules, as otherwise we will have to exclude you from the ex-
periment and therefore from any payment as well. In case of questions please
raise your hand and we will answer them individually.
The experiment consists of two phases.
Phase 1
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In the beginning of the experiment you will take part in a knowledge quiz
based on the text you have received previously via e-mail. Your outcome of the
quiz is partly determined by how well you prepared this text. The quiz lasts for
about 15 minutes. It is prohibited to use the text during the quiz, and you will
be excluded from the experiment if you do so.
[You will receive 10 ECU for every correctly answered question.]
[You will receive 100 ECU for every correctly answered question.]
[You will receive 50 ECU for every correctly answered question.]
After the quiz you will receive new instructions in the second phase. At the
end of the experiment you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire. Please an-
swer this questionnaire carefully.
Phase 2
Phase 2 consists of 10 periods. At the beginning of each period, groups
of two participants will be randomly matched. Thus, you will be randomly
grouped with another participant in this room. New groups are formed in each
period, which means that you will interact with a different participant in each
period. No participant will know at any time with whom he or she was matched
during the experiment.
Each period consists of several rounds. Since new groups are formed at the
beginning of each period, you will interact with the same participant for the
duration of each period. This means that you will remain in the same group in
all rounds of a given period.
After all groups have completed a given period, new groups are formed and
a new period begins. After all 10 periods have been completed, the computer
will randomly choose only one period for your payment. Your earnings in the
experiment will consist of the show-up fee (2.50 e) [plus your earnings in the
quiz] plus your earnings from the single period which was randomly chosen to
be payment-relevant.
In each period, you and the other person in your group will have a joint ac-
count. At the beginning of the period, [for each of you 1200 ECU will be trans-
ferred to the joint account.] [your and the other person’s complete earnings
from the quiz will be transferred to your joint account.] [your and the other
person’s complete earnings from the quiz will be transferred to your joint account. The
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computer will randomly determine whether you are a “type A” or a “type B” player. If
you are of type A, every ECU from your earnings in the quiz will be tripled, meaning
that for each ECU you earned, 3 ECU will be transferred to the joint account. If you are
of type B, your earning are counted only once, meaning that for each ECU you earned,
1 ECU will be transferred to the joint account. You will be informed about your type be-
fore you have to make decisions. You will keep your type until the complete experiment
ends.]
You and the other person in your group will decide how to split the [jointly
produced/ jointly produced] ECU on the account. You and the other person will
have to make two decisions. You will decide how much you want to offer to
the other person, and the other person will decide how much should be given
to you. Simultaneously, you will both demand a minimal acceptable amount.
This determines the minimum amount below which you reject an offer.
After you and the other person in your group submitted an offer and a mini-
mum acceptable amount, the computer randomly chooses one of the offers and
compares it to the other person’s minimum acceptable amount. This selected
proposal could be either your offer or the other person’s offer. The chances are
50/50 whether your or the other person’s offer will be selected.
After submitting your offer and minimum acceptable amount, you will be
informed about how much the other person offered, which offer was selected,
and whether the offer was accepted.
If the selected offer is at least as high as the other person’s minimum accept-
able amount, the other person receives the offer and the offering person receives
what is left on the joint account. If an offer is accepted, this period ends. In this
case, you will see a waiting screen until all groups have finished the period and
new groups are formed.
If the chosen offer is below the acceptance threshold, the offer is rejected and
you will return to the decision screen for a new round. In this case, the amount
on the joint account is reduced as described in the table below. You and the
other person in your group will make a new offer and state a new minimum ac-
ceptable amount in a similar way as in the previous round. Every time a chosen
offer is rejected, the amount on the account shrinks as described in the table
below. It will, however, never become negative.
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The amount on the account shrinks according to this table:
Number
of
rejec-
tions
cost of
this re-
jection
Overall
cost of
rejec-
tions
[Example:/Example:]
ECU on
the account
0 0 0 2400
1 1 1 2399
2 2 3 2397
3 4 7 2393
4 8 15 2385
5 16 31 2369
6 32 63 2337
7 64 127 2273
8 128 255 2145
9 256 511 1889
10 512 1023 1377
11 1024 2047 353
12 2048 4095 0 TASK ENDS
HERE
13 4096 8191 0
14 8192 16383 0
15 16384 32767 0
Once an offer is accepted and the computer chose it for implementation, the
period ends. The period will also end if there is no more ECU in the joint ac-
count.
Before the actual experiment begins, you will answer a few control questions
concerning the rules of the experiment. After that, there will be a practice round
so that you can familiarize yourself with the experiment. This practice round
will not be chosen for payment.
Here are two examples of possible courses of action in one group during one
period:
Example 1:
Round 1:
1. You and the other person have a joint amount of 2400 ECU on your account.
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Here is an example of what you will see on the decision screen
Here is an example of the information screen
2. You offer 2400 ECU and accept every offer of at least 2400.
3. The other player offers you 0 ECU and accepts every offer of at least 0 ECU.
4. Your offer is chosen.
5. Your offer is above the minimum offer the other person is willing to accept
(2400 = 0).
6. You receive 0 ECU, the other person receives 2400 ECU.
In example 1, the period ends in round 1.
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Example 2:
Round 1:
1. Both you and the other person have a joint amount of 2400 on your ac-
count.
2. You offer 0 ECU and accept every offer of at least 0.
3. The other player offers you 0 ECU and accepts every offer of at least 2400
ECU.
4. Your offer is chosen.
5. Your offer is below the minimum offer the other person is willing to accept
so that it is rejected (0 = 2400).
Round 2:
6. The amount on the account shrinks by 1 ECU (now 2399 ECU).
7. You offer 0 ECU and accept every offer of at least 1.
8. The other player offers you 0 ECU and accepts every offer of at least 2399
ECU.
9. The other person’s offer is chosen.
10. The other person’s offer is below your acceptance threshold and is re-
jected (0 = 1).
Round 3:
11. The amount on the account shrinks by 2 ECU (now 2397 ECU).
12. You offer 2398 ECU and accept every offer of at least 2397 ECU.
13. The other player offers you 0 ECU and accepts every offer of at least 0
ECU.
14. Your offer is chosen.
15. Your offer is above the acceptance threshold of the other person and is
accepted (2398 = 0).
16. You receive 0 ECU, the other person receives 2397 ECU.
In example 2, the period ends in round 3.
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